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WAI THROUGH K?N?WAI: 
WATER FOR HAWAI‘I’S STREAMS AND 
JUSTICE FOR HAWAIIAN COMMUNITIES 
D. KAPUA‘ALA SPROAT* 
I.  INTRODUCTION: WAI THROUGH K?N?WAI1 
Kaulana N? Wai ‘Eh?: “Famous are the Four Great Waters” of 
Waihe‘e River, and Waiehu, ‘?ao, and Waikap? Streams in the heart of 
Central Maui.2  Since time immemorial, K?naka Maoli (Native 
Hawaiians)3 revered the abundance of fresh water in Hawai‘i’s rivers 
 
* Assistant Professor, Ka Huli Ao Center for Excellence in Native Hawaiian Law, 
University of Hawai‘i at M?noa, William S. Richardson School of Law.  Mahalo piha to 
Kahik?kal? Hoe for his unwavering support and aloha, as well as assistance with translations 
and research.  Mahalo n?nui to Eric Yamamoto, Susan Serrano, Isaac Moriwake, and N? Wai 
‘Eh?’s water warriors for your invaluable inspiration and guidance.  Mahalo n? ho‘i to 
Natasha Baldauf, Teri Wright, Justin Levinson, and Dina Shek, for amazing support with 
research, editing, and much more.  Any errors are the author’s alone. 
1. Wai means “water” in the Hawaiian language.  MARY KAWENA PUKU‘I & SAMUEL 
H. ELBERT, HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY 377 (1986) [hereinafter HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY].  
K?n?wai refers to a “[l]aw, code, rule, statute, act, regulation, ordinance, decree, [or] edict.”  
Id. at 127.  For a detailed discussion of the relationship between fresh water and the law in 
Hawai‘i, see infra Part II.A. 
2. Kaulana N? Wai ‘Eh?, or “famous are the four great waters,” is a well-known saying 
about the N? Wai ‘Eh? region of Central Maui that encompasses Waikap?, ‘?ao, Waiehu, and 
Waihe‘e Streams and communities.  TY P. K?WIKA TENGAN, REPORT ON THE ARCHIVAL, 
HISTORICAL AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES OF N? WAI ‘EH?, WAILUKU DISTRICT, 
ISLAND OF MAUI 1–2 (2007) [hereinafter TENGAN REPORT] (explaining the historical 
significance of N? Wai ‘Eh?, including the saying “Kaulana N? Wai ‘Eh?”).  N? Wai ‘Eh? was 
and is historically and culturally significant due, in large part, to the abundance of fresh water 
flowing in its rivers and streams.  Id. at 1; see also E.S. CRAIGHILL HANDY & ELIZABETH 
GREEN HANDY WITH THE COLLABORATION OF MARY KAWENA PUKU‘I, NATIVE 
PLANTERS IN OLD HAWAI‘I: THEIR LIFE, LORE, & ENVIRONMENT 496?97 (1972) 
[hereinafter HANDY & HANDY]. 
3. K?naka Maoli or Maoli refers to the Indigenous population inhabiting Hawai‘i at the 
time of Western contact in the late 1700s.  HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 127 
(noting that K?naka Maoli historically referred to a “full-blooded Hawaiian person”).  In the 
context of this article, however, these terms refer to Indigenous Hawaiians without reference 
to blood quantum and may be used interchangeably with native Hawaiian, Native Hawaiian, 
or Hawaiian.  Some scholars use “native Hawaiian” to refer to individuals with 50% or more 
blood quantum and “Native Hawaiian” to refer to individuals with less than 50% blood 
quantum.  Native and Indigenous are also capitalized to acknowledge the unique legal and 
political status of these groups.  See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and 
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and streams, including N? Wai ‘Eh?, as a physical embodiment of 
K?neikawaiola, a gift from the gods that brought life to the earth.4  
Traditional songs about this area, such as “N? Wai Kaulana” by Alice 
Namakelua, beckon listeners to “e ‘ike i n? wai ‘eh? . . . ‘o n? wai 
kaulana ia a o ku‘u ‘?ina,” “behold the four great streams . . . which are 
the famous waters of my home.”5 
Today, N? Wai ‘Eh?’s legendary waters are a mere trickle of their 
former selves.  For the last 150 years, massive diversion systems have 
drained these streams almost completely dry to subsidize plantation 
agriculture—and sugar cane in particular—on Maui’s Central Plain, 
devastating the natural ecosystems and cultures that relied upon free-
flowing streams.6  Plantation agriculture’s wholesale appropriation and 
redirection of surface water in this region physically and spiritually 
disemboweled K?naka Maoli communities, whose Indigenous culture is 
heavily dependent on natural resources, including fresh water.7  These 
diversions thus imposed significant cultural harms, many of which 
remain unaddressed to this day.8 
As the heyday of plantation agriculture comes to a close, however, 
and all but one sugar plantation has left the islands, some on Maui have 
dared to dream of a different future.9  K?naka Maoli are banding 
 
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988). 
4. K?neikawaiola, or “K?ne of the life-giving waters,” refers to one of the four principal 
akua (gods or ancestors) in the Maoli pantheon who is associated with fresh water resources.  
See HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 63 (“Water, whether for irrigation, for drinking, or 
other domestic purposes, was something that ‘belonged’ to Kane-i-ka-wai-ola (Procreator-in-
the-water-of-life), and came through the meteorological agency of Lono-makua the Rain-
provider.”); HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 128. 
 
Fresh water as a life-giver was not to the Hawaiians merely a physical element; it 
had a spiritual connotation. . . .  [T]he ‘Water of Life of Kane’ is referred to over 
and over again.  Kane the word means ‘male’ and ‘husband’ was the embodiment of 
male procreative energy in fresh water, flowing on or under the earth in springs, in 
streams and rivers, and falling as rain (and also as sunshine), which gives life to 
plants. . . .  Regardless of all such distinctions, life-giving waters were sacred. 
HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 64. 
5. See N? Wai Kaulana, in ALICE NAMAKELUA & HEINZ-GUENTHER PINK, AUNTY 
ALICE NAMAKELUA’S LIFETIME HAWAIIAN COMPOSITIONS (1973); RICHARD HO‘OPI‘I, N? 
Wai Kaulana, on ULULANI (The Mountain Apple Co. 2003). 
6. TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 15?18. 
7. Id. 
8. See id. at 19. 
9. Andrew Gomes, Sugar Plantation Gets Reprieve, HONOLULU ADVERTISER 
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together with environmental groups and others to utilize existing legal 
tools to return diverted flows to their streams and communities of 
origin.10 
In June 2004, the K?naka Maoli group Hui o N? Wai ‘Eh? and Maui 
Tomorrow Foundation, Inc. (collectively, the “Hui”)11 partnered with 
the public interest litigation firm Earthjustice12 to petition Hawai‘i’s 
water commission13 to restore continuous mauka to makai flow to N? 
 
(Jan. 30, 2010), http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2010/Jan/30/bz/hawaii1300309.html 
(discussing the decline of plantation agriculture in Hawai‘i and community efforts to restore 
stream flow); Liza Simon, Streams of Controversy, KA WAI OLA, March 2010, at 10–11 
(detailing community efforts to restore stream flow in the wake of sugar plantation declines); 
see also Restore Stream Flow, EARTHJUSTICE, http://www.restorestreamflow.org (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2011) (disucssing more on community efforts to restore diverted stream flows on 
Maui). 
10. See, e.g., Petition to Amend the Interim Instream Flow Standards for Waihe‘e, North 
and South Waiehu, ‘?ao and Waikap? Streams and Their Tributaries at 5–7, In re Petition to 
Amend Interim Flow Standards (Haw. Water Comm’n June 25, 2004) [hereinafter Hui’s IIFS 
Petition], available at http://hawaii.gov/dlnr/cwrm/currentissues/iifsmaui2/General.pdf 
(detailing Petitioners’ interests in the restored resources of local streams and waters); Simon, 
supra note 9, at 11; DVD: Kaulana N? Wai ‘Eh?: Restoring Maui’s Famous Streams, 
EARTHJUSTICE, available at http://www.youtube.com/v/NZ2BmMcRBu0&hl=en_GB&fs=1& 
(detailing recent efforts to restore streams and communities in N? Wai ‘Eh?, Maui); E-mail 
from Tricia Kehaulani Watson, President, Honua Consulting, to author (Aug. 29, 2011, 11:34 
HAST) (on file with author) (sending the text of an article to the author written by Dr. 
Watson entitled It’s Time for Balance in N? Wai ‘Eh?, as published on the now-defunct 
HONOLULU ADVERTISER BLOG, Oct. 12, 2009). 
11. Letter from Isaac H. Moriwake et al., Attorneys, Earthjustice and Maui Tomorrow 
Foundation, Inc., to Laura Thielen, Chairperson, Commission on Water and Resource 
Management (June 26, 2009), available at http://hawaii.gov/dlnr/cwrm/swma/swupobjections/2
0090626HuioNaWaiEha.PDF.  Hui o N? Wai ‘Eh? is a K?naka Maoli name that means group 
or supporters of N? Wai ‘Eh?, or the Four Great Waters.  It is a largely Native, community-
based organization established to promote the conservation and management of Hawai‘i’s 
natural resources and cultural practices that depend on them.  See id.  Maui Tomorrow 
Foundation is a community-based organization.  See generally MAUI TOMORROW 
FOUNDATION, http://maui-tomorrow.org/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).  It is dedicated to 
sustainable planning, responsible resource management, and preserving the opportunity for 
rural lifestyles on Maui.  Id.   
12. Earthjustice is the nation’s leading non-profit environmental law firm.  See 
Earthjustice, About Us, http://www.earthjustice.org/about (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).  The 
Mid-Pacific Office opened its Honolulu doors in 1988 and represents a range of 
environmental, K?naka Maoli, and other community organizations.  Earthjustice, Mid-
Pacific, http://www.earthjustice.org/about/offices/mid-pacific (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). 
13. The Commission on Water Resource Management, or water commission as it is 
more popularly known, is an administrative agency housed within Hawai‘i’s Department of 
Land and Natural Resources.  The water commission implements article XI, sections 1 and 7 
of Hawai‘i’s Constitution as well as Hawai‘i Revised Statutes chapter 174C and is responsible 
for managing and protecting Hawai‘i’s ground and surface water resources.  See HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 174C-5 (1993) (detailing the Commission’s general powers and duties); About Us: 
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Wai ‘Eh?’s streams and communities.14  Over seven years of still-
ongoing litigation ensued.  The Hui and its allies, including the Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs (OHA),15 detailed the water commission’s 
constitutional, statutory, and moral obligations to return flows sufficient 
to rebuild Native culture and practices, restore ecological balance, and 
improve social welfare conditions—all set within the broader context of 
the state’s commitment to reconciliation with and restorative justice for 
K?naka Maoli.16 
 
Law & Regulations, COMMISSION ON WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, 
http://hawaii.gov/dlnr/cwrm/aboutus_regulations.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) (detailing the 
origin of the water commission). 
14. Hui’s IIFS Petition, supra note 10, at 2.  “Mauka to makai flow” refers to continuous 
stream flow from the upper reaches of the mountains until that stream flows into the ocean.  
D. Kapua‘ala Sproat, Water, in THE VALUE OF HAWAI‘I: KNOWING THE PAST, SHAPING 
THE FUTURE 187, 188 (Craig Howes & Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo’ole Osorio eds., 2010) 
[hereinafter Sproat, Water]. 
15. The Office of Hawaiian Affairs, or OHA, is a state agency that was established as a 
result of Hawai‘i’s 1978 Constitutional Convention and is dedicated to the betterment of 
native Hawaiians and Hawaiians.  Establishment of OHA, OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, 
http://www.oha.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=21&Itemid=125 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2011).  Since its first trustees were sworn-in in 1980, OHA has grown 
significantly in size and scope and now manages almost 30,000 acres and $326.89 million in 
revenues from the “ceded” lands trust.  OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT 30, available at http://www.oha.org/pdf/OHA_Annual_Report_2010.pdf.  OHA is 
currently governed by nine trustees elected by the general populace.  Board of 
Trustees, OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.oha.org/index.php?option=com_conte
nt&task=section&id=6&Itemid=282 (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).  Four of the nine positions 
are at-large seats that represent the state as a whole.  Id.  The remaining five positions are 
representatives from geographic districts.  Id.  OHA’s mission is “[t]o m?lama (protect) 
Hawai‘i’s people and environmental resources and OHA’s assets, toward ensuring the 
perpetuation of the culture, the enhancement of lifestyle and the protection of entitlements of 
Native Hawaiians, while enabling the building of a strong and healthy Hawaiian people and 
nation, recognized nationally and internationally.”  OHA Vision and Mission, OFFICE OF 
HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.oha.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategor
y&id=23&Itemid=127 (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).  The Hawai‘i Constitution limited the right 
to vote for the nine OHA trustees to “qualified voters who are Hawaiians, as provided by 
law.”  HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 5.  The term “Hawaiian” as provided by statute means “any 
descendant of the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands which exercised 
sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, and which peoples thereafter have 
continued to reside in Hawai[‘]i.”  HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-2 (2009).  This limitation was 
challenged and set aside in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517, 524 (2000); see infra Part 
III.A.1.  For a more detailed review of the Rice case, see Eric Yamamoto & Catherine Betts, 
Disfiguring Civil Rights to Deny Indigenous Hawaiian Self-Determination: The Story of Rice 
v. Cayetano, in RACE LAW STORIES 541 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008). 
16. See HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (affirming the State’s “obligation to protect, control 
and regulate the use of Hawai[‘]i’s water resources for the benefit of its people”); id. art. XII, 
§ 7 (declaring that the “State reaffirms and shall protect all rights, customarily and 
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In particular, OHA and the Hui focused on the commission’s 
directive to “protect, enhance, and reestablish, where practicable, 
beneficial instream uses of water,” to give meaning to traditional and 
customary K?naka Maoli rights and environmental protection.17  More 
specifically, the groups relied upon constitutional and statutory 
provisions establishing the state’s duty to “reaffirm[] and . . . protect all 
rights, customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural 
and religious purposes and possessed by ahupua‘a tenants who are 
descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian Islands 
prior to 1778.”18  The Hawai‘i Water Code’s pledge that traditional and 
customary rights “shall not be abridged or denied by this chapter”19 also 
 
traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes and possessed by 
ahupua‘a tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian 
Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate such rights”); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 174C-101 (1993); Closing Brief of Hui o N? Wai ‘Eh? and Maui Tomorrow 
Foundation, Inc., ‘?ao Ground Water Management Area High-Level Source Water Use 
Permit Applications and Petition to Amend Interim Instream Flow Standards of Waihe’e, 
Waiehu, ‘?ao, & Waikap? Streams Contested Case Hearing (Contested Case Hearing), No. 
CCH-MA06-01 (Dec. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Hui’s Closing Brief]; Eric K. Yamamoto & Sara 
D. Ayabe, Courts in the “Age of Reconciliation”: Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. HCDCH, 33 
U. HAW. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 24–27) (on file with author) (describing 
the State’s commitment to reconciliation with and restorative justice for K?naka Maoli, 
rooted in the constitution, statutes, and court rulings to redress the harms to Maoli over the 
last century). 
17. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(4).  “Instream use” means “beneficial uses of stream 
water for significant purposes which are located in the stream and which are achieved by 
leaving the water in the stream.”  Id. § 174C-3.  Instream uses include, but are not limited to, 
 
(1) Maintenance of fish and wildlife habitats; (2) Outdoor recreational activities; 
(3) Maintenance of ecosystems such as estuaries, wetlands, and stream vegetation; 
(4) Aesthetic values such as waterfalls and scenic waterways; (5) Navigation; 
(6) Instream hydropower generation; (7) Maintenance of water quality; (8) The 
conveyance of irrigation and domestic water supplies to downstream points of 
diversion; and (9) The protection of traditional and customary Hawaiian rights. 
Id.  Maoli traditional and customary rights reliant upon fresh water resources include, but are 
not limited to, “the cultivation or propagation of taro on one’s own kuleana and the gathering 
of h[?]h[?]wai, [‘?]pae, [‘]o‘opu, limu, thatch, ti leaf, aho cord, and medicinal plants for 
subsistence, cultural, and religious purposes.”  Id. § 174C-101(c).  
18. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 7; see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 7-1 (2010); id. § 174C-101(c) 
(1993).  An “ahupua‘a” is a “land division usually extending from the uplands to the sea, so 
called because the boundary was marked by a heap (ahu) of stones surmounted by an image 
of a pig (pua‘a), or because a pig or other tribute was laid on the altar as tax to the chief.”  
HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 9. 
19. HAW REV. STAT. § 174C-101(c) (1993) (protecting and delineating some traditional 
and customary Maoli rights regarding fresh water resources); Yamamoto & Ayabe, supra 
note 16, at 16–17. 
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figured prominently in the case. 
Through protracted litigation, the Hui and its allies established that 
restoring water to each of N? Wai ‘Eh?’s streams and communities was 
not merely a constitutional and statutory mandate, but also a necessity 
in light of restorative justice principles.20  The hearings officer, in his 
April 2009 Proposed Decision and Order, agreed with the Hui and 
OHA that stream restoration was “critical to the perpetuation and 
practice of Hawaiian culture in N? Wai ‘Eh?.”21  He also relied upon the 
specific history of agricultural and spiritual practices in this area in 
rendering his proposed decision: “In particular, cold, free-flowing water 
is essential for kalo cultivation, which in turn is integral to the well-
being, sustenance, and cultural and religious practices of native 
Hawaiians and Hawaiians.”22  The hearings officer, the most 
experienced water commissioner and former director of the State 
Department of Health, understood that “[k]alo cultivation provides not 
only a source of food, but also spiritual sustenance, promotes 
community awareness and a connection to the land, and supports 
physical fitness and mental well-being.”23  With these and other findings 
and in light of the applicable legal language, the hearings officer’s 
Proposed Decision and Order recommended restoring about half the 
 
20. See, e.g., Hearings Officer’s Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Decision and Order at 11–12, Contested Case Hearing, No. CCH-MA06-01 (Apr. 9, 2009) 
[hereinafter Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O], available at http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrm
/currentissues/cchma0601/CCHMA0601-01.pdf; N? Wai ‘Eh?: Restoring Maui’s Famous 
Streams, supra note 10; Restore Stream Flow, supra note 9.  Restorative justice is grounded in 
notions of “social healing through justice.”  Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Reparations 
Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 41 (2007). 
21. Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 12. 
22. Id.; see also Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1332 n.2 (discussing the use of specific terms, 
such as “Black,” that can be used as proper nouns to refer to a heritage or cultural group and 
not just people of a particular skin pigmentation).  One K?naka Maoli creation story explains 
that Papa and W?kea, the Earthmother and Skyfather, came together and gave birth to most 
of the major Hawaiian Islands.  ROY K?KULU ALAMEIDA, STORIES OF OLD HAWAII 1 
(1997).  W?kea then had a child with Ho‘oh?k?kalani, but it was stillborn.  HANDY & 
HANDY, supra note 2, at 80.  Where they buried that child, a kalo plant grew.  Id.  The food 
that kalo produced became the staple for K?naka Maoli, providing both physical and spiritual 
sustenance.  Id.  W?kea and Ho‘oh?k?kalani’s second child was the first Native born in 
Hawai‘i.  Id. 
23. Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 12.  For background on the 
education and experience of the hearings officer, Dr. Miike, including information about his 
medical and law degrees, and scholarship regarding Hawai‘i water issues, see About the 
Author, in LAWRENCE MIIKE, WATER AND THE LAW IN HAWAI‘I (2004), and Dissenting 
Opinion of the Hearings Officer and Commissioner Lawrence H. Miike at 3–6, Contested 
Case Hearing, No. CCH-MA06-01 (June 10, 2010) [hereinafter Hearings Officer’s Dissent]. 
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diverted flows to N? Wai ‘Eh?’s four streams and communities.24 
Despite extensive findings regarding the negative impacts of over a 
century of stream diversions on Maoli culture and people and the 
importance of restoration, in June 2010, a majority of the water 
commission, while ostensibly applying the “law,” overturned the 
proposed decision, restoring only 12.5 million gallons per day (mgd) to 
two of N? Wai ‘Eh?’s four streams in its Final Decision and Order.25  
Rather than follow the hearings officer’s lead and consider the history of 
Indigenous practices unique to this area, in the face of intense political 
pressure, the commission majority employed a-contextual analysis to 
interpret the same laws and evidence but arrived at a drastically 
different outcome.26  That final decision undermined K?naka Maoli 
cultural survival, perpetuated the subjugation of ancestral rights and 
resources, and prolonged dismal social welfare conditions caused by the 
plantation’s misappropriation of free-flowing streams for over a 
century.27  The commission’s decision also subverted the value 
accommodation crafted by the laws’ framers as a reflection of the larger 
society’s balancing of the needs of the general populace, business 
interests, and K?naka Maoli. 
The majority’s ultimate decision was an apparent response to 
explicit lobbying by agribusiness.28  In this setting, comparing the 
proposed and final decisions provides valuable insight into the influence 
 
24. Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 187?89.  In his Proposed 
Decision and Order, the hearings officer recommended that the water commission amend the 
IIFSs above the uppermost diversions to restore a total of 34.5 mgd to N? Wai ‘Eh?’s streams 
and communities.  Id.  The hearings officer would have restored a minimum flow of 14 mgd to 
Waihe‘e, 2.2 mgd to North Waiehu and 1.3 mgd to South Waiehu, 13 mgd to ‘?ao, and a 
temporary release of 4 mgd to Waikap?.  Id.; Teresa Dawson, Hearing Officer Issues 
Recommendations for Na Wai ‘Eha Contested Case Hearing, ENVIRONMENT HAWAI‘I 
(Environment Hawaii, Hilo, Haw.), June 2009, at 2, available at 
http://hawaiis1000friends.org/nmwa/docs/maui_county/200906_EH_NaWaiEha.pdf. 
25. Compare Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 187–89, with 
Commission on Water Resource Management’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Decision and Order at 185–87, Contested Case Hearing, No. CCH-MA06-01 (June 10, 2010) 
[hereinafter Final D&O], available at http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrm/currentissues/cchma06
01/CCHMA0601-02.pdf.  The majority ordered 10 mgd for Waihe‘e River, 1.6 mgd for North 
Waiehu, and 0.9 mgd for South Waiehu.  Id. at 185?86.  The majority decided not to restore 
any water to ‘?ao or Waikap? Streams.  Id. at 186?87. 
26. See infra Part IV. 
27. See infra Part V. 
28. See Teresa Dawson, Parties Conclude Debate over Impacts of Stream Restoration in 
Central Maui, ENV’T HAWAI‘I (Environment Hawaii, Hilo, Haw.), Nov. 2009, at 3–4; see also 
infra Part V.B. 
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of politics on adjudicatory decision-making, especially in controversial 
and politically charged environmental cases like this one.29  Led by 
former Chair Laura Thielen, the water commission majority 
dramatically altered the hearings officer’s outcome and reinterpreted 
the law to favor agribusiness—particularly Hawaiian Commercial and 
Sugar Company (HC&S).30  A-contextual—that is, formalist31—analysis 
of relevant legal mandates, including how much water was necessary to 
return to the streams after “weigh[ing] the importance of the present or 
potential instream values with the importance of the present or potential 
uses of water for noninstream purposes”32 and determining what 
alternative water sources were “practicable”33 for offstream users like 
HC&S, enabled the majority to focus on present commercial uses and to 
largely ignore or dismiss crucial Maoli cultural and historical facets of 
the controversy.  It also allowed the majority to disregard the impacts of 
its decision on present-day Maoli efforts to reclaim land, resurrect 
culture, and restore natural resources essential to traditional practices, 
subverting a myriad of contextual factors that are embodied in Hawai‘i 
water law.  The commission majority, therefore, claimed that it 
“followed the mandates of the law as described in the Constitution, state 
 
29. For example, HC&S—one of the largest companies in Hawai‘i—uses the lion’s share 
of the diverted water and repeatedly threatened to close all operations if the Commission did 
not award it the bulk of the water it was taking.  See, e.g., Chris Hamilton, Na Wai Eha: 
HC&S Speaks, MAUI NEWS (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.mauinews.com/page/content.detail/id/
524576/Na-Wai-Eha—HC-S-speaks.html (explaining how HC&S workers and executives 
questioned the basis for the proposed decision). 
30. See, e.g., Teresa Dawson, Commission’s Order on Na Wai ‘Eha Baffles Its Most 
Experienced Member, ENVIRONMENT HAWAI‘I (Environment Hawai‘i, Hilo, Haw.), July 
2010, at 1, available at http://www.maui-tomorrow.org/pdf/EH_201007.pdf.  (“After all the 
evidence and expert testimony presented during the Na Wai ‘Eha contested-case hearings in 
2007 and 2008 on the minimum flows necessary to protect stream habitats and other instream 
values, which numbers did the state Commission on Water Resource Management finally go 
with?  The ones that were never intended to be used for that purpose . . . .”). 
31. See infra Part III.A.1; see also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST–
REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 2 (2009).  Legal formalism is a 
“theory of adjudication according to which ‘(1) the law is rationally determinate, and (2) 
judging is mechanical.  It follows, moreover, from (1), that (3) legal reasoning is autonomous, 
since the class of legal reasons suffices to justify a unique outcome; no recourse to non-legal 
reasons is demanded or required.’”  Id. (quoting Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, 
Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1145–46 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL 
POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998)).  
32. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(2)(D) (1993). 
33. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Wai?hole II), 93 P.3d 643, 661 (Haw. 2004); see 
also Final D&O, supra note 25, at 116. 
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statutes and the Hawai‘i Supreme Court decisions.”34  The majority also 
maintained that “[a]t the end of the deliberative process, 
[c]ommissioners reached agreement on instream flow standards which 
the majority felt represented the best balance of the [legally] mandated 
values and trust responsibilities”35 even though its decision disserved 
restorative justice principles and continued the subjugation of K?naka 
Maoli communities and culture. 
Contextual legal analysis, discussed below, tells a starkly different 
story about the commission’s final decision.  It reveals the impact of 
politics on “legal interpretation” and “fact finding” in controversial 
cases.  It demonstrates also that the majority’s ruling is impossible to 
reconcile with the underlying values of Hawai‘i’s Constitution and 
Water Code, which prioritize public trust purposes, including the 
protection and restoration of natural resources and Indigenous rights 
and practices.36  Contextual legal analysis starts with the premise 
(verified by socio-legal studies) that even though decision-makers may 
feel constrained to follow the legal rules to appear legitimate, they do 
not actually do so in a “neutral” or “objective” manner, especially in 
controversial cases.  Contextual analysis then focuses on the actual 
dynamics of decision-making, paying special attention to the value 
choices and interests implicated in adjudicatory decisions.  This analysis 
exposes a crucial tension in complex cases like N? Wai ‘Eh?: decisional 
outcomes according to legal language are not “objectively determined” 
but are instead a matter of value choices influenced by decision-makers’ 
 
34. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 191. 
35. Id. 
36. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-101(c) (1993) (“Traditional and customary rights 
of ahupua‘a tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian 
Islands prior to 1778 shall not be abridged or denied by this chapter.”); id. § 174C-63 
(“Appurtenant rights are preserved.  Nothing in this part shall be construed to deny the 
exercise of an appurtenant right by the holder thereof at any time.  A permit for water use 
based on an existing appurtenant right shall be issued upon application.”).  Appurtenant 
rights appertain or attach to parcels of land that were cultivated, usually in the traditional 
staple kalo, at the time of the M?hele when private property was instituted in Hawai‘i.  See 
Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57, 78 (Haw. 1982).  M?hele land awards to 
maka‘?inana (people of the land or “commoners”) are called kuleana (to have an interest).  
LILIKAL? KAME‘ELEIHIWA, NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES: PEHEA LA E PONO AI? 
HOW SHALL WE LIVE IN HARMONY? 295 (1992).  The Land Commission received claims 
from maka‘?inana over a period of several years prior to the 1848 M?hele.  Id.  Claimants did 
not have to pay a commutation fee (except for lots in Honolulu, L?hain?, and Hilo), but did 
have to pay for the survey of their kuleana lands.  Id.  At the end of the M?hele process, 
kuleana awards totaled 28,658 acres of land (less than one percent of the total acreage of land 
in Hawai‘i).  Id. 
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political and economic ideologies in construing legal terms, selecting 
“relevant” facts, and assessing impacts. 
Having lifted the veil of necessarily neutral legal decision-making, 
how can K?naka Maoli, the government, the courts, and the community 
at large realistically assess these Indigenous environmental justice37 
claims and the water commission’s adjudicatory ruling?  Might these 
assessments illuminate justice, or injustice, for Native Peoples generally?  
Most important, how might contextual legal analysis contribute to 
envisioning and realizing “justice through law,” particularly for 
Indigenous Peoples struggling to rebuild culture, spirituality, and some 
form of self-governance? 
By interrogating the water commission’s decision-making in N? Wai 
‘Eh?, this article offers a developing contextual legal framework 
applicable to Native Peoples’ claims and adjudicatory rulings.38  It does 
so not by conceptualizing the legal process as the inevitable march 
toward justice, but rather by acknowledging that law, as it intersects 
with politics, can be both subordinating and, at times, an opening toward 
restoration and self-determination.39 
Part II.A examines water’s cultural and historical significance in 
Hawai‘i nei (this beloved Hawai‘i) and how that was impacted by the 
rise of sugar plantations.  Part II.B delves into the role of abundant fresh 
water and mauka to makai flow in N? Wai ‘Eh?,40 and analyzes the sugar 
plantations’ negative impacts on Indigenous culture and identity, 
especially in the context of water appropriation. 
Part II.C reviews the legal regime for water resource management in 
Hawai‘i, which embodies contextual factors.  Although ultimately 
expressed in somewhat general terms, these values safeguard the public 
trust nature of Hawai‘i’s water resources while prioritizing certain 
purposes, including resource protection and Maoli rights and practices.  
These factors recognize and attempt to redress the harms of 
 
37. In the context of this Article, environmental justice means “fair treatment and 
meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with 
respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, 
regulations, and policies.”  Kristina G. Fisher, The Rhino in the Colonia: How Colonias 
Development Council v. Rhino Environmental Services, Inc. Set a Substantive State Standard 
for Environmental Justice, 39 ENVTL. L. 397, 422 (2009) (quoting N.M. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 20.9.2.7(E)(2)). 
38. See infra Part IV. 
39. See infra Part IV. 
40. See Sproat, Water, supra note 14, at 188 (defining mauka to makai flow). 
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colonization, and stream diversions in particular, on both K?naka Maoli 
and the community at large by mandating the protection and restoration 
of streams and the uses they support.  Part II.C also explains the process 
for establishing Interim Instream Flow Standards (IIFSs), the key legal 
tool employed by the Hui and its allies to restore N? Wai ‘Eh? streams 
and communities. 
Part III approaches Indigenous Peoples’ claims and relevant court 
rulings through different lenses including legal formalism, legal realism, 
critical legal analysis, and critical race theory. 
Part IV flows from legal realism’s critique of formalism and the 
insights of critical race theory, particularly its revelation regarding the 
indeterminacy of rules, with an acknowledgement of limitations.  Part 
IV describes a developing contextual legal framework for environmental 
justice claims that accounts for two adjudicatory realities: (1) decision-
makers feel constrained by concerns of legitimacy to try to follow legal 
rules; and (2) in controversial cases, decision-makers are also influenced 
by political ideology and economic interests in construing and applying 
the relevant legal language.  Contextual legal analysis brings to light 
these realities to make decision-making more compellingly reflect 
principles of equality and fairness within a larger framework of social 
justice.41 
This contextual legal analysis, while revealing, is itself incomplete for 
Indigenous Peoples, particularly where specific laws?such as Hawai‘i’s 
Water Code—accommodate their interests and values.  The analysis 
requires extension and refinement to more explicitly account for key 
aspects of Native Peoples’ struggles for self-determination through 
varying forms of environmental justice.42  Tailoring this framework 
entails attention to four realms: (1) cultural integrity; (2) lands and other 
natural resources; (3) social welfare and development; and (4) self-
government.  These realms provide a starting point for analysis by 
synthesizing international human rights notions of self-determination 
for formerly colonized peoples.43  The proffered analysis thus addresses 
 
41. See Courtenay W. Daum & Eric Ishiwata, From the Myth of Formal Equality to the 
Politics of Social Justice: Race and the Legal Attack on Native Entitlements, 44 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 843, 866–67 (2010) (defining social justice as “a strategic alternative to formal equality” 
that “allows for those communities that have been historically oppressed to place claims on 
the political and legal systems to overcome a legacy of discrimination and institutionalized 
racism”). 
42. See infra Parts IV.A–B. 
43. See infra Parts IV.C–D. 
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a wide range of legal controversies involving Native Peoples’ 
environmental values and claims 
Part V employs this analysis, revealing that the commission 
majority’s final decision in N? Wai ‘Eh?, while embracing formalist 
methodology, is not actually “grounded in the facts or law,” thereby 
undermining restorative justice for K?naka Maoli and larger community 
interests.  This contextual legal analysis also underscores the importance 
of an adjudicatory body giving full consideration to land, culture, social 
welfare, and self-governance in assessing Indigenous Peoples’ 
environmental claims to restorative justice—particularly claims rooted 
in legal directives to “reaffirm[] and . . . protect all rights, customarily 
and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious 
purposes.”44  At bottom, contextual legal analysis highlights the 
uncertain yet potentially potent opening for the legal process, when 
appropriately linked to political organizing and other change agents, to 
create opportunities for liberation and justice—first at the 
administrative adjudication level and later in courts of law.45  In doing 
so, the analysis brings an expanded kind of realism to issues of 
environmental justice for Indigenous Peoples. 
The water commission’s final ruling is already percolating up 
through the courts of appeal and is currently pending before the Hawai‘i 
Supreme Court.46  Prophesying how the high court will likely rule is 
risky business, particularly in light of the multifaceted nature of the 
evidence marshaled and the legal arguments advanced.  By specifically 
considering history and current socio-economic conditions in the context 
of cultural integrity, lands and other resources, social welfare, and self-
governance, contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims offers 
courts a compelling analytical method for assessing cases involving 
Native Peoples’ claims for justice.47  This framework also reveals the 
necessity of employing contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ 
 
44. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 7. 
45. See infra Part V. 
46. On July 12, 2010, the Hui and OHA appealed the water commission’s June 2010 
Final Decision and Order to Hawai‘i’s Intermediate Court of Appeals.  See Community 
Groups Appeal Na Wai Eha Ruling, MAUI NEWS (July 13, 2010), 
http://www.mauinews.com/page/content.detail/id/533350.html.  The appeal was recently 
transferred to the Hawai‘i Supreme Court, upon the Hui’s motion, where briefing is ongoing.  
See Order Accepting Application for Transfer, Appeal from the Commission on Water 
Resource Management, Contested Case Hearing, No. SCAP-3063 (Haw. June 23, 2011). 
47. See infra Part V. 
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claims because, as demonstrated here, even when the law itself 
embodies broader interests and values, formalist methodology can still 
be deployed to subvert both full and proper consideration of those 
interests and values and the possibility of “justice through law.” 
II.  HISTORICAL SETTING AND THE LITIGATION 
A.  Fresh Water’s Historical and Cultural Significance in Hawai‘i Nei 
Before Westerners stumbled onto Hawai‘i’s shores in the late 1700s, 
fresh water was a principal source of life in the islands.48  Streams and 
springs supplied drinking water for substantial populations of K?naka 
Maoli,49 sustained healthy ecosystems that linked mountain flows to 
nearshore marine waters, enabled abundant estuaries and fisheries in 
the streams and oceans, and supported Native agriculture and 
aquaculture, including lo‘i kalo—the wetland cultivation of kalo that 
was made into the Native staple poi—and loko i‘a—traditional 
fishponds.50  Ola i ka wai: fresh water was the source of all life for 
 
48. D. Kapua‘ala Sproat, From Wai to K?n?wai: Water Law in Hawai‘i, in NATIVE 
HAWAIIAN LAW: SECOND EDITION OF THE NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK 9-1, 9-
3 (MacKenzie, Serrano, & Sproat eds., 2d ed. forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Sproat, From 
Wai to K?n?wai]; see also HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 64 (detailing the importance of 
fresh water to the Native Hawaiian people); Emma Metcalf Nakuina, Ancient Hawaiian 
Water Rights: And Some of the Customs Pertaining to Them, in HAWAIIAN ALMANAC & 
ANNUAL FOR 1894, at 79, 79–84 (Thomas G. Thrum ed., 1893) (describing K?naka Maoli 
customs associated with fresh water).  For an analysis of the arrival of Westerners in Hawai‘i 
and resulting impacts, see KAME‘ELEIHIWA, supra note 36, at 67. 
49. See generally DAVID E. STANNARD, BEFORE THE HORROR: THE POPULATION OF 
HAWAI‘I ON THE EVE OF WESTERN CONTACT 78–80 (1989) (providing detailed population 
estimates of K?naka Maoli at the time of Western contact); KAME‘ELEIHIWA, supra note 36, 
at 81 (explaining that Stannard’s conservative methodologies underestimate the number of 
people inhabiting Hawai‘i at the time of Western contact and a figure of “at least one million 
Hawaiians in 1778” is more appropriate); ROBERT C. SCHMITT, DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS 
OF HAWAII: 1778–1965, at 36–38 (1968) (discussing the decline of Hawai‘i’s Indigenous 
population in the nineteenth century). 
50. Sproat, From Wai to K?n?wai, supra note 48, at 9-3 to 9-5.  Lo‘i kalo refers to the 
wetland cultivation of the staple crop kalo (taro, or Colocasia esculenta), which was 
traditionally raised in irrigated paddies.  See generally JOSEPH M. FARBER, ANCIENT 
HAWAIIAN FISHPONDS: CAN RESTORATION SUCCEED ON MOLOKA‘I? 6?8 (2d ed. 2001) 
(analyzing the significance of loko i‘a and current restoration efforts); HANDY & HANDY, 
supra note 2, at 71?118 (detailing the practices and culture of kalo cultivation in ancient 
Hawai‘i, including the role of kalo and poi in Maoli society); HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY, supra 
note 1, at 209 (defining lo‘i); Wayne Tanaka, Loko i‘a—Hawaiian Fishponds, in NATIVE 
HAWAIIAN LAW, supra note 48, at 11-2 to 11-8 (detailing the history and cultural significance 
of loko i‘a in ancient Hawai‘i). 
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Hawai‘i’s Indigenous People.51  In fact, fresh water was so important 
that it was revered as a kinolau, or the physical embodiment of K?ne, 
one of the four principal akua of the Maoli pantheon.52  Given fresh 
water’s significance to Indigenous communities and culture, it was 
shared by all and managed as a public trust resource for the benefit of 
present and future generations.53 
Water’s vital role in Maoli society is better understood when 
considering the interconnection of significant terms.  In ‘?lelo Hawai‘i, 
the islands’ Native language, the word for fresh water is wai.54  Waiwai, 
or water repeated twice, means valuables or wealth.55  The term for law 
is k?n?wai, because Hawai‘i’s early laws evolved around the 
management and use of fresh water.56  Given that wai, or water, is at the 
heart of each of these concepts, it is no coincidence that both wealth and 
the law were and continue to be defined by access to and appropriate 
management of Hawai‘i’s fresh water.57 
Not long after the arrival of foreigners, Hawai‘i became a magnet for 
 
51. D. KAPUA‘ALA SPROAT, OLA I KA WAI: A LEGAL PRIMER FOR WATER USE AND 
MANAGEMENT IN HAWAI‘I 3?5 (2009) [hereinafter SPROAT, OLA I KA WAI] (detailing the 
role that fresh water played in pre-European contact Hawai‘i and why it was a foundation for 
life in the islands). 
52. HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 65; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text 
(discussing Akua K?ne’s significance). 
53. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1338 (Haw. 1973) (holding that “the 
right to water is one of the most important usufruct of lands, and it appears clear . . . [that] the 
right to water was specifically and definitely reserved for the people of Hawai[‘]i for the 
common good in all of the land grants”); Sproat, From Wai to K?n?wai, supra note 48, at 9-5; 
see also HAW. CONST. of 1840, translated in TRANSLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND 
LAWS OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, ESTABLISHED IN THE REIGN OF KAMEHAMEHA III 10–
11 (photo. reprint 1994) (1842) (acknowledging the public trust nature of Hawai‘i’s water 
resources); HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 63?64 (conceptualizing water as a public trust 
resource); KA LAMA K? O KA NO‘EAU: THE STANDING TORCH OF WISDOM vi-vii (2009) 
(discussing how William S. Richardson, the former chief justice of the Hawai‘i Supreme 
Court, helped to reincorporate Native Hawaiian tradition and custom into state law). 
54. HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 377.  For a more in-depth discussion of 
the range of terms associated with fresh water, see HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 57?58. 
55. HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 380. 
56. Id. at 127–28; see also LORRIN ANDREWS, A DICTIONARY OF THE HAWAIIAN 
LANGUAGE 257 (2003) (“The ancient system of regulations for water courses contained 
almost everything the ancient Hawaiians formerly had in common in the shape of laws; hence 
the name Kanawai has in more modern times been given to laws in general.”); HANDY & 
HANDY, supra note 2, at 58 (“The word kanawai, or law, also tied back to water.  Ka-na-wai 
is literally ‘belonging-to-the-waters.’”). 
57. See HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 57?58. 
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plantation agriculture, including the cultivation of sugar cane.58  
Hawai‘i’s favorable climate and year-round growing season were perfect 
for cane; all the sugar barons needed was water to irrigate their fields.59  
On Maui, like the other Hawaiian islands, miles of extensive ditch 
systems were constructed to capture free-flowing streams for the sugar 
planters’ benefit.60  Contrary to Native traditions and laws, newcomers 
to the islands viewed water as a commodity for private use.61  They gave 
little thought to the cultural harms that resulted from taking the entire 
flow of streams and depriving natural and human communities of this 
physical and spiritual life force.62 
Despite Maoli laws and customs that managed water as a public 
trust, plantations increasingly diverted streams and springs for their 
private use.63  Conflicts over fresh-water resources erupted, first 
between plantation interests and K?naka Maoli and later between 
 
58. The history of plantations in Hawai‘i is difficult and complex.  For more information 
regarding Hawai‘i’s plantation history, see NOEL KENT, HAWAII ISLANDS UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE 35–55 (2d ed. 1993).  See generally HANAHANA: AN ORAL HISTORY 
ANTHOLOGY OF HAWAII’S WORKING PEOPLE (Michi Kodama-Nishimoto et al. eds., 1984) 
(featuring oral history narratives of twelve laborers and how they felt working on the sugar 
plantations in the twentieth century); RONALD TAKAKI, PAU HANA: PLANTATION LIFE AND 
LABOR IN HAWAII 1835–1920, at 3?21 (1983) (describing the impact of plantation owners on 
Maoli); TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 15?18; CAROL WILCOX, SUGAR WATER: 
HAWAII’S PLANTATION DITCHES 9–11 (1996) (detailing Hawai‘i’s plantation history of water 
appropriation). 
59. WILCOX, supra note 58, at 1?2; D. Kapua‘ala Sproat & Isaac H. Moriwake, Ke Kalo 
Pa‘a o Wai?hole: Use of the Public Trust as a Tool for Environmental Advocacy, in CREATIVE 
COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 247, 251?53 (Clifford 
Rechtschaffen & Denise Antolini eds., 2007). 
60. See, e.g., WILCOX, supra note 58, at 114?37; Sproat, From Wai to K?n?wai, supra 
note 48, at 9-8 to 9-10.  For more specific information on the various ditches and distribution 
systems on Maui, see Final D&O, supra note 25, at 25?32. 
61. Sproat, From Wai to K?n?wai, supra note 48, at 9-6 to 9-10. 
62. See, e.g., WILCOX, supra note 58, at 9–11 (acknowledging that “[o]ne can admire the 
vision and initiative of the early sugar planters while at the same time mourning the loss of 
water resources and authentic Hawaiian lifestyle”); TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 15?18 
(chronicling the impacts of sugar plantation diversions in N? Wai ‘Eh? on K?naka Maoli and 
their culture); Elizabeth Ann Ho‘oipo K?la‘ena‘auao Pa Martin et al., Cultures in Conflict in 
Hawai‘i: The Law and Politics of Native Hawaiian Water Rights, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 71, 95 
(1996) (explaining that sugar plantations withdrew “unlimited quantities of water regardless 
of the consequences to the environment and other water users,” ignoring “the basic precept 
that Hawaiians’ traditional life support systems depended upon the integrity of ma[u]ka-
makai (mountain to sea) resources”). 
63. See TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 15?18 (detailing the history of plantation 
owners taking public trust water without consulting Maoli communities). 
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competing plantations.64  In fact, some of the Hawai‘i Reporter’s earliest 
published decisions on water rights involved disputes over flows taken 
from N? Wai ‘Eh? streams.65  Court decisions under both the Kingdom 
of Hawai‘i and later the Territory of Hawai‘i began to reflect 
increasingly Western notions of private property, and soon both the 
physical resource and the law of water in Hawai‘i were appropriated to 
suit plantation needs.66 
After about a century of plantation rule, a movement resurfaced in 
the 1960s and 1970s to return public resources to public management 
and control.67  As detailed in Part II.C, below, this created the regime 
for water resource management in Hawai‘i today.68 
 
64. See, e.g., Territory v. Gay, 31 Haw. 376, 377 (1930); Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar 
Co. v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 14 Haw. 50, 52 (1902); Horner v. Kumuliilii, 10 Haw. 174, 175 
(1895). 
65. See Lonoaea v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 9 Haw. 651, 652–53 (1895); Peck v. Bailey, 8 
Haw. 658, 659–62, 673–74 (1867) (denying sugar company’s claim to paramount rights to 
water in the Wailuku (or ‘?ao) Stream, holding that both parties were limited to their 
appurtenant rights to use water for their lands, neither party having exceptional rights and 
further holding that the defendant had the right to use taro water); WILCOX, supra note 58, at 
33 (explaining that “from 1900 to 1959, the Hawai[‘]i Supreme Court was composed of 
lawyers drawn from the prominent business interests whose commercial philosophy they 
upheld”). 
66. D. Kapua‘ala Sproat, Where Justice Flows Like Water: The Moon Court’s Role in 
Illuminating Hawai‘i Water Law, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 7–8) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Sproat, Where Justice Flows Like Water]; see also SPROAT, 
OLA I KA WAI, supra note 51, at 6. 
67. Sproat, Where Justice Flows Like Water, supra note 66, at 8?9. 
68. Id. at 9; see also KA LAMA K? O KA NO‘EAU, supra note 53, at vi–vii. 
 
Hawai‘i has a unique legal system, a system of laws that was originally built on an 
ancient and traditional culture.  While that ancient culture had largely been 
displaced, nevertheless many of the underlying guiding principles remained.  During 
the years after the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893 and through 
Hawai‘i’s territorial period, the decisions of our highest court, reflected a primarily 
Western orientation and sensibility that wasn’t a comfortable fit with Hawai‘i’s 
indigenous people and its immigrant population.  We set about returning control of 
interpreting the law to those with deep roots in and profound love for Hawai‘i.  The 
result can be found in the decisions of our Supreme Court beginning after 
statehood.  Thus, we made a conscious effort to look to Hawaiian custom and 
tradition . . .—and consistent with Hawaiian practice, our court held that beaches 
were free to all, that access to the mountains and shoreline must be provided to the 
people, and that water resources could not be privately owned. 
Id. (quoting Chief Justice William S. Richardson).  
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B.  Fresh Water’s Historical and Cultural Significance in N? Wai ‘Eh? 
As detailed in Part I, above, N? Wai ‘Eh? was “famed in song and 
story.”69  Even the water commission majority recognized that the 
abundance of natural and cultural resources, especially fresh water, 
made N? Wai ‘Eh? “the primary ritual, political, and population center 
of Maui.”70  “Due to the profusion of fresh-flowing water in ancient 
times, N? Wai ‘Eh? supported one of the largest populations and was 
considered the most abundant area on Maui; it also figured centrally in 
Hawaiian history and culture in general.”71  Moreover, “[t]he four 
ahupua‘a of N? Wai ‘Eh? and their streams comprised the largest 
continuous area of wetland taro cultivation in [all of] the [Hawaiian] 
[I]slands.”72  “N? Wai ‘Eh? was a prime location not only for fertile kalo 
lands that helped sustain Hawaiian culture for over 1,000 years, but also 
the creation of a complex irrigation system that the Hawaiian people 
properly managed and used to support robust communities.”73  The 
abundant fresh water in this region thus physically and spiritually 
nurtured its Indigenous People, enriching lands and other resources, 
promoting a vibrant culture, enhancing the overall quality of life, and 
enabling political independence and cultural sovereignty.74 
These natural riches also attracted sugar barons who diverted N? 
Wai ‘Eh?’s fresh water for their commercial use.75  Beginning in 1862, 
sugar interests began to construct and use ditches to take stream flows 
for plantation irrigation in the area.76  “Historically, an average of about 
 
69. HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 272; see also supra note 5. 
70. TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. 
71. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 8. 
72. Id.  For a definition of ahupua‘a see supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
73. TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 15. 
74. “Cultural sovereignty” is the effort of Native Peoples to “exercise their own norms 
and values in structuring their collective futures.”  Rebecca Tsosie, Engaging the Spirit of 
Racial Healing Within Critical Race Theory: An Exercise in Transformative Thought, 11 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 21, 45 (2005) (quotations omitted) (quoting Wallace Coffey & Rebecca 
Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective 
Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 191, 196 (2001)). 
75. See generally TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 15?18. 
76. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 27.  Construction on the companies’ current surface 
water systems?the Spreckels, ‘?ao and Waiehu, and Waihe’e ditch systems—began in 1882, 
1900, and 1905, respectively, and built on and expanded the companies’ initial irrigation 
systems.  Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 23, at 160.  Today, “[t]he primary 
distribution systems receive stream waters via nine active diversions, two on Waihe‘e River, 
one on North Waiehu Stream, one of South Waiehu Stream, two on ‘?ao Stream and three on 
Waikap? Stream.”  Final D&O, supra note 25, at 26.  In addition there are a number of 
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67 mgd was diverted from the four streams for sugar cane irrigation: 40 
mgd from Waihe‘e, 3 mgd from North Waiehu, 3 mgd from South 
Waiehu, 18 mgd from ‘?ao, and 3 mgd from Waikap?,” leaving the 
streams bone-dry below the ditch intakes.77  These diversions took the 
lion’s share of N? Wai ‘Eh?’s fresh water with significant, negative 
impacts on K?naka Maoli resources, cultural integrity, social welfare 
conditions, and self-governance.  Unfortunately, “Native Hawaiian 
communities and agricultural systems felt the burden of the plantations 
almost immediately, and the rise of sugar initiated a period of great 
transformation in N? Wai ‘Eh? and in Hawai‘i.”78  As one example, on 
January 13, 1866, S.D. Haku‘ole chronicled the effects of the sugar 
plantations in N? Wai ‘Eh? via the Hawaiian language newspaper 
N?pepa K?‘oko‘a: 
 
DESPAIR! WAILUKU IS BEING DESTROYED BY THE 
SUGAR PLANTATION—A letter by S.D. Haku‘ole, of Kula, 
Maui arrived at our office, he was declaring that the land of 
Wailuku is being lost due to the cultivation of sugarcane.  
Furthermore, he states the current condition of once cultivated 
taro patches being dried up by the foreigners, where they are 
now planting sugarcane.  Also, he fears that Hawaiians of that 
place will no longer be able to eat poi, and that there will 
probably only be hard crackers which hurt the teeth when eaten, 
a cracker to snack on but does not satisfy the hunger of the 
Hawaiian people.  Although, let it be known that the Hawaiian 
people were accustomed to eating poi.79 
 
 
“kuleana” intakes directly on the streams, which historically provided water to K?naka Maoli 
for household and other uses, including the cultivation of kalo.  Id. 
77. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 32. 
78. TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 15. 
79. Id. at 16 (quoting S.D. Haku‘ole, Despair!  Wailuku Is Being Destroyed by The Sugar 
Plantation, N?PEPA K?‘OKO‘A, Jan. 13, 1866). 
 
The words of Haku‘ole remind us that Native Hawaiian culture is intimately tied to 
the land and the water, and the inability to access these resources threatens the life 
of a people.  Yet it is also here that one might find hope, for in the water is life, and 
the return of the streams will promote a vigorous and healthy regeneration of land 
and people. 
Id. at 18; see also HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 71?115 (detailing the practices and 
culture of kalo cultivation in ancient Hawai‘i, including the role of kalo and poi in K?naka 
Maoli society); supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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Over a century later, those impacts continue: “Cultural experts and 
community witnesses provided uncontroverted testimony regarding 
limitations on Native Hawaiians’ ability to exercise traditional and 
customary rights and practices in the greater N? Wai ‘Eh? area due to 
the lack of fresh water flowing in N? Wai ‘Eh?’s streams and into the 
nearshore marine waters.”80 
For over 150 years, sugar plantations arose, merged, and closed in 
N? Wai ‘Eh?, although the principal plantation interests remained 
Wailuku Sugar Company (which later became Wailuku Agribusiness 
and is now Wailuku Water Company (WWC))81 and HC&S.82  Despite 
many changes, including significant reductions in the amount of land in 
cane cultivation, plantation diversions on N? Wai ‘Eh? streams continue 
apace, maintaining the subordination of Maoli people, culture, and 
resources.83 
C.  Hawai‘i’s Legal Regime for Water Resource Management 
In light of Hawai’i’s unique history (including the United States’ role 
in the illegal overthrow of the sovereign Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893), 
issues impacting K?naka Maoli implicate restorative justice principles 
that underscore the importance of respecting Indigenous rights in partial 
redress for the harms of American colonialism.84  Justice for Hawai‘i’s 
 
80. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 10; see also TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 15?19  
(noting the negative effects of plantation irrigation systems on K?naka Maoli). 
81. Background on N? Wai ‘Eh?, EARTHJUSTICE, http://earthjustice.org/ 
features/background-on-na-wai-eha (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) (“Wailuku Sugar Company 
has reinvented itself as Wailuku Water Company.  It maintains its water diversions to turn a 
profit by selling that water to the private development projects built on the former plantation 
lands.”). 
82. HC&S is a subsidiary of Alexander & Baldwin (A&B) and the major user of N? Wai 
‘Eh? water to irrigate about 5,000 acres of its 36,000-acre plantation.  Koa Kaulukukui, Maui: 
In Water We Trust, THE HAWAII INDEPENDENT (June 16, 2011) (on file with law review).  
HC&S’s plantation consists of sugar cane, although it leases some land to Monsato, an 
agricultural biotechnology corporation, to grow seed corn.  Id.  “Historically, HC&S 
supplemented the stream water systems with 16 wells tapping underground water beneath its 
plantation with the capacity to pump over 240 million gallons per day.”  Id.  A&B is the last 
of the “Big Five” companies—the original five plantations started by colonists?still 
dominant in Hawai‘i’s economy.  Allison Schaefers, Among the Big 5, A&B Still Reigns, 
HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN (Oct. 22, 2009), http://archives.starbulletin.com/content/ 
20091025_among_the_big_5_ab_still_reigns. 
83. See Background on Na Wai ‘Eh?, supra note 81; Four Waters of Maui Removed 
From Private Control, ENV’T NEWS SERV. (Mar. 21, 2008), http://www.ens-
newswire.com/ens/mar2008/2008-03-21-091.html. 
84. Pub. L. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993) [hereinafter Apology Resolution] (“Joint 
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Indigenous People, however, also benefits all of Hawai‘i’s people, many 
of whom are not “Hawaiian” by ethnicity or nationality.85 
As described below, Hawai‘i currently has a detailed legal regime for 
the management of fresh water, including constitutional provisions, 
statutes, and other legal tools that have the potential to yield just 
results.86  Although framed generally, much of the legal language 
appears favorable to both Hawai‘i’s Indigenous People87 and the 
community at large.88  Establishing this regime was both its own struggle 
and a direct response to years of repressive colonial interests that seized 
Native lands and took massive quantities of stream water for plantation 
agribusiness while decimating agrarian Maoli communities reliant on 
continuous mauka to makai flow.89 
Today, in light of acknowledged wrongful land confiscation, cultural 
destruction, and the devastation90 of Maoli communities, both the 
 
Resolution to Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17, 1893 Overthrow of the 
Kingdom of Hawaii.”); see also Eric K. Yamamoto and Jen-L W. Lyman, Racializing 
Environmental Justice, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 311, 344 (2001). 
85. See Yamamoto & Lyman, supra note 84, at 316–17. 
86. See HAW. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7; HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C (1993); HAW. ADMIN. R. 
§§ 13-167-1 to 13-171-60. 
87. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-101(c) (“Traditional and customary rights of 
ahupua‘a tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian 
Islands prior to 1778 shall not be abridged or denied by this chapter.  Such traditional and 
customary rights shall include, but not be limited to, the cultivation or propagation of taro on 
one’s own kuleana and the gathering of h[?]h[?]wai, [‘?]pae, [‘]o‘opu, limu, thatch, ti leaf, aho 
cord, and medicinal plants for subsistence, cultural, and religious purposes.”); id. § 174C-
101(d) (“The appurtenant water rights of kuleana and taro lands, along with those traditional 
and customary rights assured in this section, shall not be diminished or extinguished by a 
failure to apply for or receive a permit under this chapter.”). 
88. See, e.g., In re Wai‘ola O Moloka‘i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 680 (Haw. 2004) (“The Code 
mandates consideration of the large variety of public interests.  The definition of ‘public 
interest’ in the Code broadly encompasses the protection of the environment, traditional and 
customary practices of native Hawaiians, scenic beauty, protection of fish and wildlife, and 
protection and enhancement of the waters of the State.”). 
89. Hawai‘i’s citizens came together in a constitutional convention and crafted 
amendments to Hawai‘i’s constitution to elevate the management of natural and cultural 
resources to a constitutional mandate, while also centralizing management of fresh water 
under a single state agency to minimize political influence at the county level.  See HAW. 
CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7.  In 1978, Hawai‘i’s voters ratified those amendments and in 1987 
Hawai‘i’s State Water Code, Hawai‘i Revised Statutes chapter 174C, was implemented as a 
comprehensive management tool for Hawai‘i’s water resources.  See Sproat, Where Justice 
Flows Like Water, supra note 66, at 11?12; supra note 68 (discussing the evolution of Hawai‘i 
law, including water, and its roots in Maoli culture). 
90. Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 
1150?51 (D. Haw. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 416 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005), reh’g en 
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federal government and state legislature have separately committed to 
reconciling with K?naka Maoli.91  Hawai‘i’s people embraced restorative 
justice principles and ratified those obligations, even though the state as 
a whole has struggled to actualize that commitment.92  On the ground in 
the community, however, the law has produced limited salutary results.93 
The State’s commitment to reconciliation with K?naka Maoli is 
particularly relevant in the context of Hawai‘i’s management of its 
natural and cultural resources—especially the plantation history of 
water appropriation.94  With these restorative justice goals in mind, 
Hawai‘i’s Constitution was amended and the Water Code adopted with 
directives requiring the water commission to take the initiative to 
protect and preserve the public’s interest in fresh water resources, with 
specific provisions for Maoli rights and interests.95  Article XI, section 1 
 
banc granted, 441 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 470 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006). 
91. See, e.g., Apology Resolution, supra note 84, at 1; 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 956, § 1; 
1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 1009, § 1(9); H.R. 1627, 26th Leg. (Haw. 2011); H.R. Con. Res. 179, 
17th Leg. (Haw. 1993).  The Apology Resolution, for example, apologized for and 
acknowledged the significance of the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i and agreed 
to support reconciliation efforts.  See Apology Resolution, supra note 84, at 8–9.  It commits 
Congress to provide a proper foundation for reconciliation between the United States and 
K?naka Maoli.  Id.  In 2011, Hawai‘i’s State Legislature reaffirmed its commitment to K?naka 
Maoli by passing a new law acknowledging a special trust relationship between the United 
States and Maoli.  H.R. 1627, 26th Leg. (Haw. 2011). 
92. See, e.g., Kamehameha Sch., 441 F.3d at 1174–75; Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. 
Housing and Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw., 177 P.3d 884, 900 (Haw. 2008) (noting that “the 
‘Apology Resolution by itself does not require the State to turn over the lands to the Native 
Hawaiian people, but it puts the State on notice that it must carefully preserve these lands so 
that a subsequent transfer can take place when the political branches reach an appropriate 
resolution of this dispute’”); Haw. H.R. Con. Res. 179. 
93. See, e.g., The Water Commission: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, ENV’T HAWAI‘I 
(Env’t Haw., Hilo, Haw.), July 2010, at 2, 3 [hereinafter An Idea Whose Time Has Passed] 
(“[T]he only purpose that the [w]ater [c]ommission seems to serve these days, so far as stream 
restoration is concerned, is to give diverters years, even decades, of water as the challenges to 
their use drags through the commission’s unwieldy . . . .  Even after it issues its milquetoast 
orders, it lacks the staff—to say nothing of the will—to enforce them.”). 
94. For example, in 1993, the legislature established the Hawaiian Sovereignty Advisory 
Commission to advise the legislature on how to “facilitate efforts of native Hawaiians to be 
governed by an indigenous . . . nation of their . . . choosing” as “the indigenous people of 
Hawai[‘]i were denied the mechanism for expression of their inherent sovereignty . . . and 
self-determination, their lands, and their ocean resources.”  1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 1009, 1010. 
95. In a path-breaking decision, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court opined that the state water 
commission “must not relegate itself to the role of a mere umpire passively calling balls and 
strikes for adversaries appearing before it, but instead must take the initiative in considering, 
protecting, and advancing public rights in the resource at every stage of the planning and 
decisionmaking process.”  In re Water Use Permit Applications (Wai?hole I), 9 P.3d 409, 455 
(Haw. 2000) (internal quotations omitted); see also HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 174C-63, -101 
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of Hawai‘i’s Constitution provides that “[a]ll public natural resources 
are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people.”96  Article XI, 
section 7 of Hawai‘i’s Constitution makes explicit reference to water, 
including the directive “to protect, control and regulate the use of 
Hawai‘i’s water resources for the benefit of its people.”  Significantly, 
“article XI, section 1 and article XI, section 7 adopt the public trust 
doctrine as a fundamental principle of constitutional law in Hawai‘i.”97 
Many trace the public trust’s origin to English and Roman law.98  
Yet, long before the existence of the constitutional provisions described 
above, cases and laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom, along with Maoli 
custom and tradition, firmly established the principle that natural 
resources (including water) were not private property, but were held in 
trust by the government for the benefit of the people.99  Today under 
Hawai‘i’s Constitution, Water Code, and common law, the “water 
resources trust” applies to “all water resources without exception or 
distinction.”100  The public trust establishes “a dual mandate of (1) 
protection and (2) maximum reasonable and beneficial use.”101  The 
water commission, therefore, has an “affirmative duty to take the public 
trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and 
to protect public trust uses whenever feasible.”102 
Thus far, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court has identified only a handful of 
“public trust purposes,” including environmental protection, traditional 
 
(1993); supra note 89 and accompanying text (reviewing the 1978 Constitutional Convention 
and its impacts). 
96. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.  Some text here and for the next two paragraphs 
previously appeared in SPROAT, OLA I KA WAI, supra note 51, at 3?5. 
97. Wai?hole I, 9 P.3d at 444 (citations omitted) (citing Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 
272 (1976)). 
98. For a detailed analysis of common and Roman law development of the public trust 
doctrine, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475?76 (1970).   
99. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. of 1840, supra note 53, at 10–11 (noting that the first 
constitution of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i declared that the land and its resources “belonged to 
the chiefs and people in common, of whom [the King] was the head and had the management 
of the landed property”); Hawai‘i Kingdom Laws of 1839, reprinted and translated in 
TRANSLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, supra note 
53, at 33 (reprinting an 1839 law respecting water for irrigation, which sought to manage 
water resources for the common good); see also Sproat, Where Justice Flows Like Water, 
supra note 66, at 5?6. 
100. Wai?hole I, 9 P.3d at 445. 
101. Id. at 451. 
102. Id. at 453 (emphasis removed) (quoting Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of 
Alpine Cnty. (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983)). 
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and customary K?naka Maoli rights, appurtenant rights, domestic water 
uses, and reservations for the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands.103  
Public trust purposes have priority over private commercial uses, which 
do not enjoy the same protection.104  The public trust dictates that “any 
balancing between public and private purposes [must] begin with a 
presumption in favor of public use, access, and enjoyment” and 
“establishes use consistent with trust purposes as the norm or ‘default’ 
condition.”105  Offstream diverters who seek water for their private 
commercial gain have the burden of justifying proposed uses in light of 
protected rights in the resources, including traditional and customary 
Maoli practices.  Many of the Water Code’s provisions were 
purposefully crafted to rectify the monopoly of resources by a handful 
of business interests (e.g., sugar plantations owned by descendants of 
American colonists) to ensure that water supplies supported the entire 
range of public uses and to prioritize certain uses, including Indigenous 
rights and practices.106 
In addition to the Water Code, constitutional and statutory 
 
103. Id. at 448?50; In re Wai‘ola o Moloka‘i, 83 P.3d 664, 694 (Haw. 2004).  Appurtenant 
rights appertain or attach to parcels of land that were cultivated, usually in the traditional 
staple kalo, at the time of the M?hele.  See Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57, 78 
(Haw. 1982).  The Department of Hawaiian Home Lands was established through the 
enactment of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 42 Stat. 108 (1921).  The HHCA 
provides “rehabilitation of the native Hawaiian people through a government-sponsored 
homesteading program” intended to “provide for economic self-sufficiency of native 
Hawaiians through the provision of land.”  Laws/Rules, DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOMELANDS, 
http://hawaii.gov/dhhl/laws (last visited Oct. 12, 2011). 
104. Wai?hole I, 9 P.3d at 454. 
105. Id. 
106. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-2 (1993); see also Wai?hole I, 9 P.3d at 449?50.  In 
Wai?hole, the court explained its position as follows: 
 
[W]e continue to uphold the exercise of Native Hawaiian and traditional customary 
rights as a public trust purpose. . . . 
. . . . 
 Although its purpose has evolved over time, the public trust has never been 
understood to safeguard rights of exclusive use for private commercial gain. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [I]f the public trust is to retain any meaning and effect, it must recognize 
enduring public rights in trust resources separate from, and superior to, the 
prevailing private interests in the resources at any given time. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Wai‘ola, 83 P.3d at 680 (“The definition of ‘public interest’ in 
the Code broadly encompasses the protection of the environment, traditional and customary 
practices of native Hawaiians, scenic beauty, protection of fish and wildlife, and protection 
and enhancement of the waters of the State.”). 
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provisions also safeguard Indigenous rights and practices.  For example, 
Hawai‘i’s Constitution “reaffirms and shall protect all rights, 
customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and 
religious purposes and possessed by ahupua‘a tenants who are 
descendants” of Hawai‘i’s Indigenous People.107  Moreover, Hawai‘i 
Revised Statutes sections 1-1 and 7-1 provide independent protections 
for traditional and customary Maoli practices, and water rights in 
particular.108 
The Water Code’s basic structure for water resource management in 
Hawai‘i, however, has not achieved the law’s stated purpose of 
protecting and restoring fresh water resources, leaving the vast majority 
of those resources in the hands of plantation or former-plantation 
interests.109  The law gives water commissioners and communities a false 
sense that the mere passage of a statute is sufficient and that nothing 
more needs to be done.  After all, because the Water Code is in place, 
many assume that qualified water commissioners will be appointed, 
sufficient funding will be sought and provided, and that commission staff 
will implement constitutional and statutory mandates.110  In the pursuit 
of justice through law, however, a more in-depth contextual 
examination of the current state of water resource management in 
Hawai‘i reveals an unsavory political and economic reality.111  The 
longstanding failure to establish scientifically based Interim Instream 
Flow Standards (IIFSs) provides one example. 
IIFSs are critical tools for water management in Hawai‘i because 
 
107. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 7.   
108. HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-1 (1993) (noting the common law of England is “declared to 
be the common law of the State of Hawai[‘]i in all cases, except as otherwise expressly 
provided by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or by the laws of the State, or fixed 
by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage”); id. § 7-1 (“[P]eople on 
each of their lands shall not be deprived of the right to take firewood, house-timber, aho cord, 
thatch, or ki leaf, from the land on which they live, for their own private use, but they shall 
not have a right to take such articles to sell for profit[; further, t]he people shall also have a 
right to drinking water, and running water, and the right of way.”). 
109. Compare HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-5 (detailing the water commission’s general 
powers and duties), with An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, supra note 93, at 3 (“If the 
Legislature had tried to invent a means of paying lip service to streams while leaving status 
quo diversions intact and flourishing, it would have been hard pressed to come up with a 
better solution than the water commission.”). 
110. Sproat, Water, supra note 14, at 191?94. 
111. See, e.g., id.; An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, supra note 93, at 3 (“[T]he fact 
remains: the [w]ater [c]ommission, as a tool for resolving stream disputes, is utterly, 
hopelessly broken.”). 
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they underpin the entire instream use and protection program.112  An 
IIFS establishes the minimum amount of water that must remain in a 
stream, or a particular reach of a stream, to support beneficial instream 
uses such as the maintenance of ecosystems and wildlife habitats, water 
quality, and traditional and customary Native Hawaiian practices.113  The 
Hawai‘i Supreme Court deemed IIFSs “the primary mechanism by 
which the commission is to discharge its duty to protect and promote the 
entire range of public trust purposes dependent upon instream flows.”114  
Given this vital role, the Water Code requires the commission to set 
IIFSs “on a stream-by-stream basis whenever necessary to protect the 
public interest in the waters of the State.”115  The commission also 
outlined an investigation and fact-finding process and mandated that 
any IIFS or IFS116 “shall be adopted by the commission not later than 
July 1, 1990.”117  Nevertheless, the water commission did not approve 
standards that were based on the Code’s rigorous requirements for 
scientific analysis and consultation with expert agencies.118  Instead, the 
commission simply adopted as IIFSs whatever amount of water, if any, 
happened to be flowing in certain streams on a particular date.119  This 
 
112. See Wai?hole I, 9 P.3d 409, 460 (Haw. 2000). 
113. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-3 (defining all beneficial instream uses of stream 
water). 
114. Wai?hole I, 9 P.3d at 460. 
115. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(1) (providing an overview of requirements for the 
protection of instream uses, including the establishment of IIFS). 
116. An IFS or Instream Flow Standard is a “quantity or flow of water or depth of water 
which is required to be present at a specific location in a stream system at certain specified 
times of the year to protect fishery, wildlife, recreational, aesthetic, scenic, and other 
beneficial instream uses.”  Id. § 174C-3.  An IFS is permanent, whereas an IIFS is temporary.  
In establishing an IIFS, the Commission must adhere to many of the same standards 
established for an IFS.  SPROAT, OLA I KA WAI, supra note 51, at 22–23.  The IIFS process is 
supposed to be expedited, however, and the standard is more flexible in terms of how broadly 
it may be imposed, when compared to a permanent IFS.  Id. 
117. HAW. ADMIN. R. § 13-170-2(e) (1988).  The initial deadline was roughly three years 
after the Water Code was enacted.  Shortly thereafter, administrative rules specified that 
IIFSs must be set for streams on the various Hawaiian Islands on a schedule ranging from a 
July 31, 1987 deadline for Windward O‘ahu to a December 31, 1988 deadline for West Maui 
and Leeward O‘ahu.  Id. § 13-169-42 (“The commission shall adopt interim instream flow 
standards as follows: (1) Windward O‘ahu by July 31, 1987; (2) East Maui and Kaua‘i by 
December 31, 1987; (3) Hawai‘i and Moloka‘i by July 1, 1988; and (4) West Maui and 
Leeward O‘ahu by December 31, 1988.”). 
118. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(1)(E). 
119. See, e.g., HAW. ADMIN. R. §§ 13-169-44 to -49; see also An Idea Whose Time Has 
Passed, supra note 93, at 2 (explaining the process of establishing “non-quantified ‘interim’ 
flow standards, reflecting the status quo.”). 
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was done without assigning any actual numbers to these standards, 
making them practically impossible to enforce.120 
The water commission claimed that this action satisfied the legal 
requirement of “protect[ing] the public interest”121 by identifying the 
“flows of water necessary to protect adequately fishery, wildlife, 
recreational, aesthetic, scenic, or other beneficial instream uses in the 
stream,”122 while considering the “economic impact”123 of taking water 
out of the stream for other “noninstream purposes.”124  These status quo 
IIFSs, however, left the streams and their communities with little to no 
protection and no immediate prospects of restoration, despite the Water 
Code’s intent and admonitions to the contrary.125  As the Hawai‘i 
Supreme Court recognized, 
 
The [c]ommission, obviously, cannot “implement” or 
“protect” standards that do not exist.  In order for the “instream 
use protection” regime to fulfill its stated purpose, therefore, the 
[c]ommission must designate instream flow standards as early as 
possible, during the process of comprehensive planning, and 
particularly before it authorizes offstream diversions potentially 
detrimental to public instream uses and values.126   
 
120. See An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, supra note 93, at 2–3. 
121. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(1)(C). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. § 174C-71(1)(E). 
124. Id. 
125. See An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, supra note 93, at 3 (“Protection and 
restoration of streams and the customary and traditional uses associated with them are among 
the commission’s primary purposes, as set forth by law.  Over the last two decades, however, 
the zeal with which it has pursued these goals has undergone a slow transformation.”). 
126. Wai?hole I, 9 P.3d at 409, 461 (citations omitted); see also Wai?hole II, 93 P.3d 643, 
654 (Haw. 2004).  In Wai?hole II, the Court also admonished the Commission for the delay in 
setting instream flow standards: 
 
We take this opportunity, however, to remind the [w]ater [c]ommission that 
seventeen years have passed since the Water Code was enacted requiring the 
[w]ater [c]ommission to set permanent instream flow standards by investigating 
the streams.  In addition, four years have passed since this court held that “the 
Commission shall, with utmost haste and purpose, work towards establishing 
permanent instream flow standards for windward streams.’  The fact that an IIFS is 
before this court evinces that this mandate has not yet been completed as of the 
[w]ater [c]ommission’s D&O II. 
Id. (citations omitted).  Temporary IIFSs and permanent IFSs “are the [w]ater [c]ommission’s 
principal mechanisms to ensure that surface water rights and interests, including resource 
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To this day, almost twenty-five years after the Water Code was passed, 
the water commission has yet to issue even one permanent IFS and the 
only IIFSs based on some actual information, rather than status-quo 
diversions, have been established as a result of litigation. 
As detailed in Part V, below, as the Hui experienced first-hand, even 
with seemingly favorable legal language that embodies key contextual 
factors, decision-makers continue to wield tremendous power to render 
dubious and even retrogressive outcomes, under the guise of objectively 
applying “neutral” laws.  As this article demonstrates, in the broad array 
of Native Peoples’ claims, contextual legal analysis must be employed to 
do the heavy lifting of unpacking political and economic influences that 
shape how rights and obligations are actually determined on the 
ground.127  A more contextual legal analysis is vital to illuminate the 
specific claims of K?naka Maoli and the meaning of “justice” through 
law in this dispute. 
III.  AN APPROACH TO INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ CLAIMS AND COURT 
RULINGS 
A.  The Limits of Legal Formalism and Emergence of Legal Realism 
To earnestly grapple with Indigenous issues in the context of water 
and beyond, legal analysis cannot focus solely on “traditional” notions 
 
protection, are adequately considered.”  SPROAT, OLA I KA WAI, supra note 51, at 22.  The 
Water Code required the establishment and administration of an “instream use protection 
program” when the Code was passed in 1987; however, the only standards that are based on 
actual information have been set as a result of litigation, with the first such IIFSs established 
in Wai?hole.  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71 (1993) (detailing the requirements of the 
instream use protection program). 
127. See An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, supra note 93, at 2.   
 
It was widely thought that, as commission staff gained knowledge of the demands 
made of stream resources, the commission would on its own adopt more 
permanent flow standards and even identify and protect streams having high 
value for recreation or resources.  That, too, was a dream, undercut by the harsh 
realities of insufficient information and, frankly, a complete failure of nerve in the 
face of the political and economic juggernaut represented by the [sugar] planters. 
Id.  As one example of how political and other influences shape decision-making, the water 
commission’s composition is the direct result of the political process with all of its members 
appointed by the governor, after confirmation by the Senate.  The Commission, COMMISSION 
ON WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, http://hawaii.gov/dlnr/cwrm/aboutus_commission.ht
m#selection (last visited Oct. 12, 2011). 
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of rights because many such notions are grounded in Western concepts 
of property that are not universally applicable, especially in Hawai‘i.128  
There is a need to go beyond the limited application of narrowly drawn 
legal rules to the selectively shaped facts of cases.129  The formalist 
approach to Native Peoples’ claims, history shows, legitimized 
colonialism, the confiscation of land, the destruction of culture, and the 
destabilization of self-government.130 
1. The Limits of Legal Formalism 
In the 1800s, legal formalism evolved in an attempt to deem the law 
a neutral tool that produced justice by mechanistically applying legal 
rules to cases.131  Classic legal formalism is a “theory of adjudication 
according to which (1) the law is rationally determinate, and (2) judging 
is mechanical.  It follows, moreover, from (1), that (3) legal reasoning is 
autonomous, since the class of legal reasons suffices to justify a unique 
outcome; no recourse to non-legal reasons is demanded or required.”132 
Formalism, therefore, “holds that the law is an internally consistent 
and logical body of rules that is independent from the variable forms of 
 
128. See, e.g., Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cnty. Planning Comm’n, 903 P.2d 
1246, 1268 (Haw. 1995) (“Our examination of the relevant legal developments in Hawaiian 
history leads us to the conclusion that the western concept of exclusivity is not universally 
applicable in Hawai‘i.”); Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57, 63 (Haw 1982) 
(clarifying that Hawai‘i’s system of water rights is “‘based upon and is an outgrowth of 
ancient Hawaiian customs and methods of Hawaiians in dealing with the subject of water’” 
(quoting Territory v. Gay, 31 Haw. 376, 395 (1930))). 
129. See Yamamoto & Lyman, supra note 84, at 311 (noting that for racialized 
communities and Indigenous Peoples, “environmental justice is mainly about cultural and 
economic self-determination and belief systems that connect their history, spirituality, and 
livelihood to the natural environment”). 
130. See, e.g., Rennard Strickland, Genocide-At-Law: An Historic and Contemporary 
View of the Native American Experience, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 713, 735–39 (1986); Tsosie, supra 
note 74, at 27–33; Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus’s Legacy: Law as an Instrument of 
Racial Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples’ Rights of Self-Determination, 8 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 51, 53?55 (1991); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The 
Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of 
Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237, 239?50 (1989). 
131. See generally Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465 (1988) 
(providing an in-depth discussion of legal formalism). 
132. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 2 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Brian 
Leiter, supra note 31, at 1145–46); Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended 
Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 639 (1999) (“Formalism therefore entails an 
interpretive method that relies on the text of the relevant law and that excludes or minimizes 
extratextual sources of law.”). 
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its surrounding social institutions.”133  Given these theoretical 
underpinnings, the “law was objective, unchanging, extrinsic to the 
social climate, and, above all, different from and superior to politics.”134 
Although the prevailing view for many years135—and still embraced 
by some scholars and many law school curricula136—legal formalism’s 
failure to fully consider social and historical context, politics, culture, 
and a myriad of other social factors impedes both the courts’ capacity to 
render just decisions and the general public’s understanding of the law’s 
role in shaping society.  Legal formalism also constrains many groups’ 
ability to achieve any semblance of justice.  “The message the formalist 
model conveys is that existing power relations in the real world are by 
definition legitimate and must go unchallenged.”137 
Formalist analysis, however, can neither explain nor predict how the 
legal process actually works for Indigenous Peoples.  History indicates 
that legal formalism’s narrow lens employs rules (for example, the 
 
133. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 2 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting MATHIEU 
DEFLEM, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: VISIONS OF A SCHOLARLY TRADITION 98 (2008)); see also 
Peer Zumbansen, Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism, and the Ironic Turn 
of Reflexive Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 769, 782 (2008) (noting that legal formalism may be 
understood by “extrapolating a logical structure of a confined set of norms from a small set of 
higher-order principles”). 
134. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 731 (2009) 
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE 
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 187 (1988)).  Tamanaha also raises questions about 
whether the formalist–realist divide has been accurately framed: “Legal theory discussions of 
legal formalism are irrelevant, misleading, or empty.  Debates about judging are routinely 
framed in terms of antithetical formalist–realist poles that jurists do not actually hold.”  
TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 3; see also Edward Rubin, The Real Formalists, The Real 
Realists, and What They Tell Us About Judicial Decision Making and Legal Education, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 863, 866 (2011) (reviewing TAMANAHA, supra note 31).  For a more in-depth 
discussion of legal formalism, see Daniel Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 NW. U. 
L. REV. 89 (1995). 
135. See TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 4.  According to Tamanaha, some jurists 
abandoned formalism much earlier than the realist revolution in the 1920s: “Jurists in the late 
nineteenth century, it turns out, took substantial pride in the progress they had made in 
overcoming formalism in law.  They thought formalism was a primitive legal stage beyond 
which they had evolved.”  Id.; see also Steven C. Papkin, The Transformation of American 
Law, 1870–1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 565, 569 (1993) 
(reviewing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960 
(1992)). 
136. Not just conservative scholars embrace legal formalism; it remains the primary 
method of teaching in law schools.  See Singer, supra note 131, at 473 (“It is correct to 
conclude that in certain ways, little changed by 1960.  Even today, we still rely almost entirely 
on appellate decisions in law school classes.”). 
137. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 376 (1992). 
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“intent of the framers”) and methods of reasoning (for example, stare 
decisis)138 in ways that treat Native Peoples as inferior to Europeans and, 
therefore, unworthy of self-governance; it also fails to provide either a 
balanced perspective or a genuine vehicle to address legal and cultural 
harms.139 
Consider the seminal case of Johnson v. M’Intosh, where the 
Supreme Court analyzed whether Native Americans had lawful title to 
their lands and could sell property to parties other than the countries 
that colonized them.140  At issue was whether Johnson, who purchased 
land directly from the Illinois and Piankeshaw nations in 1775, had 
superior title to M’Intosh, a war veteran who obtained title in 1818 from 
the United States government.141  In crafting the Court’s opinion, Chief 
Justice John Marshall relied on the doctrine of discovery, which 
assumed European superiority over “fierce savages”142 and, thus, “gave 
title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was 
made.”143  The Court recognized Native rights of occupancy only, as 
 
138.  Stare decisis is Latin for “stand by things decided” and is a legal term that refers to 
a court’s obligation to abide by former court decisions.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 
(9th ed. 2009). 
139. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL 
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 315?17 (1990); JONATHAN KAY 
KAMAKAWIWO‘OLE OSORIO, DISMEMBERING L?HUI: A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN 
NATION TO 1887, at 44–73, 250?60 (2002).  See generally KAME‘ELEIHIWA, supra note 36 
(detailing cultural harms to Native Hawaiians). 
140. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 571–72 (1823).  This complex case 
requires a detailed discussion to truly understand the impacts of the doctrine of discovery on 
Native Americans.  For a more thorough inquiry, see Blake A. Watson, John Marshall and 
Indian Land Rights: A Historical Rejoinder to the Claim of “Universal Recognition” of the 
Doctrine of Discovery, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 481, 483?86 (2006) (discussing the 
significance of Johnson v. M’Intosh). 
141. See M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 555–56, 560, 572; see also David E. Wilkins, Johnson v. 
M’Intosh Revisited: Through the Eyes of Mitchel v. United States, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
159, 161?62 (1994). 
142. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 590–92.  The Court justified the doctrine of discovery using 
racism and ethnocentrism, for example, the decision characterized  
 
the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country [as] fierce savages, whose occupation 
was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest.  To leave them 
in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them 
as a distinct people, was impossible, because they were as brave and as high spirited 
as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their 
independence.   
Id. 
143. Id. at 573.  The Court did, however, recognize the inherent right of Indigenous 
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subordinate to the perceived superiority of European ownership.144  The 
decision used Western laws and practices to justify “the exclusive right 
of the discoverer to appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians.”145  
After all, “[c]onquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror 
cannot deny.”146 
As demonstrated by M’Intosh, the narrow lens of legal formalism 
deployed established methods (stare decisis or precedent) to embrace 
regressive rules (for example, the “doctrine of discovery”) in light of 
selected facts (Natives as uncivilized “savages”) to award the United 
States “lawful” title to all Native American lands.147  The Court’s 
decision fundamentally limited the ability of Indigenous Peoples within 
the United States to control their own homelands and resources.148  Most 
importantly, this was ostensibly accomplished under the “rule of law”—
the application of law to facts—while “respecting the original justice”149 
 
Peoples as 
 
rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of 
it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete 
sovereignty, as independent nations were necessarily diminished, and their power to 
dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the 
original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who 
made it. 
Id. at 574.  The Court went on to explain that “[t]he history of America, from its discovery to 
the present day, proves, we think, the universal recognition of these principles.”  Id. 
144. Id. at 587–92; see also Tsosie, supra note 74, at 31 (“Under this colonial doctrine, 
the Native American Nations were divested of their political right to cede lands or enter 
political alliances with other sovereigns.  The sovereigns transferred title to their successors in 
interest.  The right of occupancy entitled the Indians to continue their physical use and 
occupancy of the lands until the right was extinguished by the sovereign through ‘purchase or 
conquest.’” (quoting M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 587)) 
145. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 584. 
146. Id. at 588. 
147. See id., 571–605; Tsosie has discussed the M’Intosh decision and its application (or 
rather lack thereof) to Native Hawaiians as follows: 
 
[T]he Kingdom of Hawai[‘]i was never subjected to the “Doctrine of Discovery” 
that was used to subordinate Native American rights to land and sovereignty with 
the legal fiction that, upon discovery and settlement of lands in the New World, the 
Europeans and their successors in interest (e.g., the United States) received the full 
title to the land, except for the Indian’s “right of occupancy.” 
Tsosie, supra note 74, at 31.  
148. Watson, supra note 140, at 485–86 (discussing the significance of Johnson v. 
M’Intosh). 
149. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 588. 
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of M’Intosh’s claim to land through the United States’ colonization of 
the Americas. 
For disenfranchised groups, however, legal formalism’s reach was 
not limited to the nineteenth century.  It continues to be utilized in 
contemporary times to perpetuate the status quo while restricting 
Native Peoples’ right to control their destinies.  Rice v. Cayetano 
provides a chilling example.150  In Rice, courts wrestled with whether the 
election of trustees for OHA151—a state agency established to combat 
the lingering effects of colonization on Hawai‘i’s Indigenous People and 
to create better conditions for them—could be limited to Maoli.152 
The lead plaintiff, Freddy Rice, was a White rancher whose 
ancestors came to Hawai‘i in the mid-1800s as Christian missionaries 
and eventually built a ranching empire on land that had formerly 
belonged to Native Hawaiians.153  Despite having benefitted personally 
(including accumulating land and other resources) as a direct result of 
his family’s role in colonizing Hawai‘i, Rice sued the State of Hawai‘i for 
not allowing him to vote in OHA elections, claiming this restriction 
contravened the Voting Rights Act of 1965154 as well as the Fourteenth155 
and Fifteenth Amendments.156  Although each of those laws was 
 
150. 963 F. Supp. 1547 (D. Haw. 1996), aff’d, 146 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 
528 U.S. 495, 498–99, 524 (2000); see also Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 15, at 545–48 
(deconstructing Rice and how the case was solicited and pursued by conservatives to roll back 
protections for K?naka Maoli).  The majority opinion ignored the present-day sovereignty 
and self-determination movements and presented a sanitized retelling of Hawai‘i’s history.  
Id. at 558.  “Nor did the majority opinion acknowledge specifically the destruction of 
Hawaiian culture through the banning of Hawaiian language or the current effects of 
homelands dispossession, including poverty, low levels of education and health, and high 
levels of homelessness and incarceration.”  Id. 
151. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (providing a more detailed explanation of 
OHA and its mission and objectives). 
152. Rice, 528 U.S. at 498?99.  During the 1978 Constitutional Convention, Hawai‘i 
amended its constitution to create the Office of Hawaiian Affairs.  See HAW. CONST. art. XII, 
§ 5.  OHA’s mission is the “betterment of conditions of native Hawaiians” and “Hawaiians.”  
HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-3(1) to -3(2) (2009); see also note 15 (describing OHA and its mission) 
153. Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 15, at 545?48. 
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).  This Act prohibits any state or political subdivision from 
imposing or applying any “voting qualification or prerequisite . . . or [any] standard, practice, 
or procedure . . . in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”  Id. § 1973(a). 
155. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibits states from treating citizens unequally on the basis of race.  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. 
156. The Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that “[t]he 
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
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specifically crafted to protect historically disadvantaged groups, Rice 
turned the laws on their heads, wielding them against a historically 
disadvantaged group to challenge the group’s ability to elect trustees for 
an agency designed to manage Indigenous resources in partial redress 
for the devastation imposed by American colonialism. 
Judge David Alan Ezra of the District Court for the District of 
Hawai‘i employed contextual analysis to reject Rice’s claims and rule in 
favor of the State of Hawai‘i.157  Judge Ezra examined Hawai‘i’s history, 
including Westerners’ role in fundamentally altering the Native system 
of land use and management and eventually overthrowing the sovereign 
Hawaiian Kingdom.158  He recognized Maoli as the Indigenous People of 
Hawai‘i whose continuing relationship with the state and federal 
government was analogous to other Native Peoples.159  Judge Ezra ruled 
that OHA’s voting requirements were rationally tied to state and 
congressional trust obligations to K?naka Maoli.160  On appeal to the 
Ninth Circuit, a three-judge panel affirmed.161 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, relying on formalist 
analysis.162  The majority, led by Justice Anthony Kennedy, selectively 
framed Hawaiian history:163 it blurred the lines between Indigenous 
Maoli and Rice’s ancestors (American colonists),164 and it ruled that 
ancestry was a “proxy for race.”165  Ironically, although the majority 
invalidated the State’s voting process for OHA trustees because the 
“use of racial classifications is corruptive of the whole legal order 
democratic elections seek to preserve,”166 it effectively used the rule of 
 
States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
157. Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547, 1548, 1553?58 (D. Haw. 1997).  For more 
discussion on contextual analysis, see infra Part IV.A. 
158. Rice, 963 F. Supp. at 1551?52. 
159. Id. at 1553?54. 
160. Id. at 1554–55. 
161. Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 1998). 
162. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 498–99, 524 (2000). 
163. Colonization and the Americans’ role in overthrowing Hawai‘i’s sovereign 
government is explained away.  As one example: “The United States was not the only country 
interested in Hawai[‘]i and its affairs, but by the later part of the century the reality of 
American dominance in trade, settlement, economic expansion, and political influence 
became apparent.”  Id. at 504. 
164. See id. at 507–11. 
165. Id. at 514 (“Ancestry can be a proxy for race.  It is that proxy here.”). 
166. Id. at 517. 
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law to allow non-natives to once again attempt to direct the 
management of Indigenous Hawaiian land and other resources, which 
the establishment of OHA had specifically sought to rectify.167 
Justice John Paul Stevens’ dissent criticized the majority’s holding, 
insisting that it rested “largely on the repetition of glittering generalities 
that have little, if any, application to the compelling history of the State 
of Hawaii.”168  The majority failed to acknowledge the effects of 
annexation, the influx of infectious diseases, and the displacement of 
Native Hawaiians from their lands, all of which continue to take a toll 
on Native Hawaiians.169 
The Supreme Court’s majority decision reveals how legal formalists 
pick and choose their method of analysis, such as applying a certain line 
of cases to select facts to serve their own purpose.  Formalist analysis is 
often deployed to achieve a desired result, while appearing “neutral” 
and as if the decision-makers were simply applying the “rule of law.”  
Rice demonstrates that legal scholars and practitioners must examine 
the values and interests that form the lens through which a decision-
maker will view and rule on evidence if they hope to rectify historic 
wrongs. 
2. The Emergence of Legal Realism 
Legal realism emerged in the 1920s to “challenge[] the basic 
understanding of the law as a formula that produces ‘correct’ or ‘just’ 
results when mechanically applied to specific cases.”170  Legal realism is 
an approach to legal decision-making that recognizes that “[s]ocial 
context, the facts of the case, judges’ ideologies, and professional 
consensus critically influence individual judgments and patterns of 
decisions over time.”171  Realists contended that the so-called rule of law 
“created an illusion of certainty that masked the unspoken social and 
political assumptions guiding much judicial decision making.  The 
exposure of this illusion of certainty led to [r]ealist pronouncements of 
 
167. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing OHA’s mission). 
168. Rice, 528 U.S. at 527–28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
169. See id. at 532, 534. 
170. Isaac Moriwake, Comment, Critical Excavations: Law, Narrative, and the Debate on 
Native American and Hawaiian “Cultural Property” Repatriation, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 261, 
287 (1998).  For an in-depth analysis of Legal Realism and related theories, see Singer, supra 
note 131, and Bell, supra note 137, at 365. 
171. Singer, supra note 131, at 470. 
12 - SPROAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2011  12:41 PM 
2011] WAI THROUGH K?N?WAI 161 
the indeterminate nature of the law.”172  Legal realists worked to 
“develop new kinds of general rules that would be useful in predicting 
legal outcomes and in shaping the law better to serve the needs of 
society.”173  In doing so, legal realists inspired a host of other 
movements, including law and society, critical legal studies, feminist 
legal theory, law and economics, and critical race theory.174 
More recently, empirical research has documented the role and 
degree of philosophical influences on judicial decisions.175  “Judges 
routinely admit the presence of ideological influence on decisions, but 
they also insist that it comes into play in a relatively small proportion of 
cases.”176  “More dramatic differences tend to show up in areas in which 
judges have a greater discretion and the issues at stake have strong 
 
172. Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach 
to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025, 1055–56 (2003) 
(citations omitted); see also John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies 
Forward to Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 
DUKE L.J. 84, 88?89 (1995). 
173. Singer, supra note 131, at 471. 
174. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 326?28 (1987); see also Bell, supra note 137, at 363?68.  Critical 
legal studies and critical race theory are discussed in more detail in Parts III.B and III.C, 
respectively.  For additional information on critical legal studies, see Duncan Kennedy & Karl 
E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461, 461–62 (1984).  For 
more background on the law and society movement see Austin Sarat, Vitality Amidst 
Fragmentation: On the Emergence of Postrealist Law and Society Scholarship, in THE 
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 1 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004).  For insight on 
feminist legal theory, see Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 
42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 586–90 (1990).  For a more detailed discussion of law and economics 
see generally Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757 
(1975). 
175. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 8 (“Balanced realism recognizes the inevitability of 
various political influences on judging, but it also identifies the appropriate role and limits of 
this influence.”); see also Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of 
Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 261 (1995) (“Evidence also 
exists of a correlation between the president appointing a judge and case outcomes.”); 
Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the 
First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 347–54 (2003).  
See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure 
of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965 (2007). 
176. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 144.  Individual judges have also conceded that 
“their different backgrounds, experiences, perceptions, and former involvements” are all 
“part of the intellectual capital they bring to the bench.”  Id.; see also Gregory C. Sisk & 
Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical 
Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 754 (2005); Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. 
Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1476–79 (2003). 
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ideological or personal overtones.”177  Yet judges are not “free agents” 
doing as they please: “[J]udges are subject to very significant 
constraints,” including public perceptions of their legitimacy.178 
Discussed in depth in Part IV.A, below, contextual analysis 
establishes that in order to understand how the law operates both 
generally and for Native Peoples in particular, the legal community and 
the community at large must know: Who crafts the laws?  Who 
interprets the laws?  Who benefits from the laws?  Who is hurt by the 
laws?  What is at stake when the laws are “blindly” applied?  And, what 
institutional and public constraints limit judges in their decision-
making?179 
B.  The Evolution of Critical Legal Analysis 
Like other jurisprudential schools, critical legal analysis emerged 
from the shadows of legal realism in the 1980s to “critique[] the 
ostensible objectivity and neutrality of the law and the legal process.”180  
Critical legal scholars agreed with many of the realists’ fundamental 
insights, including that institutional practices and political views heavily 
influenced the judicial process.181  Similar to the realists, critical legal 
scholars expressed “skepticism that law can produce determinate results 
 
177. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 141 (internal quotations omitted).  “The differences 
on specific issues can rise to shocking levels: Carter-appointed judges upheld minority claims 
in race discrimination cases 78 percent of the time, whereas Reagan appointees did so 18 
percent (this extreme difference was almost double the next largest disparity).”  Id. at 140 
(citing C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURTS 49 (1996)).  See generally Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds and 
Judicial Decision-Making, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1551 (1966). 
178. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 144 (quotations omitted); see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1833 (2005) (“Justices who defy 
aroused public opinion risk, and they know that they risk, provoking a political backlash that 
ultimately could cause their doctrinal handiwork to collapse.”).  Following Bush v. Gore, 533 
U.S. 98 (2000), the Supreme Court justices’ motives and integrity were criticized by the 
public.  JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 
178 (2007).  Their decision was deemed “a sham, a political fix, a putsch.”  Id.  In response, 
Scalia said, “[w]e had to do something, because countries were laughing at us.”  Id. 
179. See JUAN PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A 
DIVERSE AMERICA 3?4 (2000) (articulating tools of critical inquiry, including the questions 
identified here); Scholar Advocacy Workshop #1 with Eric K. Yamamoto, Professor of Law, 
William S. Richardson School of Law, in Honolulu, Haw. (June 1, 2011) (same). 
180. Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Race, Rights and Reparation: An Overview, in RACE, 
RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 3, 12 (2001) 
[hereinafter Yamamoto et al., Race, Rights and Reparation]. 
181. Id. 
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free from reference to value, politics, or historical conditions.”182 
 
Critical Legal Studies is characterized by skepticism toward the 
liberal vision of the rule of law, by a focus on the role of legal 
ideas in capturing human consciousness, by agreement that 
fundamental change is required to attain a just society, and by a 
utopian conception of a world more communal and less 
hierarchical than the one we know now.183  
 
Importantly, critical legal scholars moved beyond legal realism to 
challenge the power structure that underpins society.  For example, 
scholars pointed out that law and the judicial process were in difficult 
cases often a function of “hidden politics” that used the guise of neutral 
decision-making to maintain the social and legal status quo and benefit 
those in power.184  These scholars questioned the ability of the law to 
level the playing field and instead viewed the legal process as a tool to 
distract underrepresented groups with the notion of rights while 
continuing to marginalize them.185  Over time, different schools of 
thought emerged within critical legal analysis, and the movement 
became fractionalized.186 
Despite its insights, critical legal analysis was challenged as elitist 
and out of touch with the majority of society.187  This “ivory tower” 
discourse made for interesting debates, but did not go far enough to 
bring about real change on the ground in the communities that needed it 
the most.188  Critical legal studies also failed to resonate completely with 
people of color and other marginalized groups who recognized the law’s 
ability to subordinate, but who also refused to abandon the legal system 
wholesale due to its potential to liberate when applied in the right 
context.189 
 
182. Matsuda, supra note 174, at 326–27, 332 (citations omitted). 
183. Id. at 326?27.  
184. Yamamoto et al., Race, Rights and Reparation, supra note 180, at 12. 
185. Id. 
186. See infra notes 198–199 and accompanying text.   
187. Matsuda, supra note 174, at 342–45. 
188. Id. at 345–49. 
189. See Eric Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering 
Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 869 (1997) [hereinafter 
Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis] (“[Marginalized groups] understand the limits of ‘rights talk’ 
and the ways in which civil rights laws can be used to reinforce the racial status quo.  They 
also, however, perceive potentially transformative value in law and rights assertion for 
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C.  Insights of Critical Race Theory 
Critical race theory emerged in the late 1980s190 and altered critical 
legal theory by infusing the voices and experiences of people of color.191  
Much of this theory arose out of concern “over the slow pace of racial 
reform in the United States” as well as the notion “that the civil rights 
movement of the 1960s had stalled, and indeed that many of its gains 
were being rolled back.”192  It also developed as a reaction to critical 
legal studies’ “trashing” of civil rights discourse.193  To address these 
setbacks, critical race scholars challenged institutionalized racism and 
sought to remedy injustice for a host of marginalized groups.194  Critical 
 
disempowered groups, and they embrace modernist notions of hope and justice through 
reconceived ideas of law and political struggle.”); see also Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1356 
(critiquing critical legal studies’ “failure to analyze the hegemonic role of racism”).  
Conservatives also criticized critical legal studies, claiming that it completely abandoned the 
rule of law, which amounted to nihilism.  Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984) (calling critical legal studies scholars “nihilists” and asking 
them to leave the legal academy); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13–16 (1986) (contending that the critical legal studies field was 
dangerous because it “mean[s] the death of the law, as we have known it throughout history, 
and as we have come to admire it”). 
190. Some trace the evolution of critical race theory to the 1970s.  Compare Introduction 
to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE xv, xvi (Richard Delgado & Jean 
Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic] (“Critical [r]ace [t]heory sprang 
up in the mid-1970s with the early work of Derrick Bell (an African American) and Alan 
Freeman (a white) . . . .”), with Francisco Valdes et al., Introduction: Battles Waged, Won, and 
Lost: Critical Race Theory at the Turn of the Millennium, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND 
A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 1, 1 (Francisco Valdes, et al. eds., 2002) (pinpointing 
critical race theory’s emergence in the legal academy in “the late 1980s”), and Crenshaw, 
supra note 3. 
191. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR 
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 355?80 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, 
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 
2323?26 (1989); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a 
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1392?1406 (1991); Tsosie, 
supra note 74, at 43 (finding that critical race theory “enables us to transcend formal equality 
and, building on the truth of the political, social, economic and spiritual conditions 
experienced by a people, to analyze alternative possibilities to achieve justice”); Patricia J. 
Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 409?410 (1987). 
192. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 190, at xvi. 
193. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 158 (1991); Robert 
L. Hayman, Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and Postmodern Constitutional 
Traditionalism, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 61 (1995); Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, 
supra note 189, at 869. 
194. See, e.g., Tsosie, supra note 74, at 22.  Critical race theory “is a jurisprudence of 
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race scholars, like the critical legal scholars before them, viewed the law 
and legal rules as indeterminate.  At the same time, as Mari Matsuda 
observed, “[t]he minority experience of dual consciousness 
accommodates both the idea of legal indeterminacy as well as the core 
belief in a liberating law that transcends indeterminacy.”195  Critical race 
theory thus “illuminates and offers a beginning response to the 
limitations of legal justice for racial minorities.  It does so by employing 
critical pragmatic tools to examine racial justice in connection with the 
interplay of law, race, culture, and social structure.”196 
Grounded in critical theory, critical race scholars explored how the 
law excluded certain groups and benefitted others; in doing so, these 
scholars helped to “reveal the social construction of legal concepts 
presented as fixed and natural, challenge the efficacy of both liberal 
legal theory and communitarian ideals as vehicles for racial progress, 
destabilize the supposedly neutral criteria of meritocracy and social 
order, and call for a re-examination of the very concept of ‘race.’”197 
 
 Critical race theorists have not placed their faith in neutral 
procedures and the substantive doctrines of formal equality; 
rather, critical race theorists assert that both the procedures and 
substance of American law, including American 
antidiscrimination law, are structured to maintain white 
privilege.  Neutrality and objectivity are not just unattainable 
ideals; they are harmful fictions that obscure the normative 
supremacy of whiteness in American law and society.198 
 
possibility precisely because it rejects standard liberal frameworks and precisely because it 
seeks to be inclusive of different groups and different experiences.”  Id. 
195. Matsuda, supra note 174, at 341. 
196. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 189, at 867. 
197. Id. at 868 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Delgado & Stefancic, supra 
note 190, at xvi. 
198. Valdes et al., supra note 190, at 1.  Charles R. Lawrence III, Mari Matsuda, Richard 
Delgado and Kimberlè Williams Crenshaw identify the “defining elements” of critical race 
theory.  See MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, 
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6–7 (1993).  Critical race theory 
“recognizes that racism is endemic to American life.”  Id. at 6.  It is skeptical about 
“dominant legal claims of neutrality, objectivity, color blindness, and meritocracy” and 
“challenges ahistoricism and insists on a contextual/historical analysis of the law.”  Id.  It 
“insists on recognition of the experiential knowledge of people of color . . . in analyzing law 
and society” and “is interdisciplinary and eclectic.”  Id.  Finally, it “works toward the end of 
eliminating racial oppression as part of the broader goal of ending all forms of oppression.”  
Id. 
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Critical race theory has come a long way since its inception.  The 
focus on anti-discrimination law and the larger goal of equality opened 
doors for a new civil rights legal analysis.  Different schools of thought 
have evolved199 and offshoots and methodologies200 have grown and 
changed over time.  Together, “[c]ritical race theorists demand not only 
simple legal reform but also actual social transformation; the prize has 
become social, economic, and political equity, not formal equality.”201 
IV.  CONTEXTUAL LEGAL INQUIRY INTO INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ 
CLAIMS AND ADJUDICATORY RULINGS 
Critical race theory’s insight, particularly its identification of 
institutional or systemic roots of subordination and proactive emphasis 
on social transformation, provides an apt foundation for contextual 
inquiry into Indigenous Peoples’ legal claims by Western courts and 
decision-making bodies.  At the same time, just as critical legal studies 
failed to acknowledge the persistence of racism and significance of civil 
rights claims for communities of color, critical race theory does not fully 
illuminate legal controversies for Native Peoples.202  Although Mari 
 
199. One example of the different schools of thought that have evolved are idealists who 
combat discrimination by seeking to eliminate negative images versus realists or materialists 
who believe that material factors are more decisive.  Tsosie, supra note 74, at 22–29.  For 
another in-depth discussion of a different school of thought within critical race theory, see 
Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive Nature of Discrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2365 (2003). 
200. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM 4–8 
(Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2003) (describing various feminist canons having grown out of 
Critial Race Theory).  See generally HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING: 
CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES 147?170 (1995); Delgado & 
Stefancic, supra note 199, at xvii–xviii (identifying some of critical race theory’s unique 
methodologies, including different forms of legal writing, such as storytelling, satire, etc.); 
Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. 
L. REV. 2411, 2435–41 (1989); Harris, supra note 174, at 590–601; Charles R. Lawrence, III, If 
He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 438–49 
(1990); Francisco Valdes, Poised at the Cusp: LatCrit Theory, Outsider Jurisprudence and 
Latina/o Self Empowerment, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 52?58 (1997); Francisco Valdes, Sex 
and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities & Inter-Connectivities, 5 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 25, 46–64 (1995).  The use of narrative in feminist and critical 
race scholarship has been criticized by some.  See generally Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna 
Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay On Legal Narratives, 45 STAN L. REV. 807 
(1993). 
201. See Valdes et al., supra note 190, at 4. 
202. Yamamoto & Lyman, supra note 84, at 344; see also Robert A. Williams, Jr., 
Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theories for Peoples of 
Color, 5 LAW & INEQ. 103, 122 (1987) (“Among the perils of [critical legal studies] for 
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Matsuda203 and Eric Yamamoto204 opened the critical race theory door to 
Indigenous Peoples’ claims through their key works, the larger body of 
critical race theory does not expressly integrate Indigenous Peoples’ 
inimitable histories, cultural factors, and present day goals.205  For Native 
Peoples, the pursuit of justice is less about equality and more about self-
determination, including the return and restoration of traditional lands 
and other resources.206  Although critical race theory offers an important 
starting point for contextual legal inquiry into Native Peoples’ claims, 
there are “often substantial differences among immigrant racial 
populations in America, imported slaves, and conquered indigenous 
peoples.”207  Given these dissimilarities, contextual legal inquiry into 
Native claims must “focus[] on the effects of land dispossession, 
cultur[al] destruction, loss of sovereignty, and, in turn, on claims to self-
determination and nationhood (rather than equality and integration).”208 
A.  Contextual Legal Analysis: A Synthesis 
Flowing from legal realism’s critique of formalism and the key 
insights of critical race theory, contextual legal analysis synthesizes the 
most important insights of the “new realism” and critical inquiry.  This is 
especially important in highly complex and controversial cases such as 
N? Wai ‘Eh?, where decision-makers often employ formalist language to 
shroud the actual dynamics of their rulings.  As quantitative studies 
 
peoples of color is its tendency to abandon and marginalize reliance upon what it regards as a 
false vision. . . .  It is far too easy for someone on a law professor’s salary to offer open-ended 
reconstructive projects which may bring immense benefits to a future generation.”). 
203. Matsuda wrote the seminal article on reparations for K?naka Maoli.  Matsuda, 
supra note 174, at 368–88; see also Tsosie, supra note 74, at 41–43 (calling for the development 
of critical race theory in the realm of Native Peoples’ environmental justice claims). 
204. Eric Yamamoto established the need for critical race theorists to modify their 
analysis to account for the unique interests and values of Native Peoples in Racializing 
Environmental Justice, supra note 84, at 344. 
205. Id.  A number of scholars have examined Native issues using critical race theory 
methodologies.  See, e.g., Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 197–99; Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1455, 1475–78 (2002).  See generally Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, 
Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 625 (1990). 
206. See, e.g., S. James Anaya, The Native Hawaiian People and International Human 
Rights Law: Toward a Remedy for Past and Continuing Wrongs, 28 GA. L. REV. 309, 342 
(1994) [hereinafter Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law]; Tsosie, 
supra note 74, at 42–43; Yamamoto & Lyman, supra note 84, at 311. 
207. Yamamoto & Lyman, supra note 84, at 344. 
208. Id. 
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have demonstrated, however, contextual factors and political 
perspectives play a significant role in shaping adjudicatory outcomes, 
even though decision-makers may feel constrained to follow the rules to 
appear legitimate. 
“A recent study of the Supreme Court found ‘strong evidence that 
legal principles are influential.’  But it cannot be denied that the 
ideological views of justices have some impact on their legal 
decisions.”209  This is particularly applicable in difficult cases like N? Wai 
‘Eh? that have tremendous cultural, economic, legal, and political 
ramifications because “judges have admitted for decades that personal 
values can have an influence on their decision in uncertain or hard 
cases.”210  Empirical studies have also “suggest[ed] that judges care[] 
about getting the correct legal result.”211  Despite the pressure to appear 
legitimate, every decision requires judgment calls that are influenced by 
individual perspectives.  “[J]udges’ personal philosophies enter into 
their decision-making when statute or precedent does not point their 
discretion in one direction or constrain it in another. . . .  In such cases 
personal philosophies may well play a significant role in judging.”212  For 
 
209. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 132 (quoting Michael J. Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, 
Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 102 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 369, 381 (2008)); see id. (noting that despite the role of 
precedent, “the ideological views of Supreme Court justices have a measurable influence on 
their legal decisions”); VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 
30–32 (2006); Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A 
Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 238 (1999) (“[P]robing all civil rights and liberties and 
economics decisions by the Supreme Court between 1969 and 1985, finds unanimous 
decisions distinctly more liberal than nonunanimous decisions . . . [and] concludes that 
ideology clearly affects unanimous civil rights and liberties decisions.”); Gregory C. Sisk, The 
Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision 
Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 879 (2008) (reviewing FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION 
MAKING IN THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS (2007)). 
210. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 146 (emphasis added); see also Michael C. Dorf, 
Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 972 (2003) (“A hard 
case is hard because fleshing out ambiguous legal text calls for a controversial moral 
judgment.”). 
211. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 136; see Frank B. Cross, What Do Judges Want?, 87 
TEX. L. REV. 183, 224 (2008) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008)) 
(“Judge Posner recognizes that the crucial test for pragmatism is not whether it gets an 
individual case ‘right’ (in an equitable or other sense) but instead whether it produces the best 
overall systemic effects.”). 
212. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 143 (quotations omitted) (quoting Patricia M. Wald, 
A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 236 (1999)); see also Frank B. Cross 
& Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1437, 1437–38 (2001). 
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example, “conflicting lines of precedent often exist, allowing judges to 
‘follow those precedents which they like best.’”213  Given the role of 
personal philosophies in decision-making, it is crucial to interrogate 
what the rules say, who the decision-makers are (and what political 
views and ideologies guide them), and what the consequences of a 
decision are.  Without resolving these and other questions, a-contextual 
analysis will continue to hide what is really going on behind the guise of 
impartiality. 
With this backdrop, socio-legal empirical studies have exposed dual 
realities of legal adjudication: (1) decision-makers do not follow 
formalist analysis in controversial cases, but (2) decision-makers 
nevertheless feel constrained to try to follow the rules to appear 
legitimate.  Although experts disagree on the precise impact of 
ideological influence, “[m]ore dramatic differences tend to show up in 
areas in which judges have greater discretion and the issues at stake 
have strong ideological or personal overtones.”214  David E. Klein’s 
study, for example, scrutinized decision-makers’ behavior in legally 
uncertain cases with broad implications (including political 
implications).215  This included “environmental law cases, [and other] 
subjects that are thought to have particular political salience.”216  “The 
key lesson of the ideology effects is quite clear: Judges prefer to adopt 
policies they agree with.”217  In other words, the study “found a 
statistically significant correlation between political preferences and the 
rules adopted: liberal judges preferred liberal rules, whereas 
 
213. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 143?44 (quoting Patricia M. Wald, Changing Course: 
The Use of Precedent in the District of Columbia Circuit, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 477, 481 
(1986)); see also Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of 
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 271 (1997). 
214. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 141; see also ROBERT A. CARP & C. K. ROWLAND, 
POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 60 (1983).  See generally 
Grossman, supra note 177, at 1556?58. 
215. DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 40–
41 (2002); see also TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 136 (discussing Klein’s methodology and 
results); Sisk, supra note 209, at 892 (noting that “empirical studies certainly have confirmed 
that judges, at the margins and in the difficult cases, are influenced by their background, 
experiences, and, yes, even ideology”). 
216. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 136 (discussing KLEIN, supra note 215). 
217. KLEIN, supra note 215, at 81; see also TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 136 (citing 
KLEIN, supra note 215, at 81–85).  See generally Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with 
It?  Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 465 (2001). 
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conservative judges preferred conservative rules.”218 
As detailed herein, contextual legal analysis accounts for both 
realities.  It starts with the language of rules, while acknowledging that 
in complex or controversial cases, rule language alone does not dictate 
the formal legal result.219  As developed in Part III.A, realists and critical 
legal theorists have conclusively demonstrated that the language of most 
substantive rules (or case holdings) is malleable enough to afford legal 
decision-makers a range of choices, each potentially supporting different 
values and interests.220  Contextual legal analysis interrogates the rule-
related choice made (measured against rejected choices), the values and 
interests served by that choice, and its short and long-term 
consequences. 
Contextual legal analysis reveals that in complex cases such as N? 
Wai ‘Eh?, the decisional outcome was not necessarily “objectively 
determined,” as formalist analysis would imply, but rather a matter of 
choices partially influenced by the interests and values accommodation 
undergirding the law and by decision-makers’ political and economic 
perspectives.  This contextual analysis221 helps judges fully and 
accurately assess both the “legal” and “justice” impacts of their 
 
218. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 136.   
 
The novelty of Klein’s study is that, while it confirmed that political influences 
matter in precisely the situations one would expect?legally uncertain cases raising 
politically fraught issues?it also demonstrated that even in these contexts judges do 
not care only about politics but continue to be moved by legal considerations. 
Id. at 136–37; see also Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About 
Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1566?79 (2010). 
219. See supra Part III.A. 
220. See supra Part III.A. 
221. For a discussion of approaches to contextual analysis in law, see Bell, supra note 
137, 364?68; Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597, 
1602?06 (1990) (describing the ways that context matters in decision-making); Eric K. 
Yamamoto, Carly Minner & Karen Winter, Contextual Strict Scrutiny, 49 HOW. L.J. 241 
(2006) (advancing contextual analysis for the Equal Protection Clause’s strict scrutiny 
standard of review).  Without expressly saying so, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court has employed a 
version of contextual legal analysis that has been especially attentive to politics, economics, 
and culture, both historically and in terms of current conditions.  See Wai?hole I, 9 P.3d 409 
(Haw. 2000) (addressing water rights); Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cnty. Planning 
Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995) (addressing traditional and customary Native Hawaiian 
rights of access and gathering); Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 87 P.2d 1247, 1271?72 (Haw. 1992) 
(addressing traditional and customary Native Hawaiian rights of access and gathering); 
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310?11 (Haw. 1982) (addressing water rights); McBryde 
Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1345 (Haw. 1973) (addressing water rights). 
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decisions on the people and communities involved, as well as society at 
large.  This reflects the first reality described above (judges do not 
blindly follow precedent). 
The decision-maker is not, however, simply a “free agent” ruling in 
whatever way she prefers.222  The language of the law is important, 
although malleable, because it imposes some degree of constraint upon 
decision-makers who are concerned about legitimacy: the decision-
maker must interpret and apply the law so the result appears at least 
plausible enough to maintain that the judge “followed the rule of law.”  
This assertion reflects the second reality described above.  Again, 
contextual legal inquiry assesses and reveals the range of options 
available to a decision-maker in light of the law’s language and focuses 
on the decision-maker’s choice. 
Having removed the cloak of inevitable neutrality and objectivity, 
contextual legal analysis inquires into and reveals the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of a decision under the rule of law by asking about and 
assessing the context:223  What values and interests are being furthered 
by the rule and according to what policy preference?  What values and 
interests are being disserved?  How would the selection of a competing 
“choice” serve values and interests differently?  How do history and 
current cultural and economic conditions and larger policy concerns 
shed light on whether a decision was appropriate or inappropriate 
(especially when measured against other available choices)? 
In this way, contextual legal analysis integrates both “realities” of 
decision-making in complex or controversial cases, and exposes for 
participants and the public “what is really going on” and “what the 
decision really means.”  Yet, for Indigenous Peoples who are differently 
situated than others because of the long-term impacts of colonialism, 
contextual legal inquiry itself needs further refinement224 to explicitly 
 
222. See Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between 
Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1757?58 (2004) (“A judge’s 
place in the constitutional structure and judicial hierarchy, a judge’s relationship with litigants 
and lawyers, and a judge’s stature in the legal community and broader polity help to explain 
both why judges tend to limit themselves to the cases before them and why judges are 
constrained by existing legal materials in the course of deciding those cases.”). 
223. See PEREA ET AL., supra note 179, at 3?4 (articulating tools of critical inquiry, 
including the questions identified here); Scholar Advocacy Workshop #1 with Eric K. 
Yamamoto, Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, in Honolulu, Haw. 
(June 1, 2011) (same). 
224. Given the importance of contextual legal inquiry (with roots in legal realism and 
critical race theory), a developing contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims must be 
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integrate Native Peoples’ unique history and cultural values into a larger 
analytical framework that accounts for restorative justice and the key 
dimensions of self-determination.225 
B.  Contextual Legal Analysis of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims and 
Adjudicatory Rulings 
Contextual legal inquiry for Native Peoples’ claims employs the 
analytical tools of contextual legal analysis, as just described, in 
assessing how the law operates and should operate and in exposing the 
shortcomings of formalism.  At the same time, this evolving framework 
embraces unique features to discern what justice looks like for 
Indigenous Peoples, particularly where restorative justice is among the 
aims of the legal regime.  Those features often include restoring self-
governance, rebuilding suppressed culture, and returning natural and 
cultural resources upon which culture depends to enable renewed 
spiritual and other connections to the natural environment through 
traditional practices.226  From a broader perspective, this developing 
framework does not focus on “equal treatment,” but instead 
encompasses a restorative justice approach informed by principles of 
self-determination that are particularly apt in light of the ravages of 
colonization.227 
 
specifically tailored to more incisively interrogate government decisions and rulings, 
particularly where the claims are controversial and implicate land, culture, economic 
development, or governance.  See infra Part IV.C.  In unraveling the fundamental struggle 
over water and power in N? Wai ‘Eh?, for example, contextual legal inquiry provides a 
framework to understand what justice truly means for K?naka Maoli and Hawai‘i’s 
community at large.  This analysis also exposes how a mechanistic approach to the law often 
prevents participants and society from discerning the actual injustice of an action or decision.  
225. Applying Hawai‘i’s Constitution or Water Code without the necessary historical or 
cultural context, for example, can ignore the fundamental importance of water to Maoli 
people and culture and the significance of cultivating the staple crop, kalo, both as an 
important source of food and as the symbolic act of caring for an elder sibling?not to 
mention specific legal provisions enacted to protect these rights and interests.  See supra 
Part II.  Too formalistic of an approach also dismisses deep cultural harms that colonialism in 
general and the relatives of plantation owners in particular imposed on K?naka Maoli 
throughout Hawai‘i for over a century both within and beyond N? Wai ‘Eh?.  HONOLULU 
BD. OF WATER SUPPLY, WATER FOR LIFE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF WATER ON 
O‘AHU, available at http://www.boardofwatersupply.com/files/Wfl_Website.pdf (explaining 
that the sugar industry created a huge demand for water, and “[d]iverting the water ultimately 
meant diverting everything”); TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 15?19 (detailing the specific 
impacts of plantations on N? Wai ‘Eh?). 
226. See infra Part IV.C. 
227. See supra Part II.A; see also Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, 
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More specifically, tailoring this contextual legal framework for 
Native Peoples requires attention to four realms (or “values”) of 
restorative justice embodied in the human rights principle of self-
determination: (1) cultural integrity; (2) lands and natural resources; 
(3) social welfare and development; and (4) self-government.228  
Indigenous Peoples have been damaged by the forces of colonialism in 
each of these four realms, which are both customarily significant and 
recognized by international human rights principles as salient 
dimensions of restorative justice.229 
As detailed herein, each of the four values of self-determination and 
restorative justice for Native Peoples is significant because they are 
inextricably intertwined.  Culture cannot exist in a vacuum and its 
integrity is linked to land and other natural and cultural resources upon 
which Indigenous Peoples depend for physical and spiritual survival.230  
In turn, Native communities’ social welfare is defined by cultural 
veracity and access to, and the health of, natural resources.231  Finally, 
cultural and political sovereignty determine who will control Indigenous 
Peoples’ destinies (including the resources that define their cultural 
integrity and social welfare) and whether that fate will be shaped 
internally or by outside forces (including colonial powers).232 
Colonization imposed significant cultural harms on Native Peoples, 
especially in the realms of cultural integrity, lands and natural resources, 
social welfare, and self-government.233  In the context of K?naka Maoli, 
 
and the Seventh Generation, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 47, 89?102 (2008); R. H?k?lei Lindsey, 
Native Hawaiians and the Ceded Lands Trust: Applying Self-Determination as an Alternative 
to the Equal Protection Analysis, 34 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 223, 257 (2009–2010). 
228. See Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, 
at 342?60.  Jim Anaya coalesced international human rights principles of self-determination 
to identify the four analytical categories utilized in this developing framework.  Id.; see also 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007). 
229. See Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, 
at 342?60; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 
61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007). 
230. See Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, 
at 346?47. 
231. See id. at 348?49. 
232. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 197 (“[T]he central challenge of cultural 
sovereignty is to reach an understanding of sovereignty that is generated from within tribal 
societies and carries a cultural meaning consistent with those traditions.”). 
233. See supra Part II.  As one example, 
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for example, the documented arrival of Westerners in Hawai‘i, 
beginning in 1778 led to physical and cultural genocide, as was the case 
with Indigenous Peoples the world over.234  Living in the most isolated 
island chain in the world made the Native population particularly 
susceptible to introduced diseases.235  K?naka Maoli were decimated, 
with the pre-European contact population going from about a million to 
less than 40,000 within the first century of contact.236  Foreigners also 
employed other tools of colonialism; for example, foreigners imposed 
English as the language of instruction in schools and banned cultural 
activities, including traditional hula dancing.237  Principal among these 
was the displacement of K?naka Maoli from their homelands.238  Over a 
period of years beginning in about 1845, a system of private property 
was imposed.239  Despite best intentions, this resulted in stripping most 
Natives of title to ancestral lands.240  In the end, less than half of one 
percent of Hawai‘i’s total land area was distributed to maka‘?inana (the 
people of the land) via this M?hele process and land quickly passed to 
foreign and largely American interests.241  In addition to severely 
 
many Hawaiians found they no longer could farm or gain access to the traditional 
gathering areas in the mountains and the ocean that once supported them.  Other 
Hawaiians were left landless.  As a result, many were forced to move to urban areas 
to seek employment.  They abandoned traditional subsistence living, which had 
supported the Hawaiian culture for centuries. 
Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 315–16 
(quoting NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK 44 (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie ed., 
1991)). 
234. See O.A. BUSHNELL, THE GIFTS OF CIVILIZATION: GERMS AND GENOCIDE IN 
HAWAI‘I 132?54 (1993) (detailing the impact of foreign diseases on the Maoli population); 
see also Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
315 (quoting NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 233, at 44).  See generally 
STANNARD, supra note 49. 
235. See BUSHNELL, supra note 234, at 134?54 (detailing the impact of foreign diseases 
on the Maoli population).  See generally STANNARD, supra note 49. 
236. See supra note 49; BUSHNELL, supra note 234, at 134?54 (detailing the impact of 
foreign diseases on the Maoli population). 
237. See Richard R. Day, The Ultimate Inequality: Linguistic Genocide, in LANGUAGE 
OF INEQUALITY 163, 166–67 (Nessa Wolfsman & Joan Manes eds., 1985).  
238. See generally KAME‘ELEIHIWA, supra note 36, at 8?16; JON M. VAN DYKE, WHO 
OWNS THE CROWN LANDS OF HAWAI‘I? 30–53 (2008). 
239. For a detailed explanation of the M?hele process, which “transformed the 
traditional Land system from one of communal tenure to private ownership on the capitalist 
model,” see KAME‘ELEIHIWA, supra note 36, at 8–16. 
240. Id. at 9–11. 
241. See supra note 36; DAVIANNA P?MAIKA‘I MCGREGOR, N? KUA‘?INA: LIVING 
HAWAIIAN CULTURE 37?40 (2007).  But see Donovan C. Preza, The Emperical Writes Back: 
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restricting K?naka Maoli’s ability to continue subsistence lifestyles, 
alienation from land and water resources had a devastating 
psychological effect given K?naka Maoli’s strong spiritual and familial 
connection to the land.242  Ultimately, these harms culminated in the 
1893 overthrow of Hawai‘i’s independent Kingdom by a handful of 
missionary descendants assisted by the United States military.243  This is 
just one example; many other Indigenous Peoples have similarly heart-
wrenching stories.244 
 
Re-Examining Hawaiian Dispossession Resulting from the M?hele of 1848 138?43 (May 
2010) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Hawai‘i at M?noa) (on file with author) 
(explaining that the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom ultimately led to the dispossession 
of Maoli from traditional homelands as non-Maoli disproportionately benefitted from 
government land sales.). 
242. Martin et al., supra note 62, at 72?73 (“Just as a plant wilts and loses strength in the 
absence of water, Hawaiian life has suffered as access to water diminished through the 
dominance of foreign beliefs, values, practices and concepts of private property.”). 
243. Apology Resolution, supra note 84.  Maoli today face many social challenges as a 
result of the harms of colonization.  K?naka Maoli are disparately impacted by morbid 
obesity, substance abuse, depression, and other mental illnesses, diabetes, respiratory illness, 
heart disease, and cancer mortality.  BROOKE S. EVANS, OBESITY IN HAWAII: HEALTH 
POLICY OPTIONS 3, 6, available at http://www.publicpolicycenter.hawaii.edu/images/PDF/Ob
esity%20White%20Paper.pdf.  Further, Maoli are disadvantaged socioeconomically.  
S.M. KANA‘IAUPUNI ET AL., INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG NATIVE HAWAIIANS: 
SUMMARY OF KA HUAKA‘I FINDINGS 1 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.ksbe.edu/spi/ 
PDFS/Reports/Demography_Well-being/05_06_5.pdf.  For example, K?naka Maoli families 
in Hawai‘i have the lowest mean family income of all major ethnic groups in the state.  
Id. at 2.  In addition, Maoli are overrepresented and disparately treated in the criminal justice 
system in Hawai‘i.  See generally OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, THE DISPARATE 
TREATMENT OF NATIVE HAWAIIANS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10–13 (2010), 
available at http://www.oha.org/images/stories/files/pdf/reports/ir_final_web_rev.pdf.  The 
study found that Maoli are disproportionately represented at every stage of the criminal 
justice system in Hawai‘i.  Id. at 17.  Further, this disparate impact increases as Maoli navigate 
deeper into the system.  Id.  Taken as a whole, the study’s findings explain “how an 
institution, fueled by tax payers’ dollars, disparately affects a unique indigenous group of 
people, making them even more vulnerable than ever to the loss of land, culture, and 
community.”  Id. at 10. 
244. Native Americans were also forcibly assimilated and stripped of their lands with 
lingering effects.  Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global 
Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 60–63 (1999).  
“[S]ome facts, figures and demographics remain deeply troubling: 31% of the total American 
Indian population, and 51% of Indians residing on reservations, live below the official 
government poverty level; while only 13% of the total United States population is in this 
predicament.”  Id. at 65.  Similarly, after annexation by the British, New Zealand’s Maori 
were also dispossessed of their ancestral homelands and although some gains have been 
made, much remains to be resolved.  See id. at 70?71.  More recently, the Yanomami of the 
Amazon are being driven from their lands by miners, who destroy the forest and bring 
epidemic diseases.  Id. at 76–77.  “Some Yanomami are killing themselves, committing the 
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For these reasons, international human rights principles of self-
determination recognize each of the four realms as salient dimensions of 
restorative justice for Indigenous Peoples, which are necessary to begin 
to address longstanding physical, cultural, and other harms.  “The 
notion of respect for cultural determinism has long been a feature of 
bilateral as well as multilateral treaties.”245  In much the same way, 
Indigenous Peoples’ rights and relationships to ancestral lands and other 
resources have also been recognized and upheld by a host of 
international protections, including the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, which the United States recently signed.246  
Entitlements regarding social welfare and development are “also 
grounded in the U.N. Charter and adjoined to the principle of self-
determination.”247  “In the particular context of indigenous peoples, 
notions of democracy (including decentralized government) join with 
precepts of cultural integrity to create a sui generis self-government 
norm.”248  This norm “upholds the accommodation of spheres of 
 
first known suicides in Yanomami history.”  Id. at 77. 
245. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
343; see also, e.g., Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation, 
Proclaimed by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization, 14th Sess., Nov. 4, 1966, art. I (declaring that “[e]ach culture has a 
dignity and value which must be respected and preserved”); The Convention Against 
Discrimination in Education, Dec. 14, 1960, art. 5, 429 U.N.T.S. 93, 100 (acknowledging “the 
right of members of national minorities to carry on their own educational activities, including 
the maintenance of schools and, depending on the education policy of each State, the use or 
the teaching of their own language”); Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of 
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (defining genocide as “acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such”); 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (upholding rights of freedom of expression, religion, and 
“association with a national minority”). 
246. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 (“All peoples have the right of self-determination.  By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 198 (“Emerging principles of 
international human rights law recognize the distinctive relationship of indigenous peoples to 
their lands and resources, and attempt to define certain rights of self-government and cultural 
protection.”). 
247. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
350.  See U.N. Charter arts. 55–56 (declaring the U.N.’s support of the proposition that “the 
creation of conditions of stability and well-being are necessary for peaceful and friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples”). 
248. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
 
12 - SPROAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2011  12:41 PM 
2011] WAI THROUGH K?N?WAI 177 
governmental or administrative autonomy for indigenous communities, 
while at the same time upholding measures to ensure their effective 
participation in all decisions affecting them left to the larger institutions 
of government.”249 
For Indigenous Peoples, contextual legal analysis entails examining 
history and current socio-economic conditions in the context of the four 
realms related to Native Peoples’ self-governance.  Each of these values 
is customarily significant and recognized by international human rights 
principles of self-determination as salient dimensions of restorative 
justice for Indigenous Peoples.250  “Thus, our challenge today is to reach 
back into the past and locate the core elements which will play a role in 
the development of our collective future.”251 
C.  Four Indigenous Values for Contextual Legal Analysis 
1. Cultural Integrity 
Contextual legal analysis of Indigenous claims highlights cultural 
integrity because of its salience to Native Peoples.252  As Ty K?wika 
Tengan explained, “[c]ulture, place, and gender are deeply intertwined 
and cannot be separated from one another.”253  For example, 
 
355.  Sui generis means “of its own kind or class; unique or peculiar.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009). 
249. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
355; see also Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1174?75 
(2008). 
250. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
342?60; see also W. Michael Reisman, International Law and the Inner Worlds of Others, 9 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 25, 35 (1996) (“Political self-determination and economic self-
determination may be important, but it is the integrity of the inner worlds of peoples—their 
rectitude systems or their senses of spirituality—that is their distinctive humanity.  Without an 
opportunity to determine, sustain, and develop that integrity, their humanity—and ours—is 
denied.”); Wiessner, supra note 249, at 1175 (explaining that Indigenous Peoples should have 
the right to self-determination and to establish a restorative framework). 
251. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 196. 
252. See, e.g., id. at 202 (“[P]ast and future generations [are] related to the present 
generation by core elements of cultural existence which may not be destroyed or removed.  
This is the essence of cultural sovereignty, which posits that culture is the living basis for the 
survival of Indian nations as distinct political and cultural groups.”); see also Marina 
Hadjioannou, The International Human Right to Culture: Reclamation of the Cultural 
Identities of Indigenous Peoples Under International Law, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 201, 226?27 
(2005). 
253. TY P. K?WIKA TENGAN, NATIVE MEN REMADE: GENDER AND NATION IN 
CONTEMPORARY HAWAI‘I 5 (2008). 
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Hawaiian men in general have lost their place and role in 
society.  Often they linked this to the loss of the old ways—the 
religious formations, political systems, cultural practices, and 
relationships to the land that our ancestors knew.  With the 
arrival of colonialism, Christianity, and modernization, all of 
these configurations of knowledge and power were radically 
transformed; some say there were lost to the P? [darkness].254 
 
Given this central role, weighing cultural impacts is a necessary 
starting point for any contextual legal inquiry involving Indigenous 
Peoples.  “The right of indigenous peoples to maintain the integrity of 
their cultures is a simple matter of equality, of being free from historical 
and ongoing practices that have treated indigenous cultures as inferior 
to the dominant cultures.”255  Moreover, this “right to equality and its 
mirror norm of non-discrimination are at the core of the contemporary 
international human rights regime.”256  “While in principle the cultural 
integrity norm can be understood to apply to all segments of humanity, 
the norm has developed remedial aspects particular to indigenous 
peoples in light of their historical and continuing vulnerability.”257  Over 
time, as outsiders have “come to consider indigenous cultures as equal 
in value to all others, the cultural integrity norm has developed to entitle 
indigenous groups like the Native Hawaiian people to affirmative 
measures to remedy the past undermining of their cultural survival and 
to guard against continuing threats in this regard.”258 
 
254. Id. at 5?6. 
255. S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move 
toward the Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 13, 16 (2004) [hereinafter Anaya, 
International Human Rights and Indigenous People]; see also Graham, Reparations, Self-
Determination, and the Seventh Generation, supra note 227, at 103. 
256. Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous People, supra note 255, at 16; 
see also Megan Mooney, How the Organization of American States Took the Lead: The 
Development of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in the Americas, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 553, 556–
70 (2007) (detailing the development of the collective and individual rights of Indigenous 
Peoples); Ruti Teitel, Human Rights Genealogy, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 315?17 (1997) 
(discussing contemporary human rights). 
257. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
345.  This norm applies to “all aspects of an indigenous group’s survival as a distinct culture, 
understanding culture to include economic or political institutions, land use patterns, as well 
as language and religious practices.”  Id. at 343–44; see also Raidza Torres, The Rights of 
Indigenous Populations: The Emerging International Norm, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 127, 159 
(1991). 
258. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
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Indigenous Peoples are in a constant struggle to maintain culture 
and traditional lifestyles due to a myriad of factors, including 
colonization and other pressures of a quickly changing world.259  “From 
an ethical standpoint, the destruction and abuse indigenous heritage has 
suffered at the hands of modern society is simply unwarranted and 
merits reparation.”260  The United Nations affirmed, in its Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, that Natives maintain the right to 
“practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs.  This 
includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and 
future manifestations of their cultures.”261 
Critical legal analysis into Native rights, therefore, must explicitly 
analyze history and socio-economic conditions in the context of cultural 
integrity and whether actions or decisions support and restore cultural 
integrity as a partial remedy for past harms, or perpetuate conditions 
that continue to undermine cultural survival.262  As Rebecca Tsosie and 
Wallace Coffey explain, “[T]radition provides the critical constructive 
material upon which a community rebuilds itself.”263  Exploring impacts 
to Native culture and tradition are, thus, vital to understanding past 
harms and shaping meaningful redress because, “only by delving into 
the inquiry of how our Ancestors saw the world can we truly understand 
the significance of our communities as they are currently constituted, 
appreciating both the strengths and continuities that exist, as well as the 
 
345.  See generally Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Rep., Annex V ¶3, 
U.N. Doc. A/52/18, GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 18 (1997) (detailing the measures to be 
taken to protect Indigenous Peoples). 
259. Kristin Ann Mattiske, Recognition of Indigenous Heritage in the Modern World: 
U.S. Legal Protection in Light of International Custom, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1105, 1109 
(2002). 
260. Id. at 1111. 
261. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Art. 11, G.A. 
Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007); see also Mattiske, supra note 259, at 
1120 (discussing a draft of the declaration). 
262. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
346.  Diversity among Indigenous People, 
 
however, does not undermine the strength of the cultural integrity norm as much as 
it leads to an understanding that the norm requires diverse applications in diverse 
settings.  In all cases, the operative premise is that of securing the survival and 
flourishing of indigenous cultures through mechanisms devised in accordance with 
the preferences of the indigenous peoples concerned. 
Id. 
263. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 199 (quotations omitted). 
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pathologies that destroy community.”264 
2. Land and Resources 
“The importance of lands and resources to the survival of indigenous 
cultures is widely acknowledged.”265  As one example, “[l]ike many 
other native people, [K?naka Maoli] believed that the cosmos was a 
unity of familial relations.  [Their] culture depended on a careful 
relationship with the land, [their] ancestor, who nurtured [them] in body 
and spirit.”266 
Recognizing and respecting this sacred relationship between Native 
Peoples and other natural and cultural resources, including land, is a 
necessary “response to the historical processes that have afflicted 
indigenous peoples, including the Native Hawaiians, by trampling on 
their cultural attachment to ancestral lands, disregarding or minimizing 
their legitimate property interests, and leaving them without adequate 
means of subsistence.”267  Considering this value is also required because 
“[p]roperty has been affirmed as an international human right.”268  
Consequently, 
 
 
264. Id. 
265. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
346; see also JULIAN BURGER, REPORT FROM THE FRONTIER: THE STATE OF THE 
WORLD’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 13?16 (1987) (detailing Indigenous philosophies on land); 
Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 205 (“This relationship between land and the Native 
people transcends the idea of land as a means of physical survival or subsistence.  Land also 
ensures the cultural survival of the Indian people as distinct groups and nations.”). 
266. Preface to HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, LIGHT IN THE CREVICE NEVER SEEN (1994).  
Likewise, this perspective is shared by other Native Peoples.  See Yamamoto & Lyman, supra 
note 84, at 337?38.  Yamamoto and Lyman note that “Native communities in the United 
States tend to share general cultural value and belief systems that are distinguishable from 
those of the Western world.”  Id.  For example, in many American Indian belief systems, 
there exists “an intimate relation between the spiritual world, the physical world, and the 
social world.”  Id. at 336 (quoting Robert A. Williams, Jr., Large Binocular Telescopes, Red 
Squirrel Piñatas, and Apache Sacred Mountains: Decolonizing Environmental Law in a 
Multicultural World, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1133, 1153 (1994)); see also MCGREGOR, N? 
KUA‘?INA, supra note 241, at 4–6. 
267. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
348; see also Lee Swepston, A New Step in the International Law of Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples: ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 677, 696–705 (1990) 
(detailing a concurring analysis of land rights). 
268. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
347; see also Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for 
International Environmental Rights, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 71, 128 (2005). 
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[i]n light of the acknowledged centrality of lands and resources 
to indigenous cultures and economies, the requirement to 
provide meaningful redress for indigenous land claims implies an 
obligation on the part of states to provide remedies that include 
for indigenous peoples the option of regaining lands and access 
to natural resources.269 
 
The appropriation of ancestral homelands and resources facilitates 
Indigenous Peoples’ loss of identity and culture.270  For example, K?naka 
Maoli had an “intricate land system [that] mirrored and sustained the 
complexity of Native Hawaiian spiritual and physical relationships.”271  
Lands also provided and continue to offer a means of self-determination 
because a land base allows Indigenous Peoples to live and develop 
freely272 to pursue their cultural and political sovereignty.273 
A developing contextual framework for Native Peoples therefore 
must directly analyze history and current socio-economic conditions 
with the intent of understanding whether a particular action perpetuates 
the subjugation of ancestral lands, resources, and rights, or attempts to 
redress historical injustices in a significant way.  This is especially 
important given that “the histories that have been constructed about 
Native people are often inaccurate and have been used to justify the 
dispossession of Native peoples from their lands, resources, and even 
their cultural identity.”274 
3. Social Welfare and Development 
The concepts of social welfare and development are also integral to 
any contextual legal inquiry into Indigenous claims because these values 
 
269. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
348?49; see also Sweptson, supra note 267, at 696?705; Jon M. Van Dyke, The Political Status 
of the Native Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 97?98 (1998) (“The Native 
Hawaiians belong to the only native group in the United States that has never been allowed 
to utilize a claims commission or other mechanism to seek redress for its losses from the 
federal government.”). 
270. Sweptson, supra note 267, at 705. 
271. Lindsey, supra note 227, at 243. 
272. Id. at 238. 
273. Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1063 & 
n.79 (2007) (“[T]erritorial and political sovereignty are inextricably linked with cultural 
sovereignty[,] and . . . cultural devastation is [a] likely consequence if tribes lose [the] ability 
to live in separate, self-governing communities.”). 
274. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 200. 
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are aimed at remedying two distinct but related historical 
phenomena that result in most indigenous communities living in 
an economically disadvantaged condition.  The first such 
phenomenon entails the progressive plundering of indigenous 
peoples’ lands and resources over time, processes that have 
impaired or, as in the case of Native Hawaiians, devastated 
indigenous economies and subsistence life and left indigenous 
people among the poorest of the poor.  The second corresponds 
with patterns of discrimination that have tended to exclude 
members of indigenous communities from enjoyment of the 
social welfare benefits generally available in the states within 
which they live.275 
 
During the colonization of Hawai‘i, many K?naka Maoli did not 
obtain Western title to their ancestral homelands and became members 
of the “floating population crowding into the congested tenement 
districts of the larger towns and cities of the Territory under conditions 
which many believed would inevitably result in the extermination of the 
race.”276  Today, Maoli “comprise the most economically disadvantaged 
and otherwise ill-ridden sector of the Islands’ population. . . .  Native 
Hawaiians are overrepresented among the ranks of welfare recipients 
and prison inmates and are underrepresented among high school and 
college graduates, professionals, and political officials.”277 
Given the importance of “health, education, an adequate standard of 
living,”278 and other social welfare measures to the continued survival of 
any group, contextual inquiry into Native claims must examine history 
and socio-economic considerations.  Hopefully, this will expose whether 
a given action or decision improves social welfare conditions or 
perpetuates the status quo of Natives bringing up the bottom of most, if 
 
275. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
352?53 (citations omitted); see also Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal 
Indian Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1751, 1760?61 (2003). 
276. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
315 (quoting NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 233, at 44). 
277. Id. at 317; see also Graham, supra note 227, at 92 (“There is little doubt that 
centuries of land dispossession, cultural and political oppression, and discrimination have led 
to many of the social welfare challenges facing Native American nations today.”). 
278. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
351.  For a detailed explanation on social welfare rights, see William E. Forbath, 
Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1821, 1855?67 (2001). 
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not all, socio-economic indicators.279  Put simply: does a decision have 
the potential to improve health, education, and living standards, or not? 
4. Self-governance 
Finally, Native Peoples’ contextual legal inquiry should address 
Indigenous groups’ ability to manage their political and cultural 
sovereignty.  Because years and generations of colonization around the 
world facilitated 
 
their non-dominant positions within the states where they live, 
indigenous communities and their members typically have been 
denied full and equal participation in the political processes that 
have sought to govern them.  [Moreover, e]ven as indigenous 
individuals have been granted full rights of citizenship and 
overtly racially discriminatory policies have diminished, the 
persistent condition of indigenous groups is typically that of 
economically disadvantaged numerical minorities.  This 
condition, shared by Native Hawaiians, is one of political 
vulnerability.280 
 
Throughout what is now considered the United States, the 
systematic dispossession of Indigenous Peoples from their lands and 
other resources facilitated the loss of political autonomy, leaving many 
Native populations dependent upon the federal government.  In 
response, international human rights law recognizes Indigenous Peoples’ 
unique relationship to their lands and resources and has attempted to 
define rights of self-government and cultural protection.281  Cultural and 
political sovereignty is essential for Indigenous Peoples’ self-
determination.  Unfortunately, however, “the nation-states (including 
the United States) have refused to recognize indigenous peoples’ rights 
to self-determination—the realization of a separate autonomous 
political existence that would limit or constrain the ability of the 
 
279. See supra notes 243–244 and accompanying text (detailing social welfare impacts on 
Indigenous Peoples). 
280. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
356; see also Angela (Riya) Kuo, Let Her Will Be Done: The Role of the Kamehameha 
Schools’ Admissions Policy in Promoting Native Hawaiian Self-Determination, 13 ASIAN PAC. 
AM. L.J. 72, 73?78 (2008); Van Dyke, supra note 269, at 96 (“Native Hawaiians are now at the 
bottom of the socio-economic scale in their own lands.”).  See generally Forbath, supra note 
278. 
281. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 198. 
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colonizing nations to control the political existence of indigenous 
peoples.”282 
For example, not dissimilar from other places around the world, the 
history of Hawai‘i 
 
is a story of violence, in which that colonialism literally and 
figuratively dismembered the l?hui (the people) from their 
traditions, their lands, and ultimately their government.  [In 
Hawai‘i, t]he mutilations were not physical only, but also 
psychological and spiritual.  Death came not only through 
infection and disease, but through racial and legal discourse that 
crippled the will, confidence, and trust of the K?naka Maoli as 
surely as leprosy and smallpox claimed their limbs and lives.283 
 
Although scholars disagree about the implications of the United 
States’ role in the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom,284 it is 
difficult to deny the deplorable social welfare conditions and political 
vulnerabilities that continue to plague the Maoli community.285  The 
United States has thus far refused to “federally recognize” the inherent 
sovereignty of K?naka Maoli.  Remedial measures to redress the health, 
educational, and other disparate impacts of colonialism continue to be 
challenged, circularly, using laws that were specifically crafted to protect 
historically disadvantaged groups, leaving Maoli physically and 
politically vulnerable.286 
 
282. Id. 
283. OSORIO, supra note 139, at 3.  
284. See, e.g., Julian Aguon, The Commerce of Recognition (Buy One Ethos, Get One 
Free): Toward Curing the Harm of the United States’ International Wrongful Acts in the 
Hawaiian Islands, ‘OHIA (forthcoming 2012) (deconstructing K?naka Maoli international law 
claims); Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 
314?15 (“United States troops invaded Hawaii and helped depose the King’s successor, 
Queen Liliuokalani, and replace her with a provisional government.  American residents 
subsequently established the short-lived ‘Republic of Hawai‘i’ and forced the imprisoned 
Queen to abdicate officially.  The United States formally annexed Hawaii in 1898, despite the 
fact that the only expression of indigenous Hawaiian opinion on the issue was a petition to 
Congress, signed by about 29,000 Hawaiians, protesting the annexation.”); Tsosie, supra note 
74, at 32 (quoting Matsuda, supra note 174, at 370) (“[T]he overthrow was accomplished by 
the use of ‘American military intervention against the will of a majority of Hawaiian citizens, 
in violation of international law as well as American foreign policy.’”). 
285. See, e.g., supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
286. See supra Part III.A.1 (deconstructing the Rice litigation and its impact on K?naka 
Maoli); infra Part IV.D (analyzing the Doe v. Kamehameha Schools litigation). 
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Given this painful history, a developing contextual legal framework 
for Native claims must consider whether a decision perpetuates 
historical conditions imposed by colonizers or will attempt to redress the 
loss of self-governance.  Time and again, “the law often replicates the 
same script portrayed in American history.”287  This is especially 
important because histories written by non-Native “people to justify the 
colonial conquest and dispossession of Native people continue to 
provide the truth in cases where Native testimony is perceived as biased 
and non-Native experts are seen as biased purveyors of truth.”288 
Together, these four realms—(1) cultural integrity; (2) lands and 
natural resources; (3) social welfare and development; and (4) self-
government—inform the contextual legal analysis of history and current 
socio-economic conditions necessary to discern the true impacts of 
actions or decisions on Native Peoples. 
D.  Brief Illustration of Contextual Legal Analysis of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Claims and Adjudicatory Rulings 
One recent case offers insight into how differing modes of analysis—
formalist and contextual—yield starkly contrasting assessments of court 
rulings in a K?naka Maoli legal controversy.  The differing appraisals 
underscore the importance of contextual legal analysis for Indigenous 
Peoples’ claims, especially in politically-charged cases. 
In Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate,289 the 
federal courts wrestled with whether a post-civil war reconstruction 
statute required a private school, created to educate K?naka Maoli 
children, to change its admission policy and admit non-natives.290  The 
Kamehameha Schools is a “charitable testamentary trust established by 
the last direct descendent of King Kamehameha I, Princess Bernice 
Pauahi Bishop, who left her property in trust for a school dedicated to 
the education and upbringing of Native Hawaiians.”291  Plaintiff, a non-
native applicant, challenged the school’s admissions policy on the 
grounds that he was denied entry because of his race, violating a civil 
 
287. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 201. 
288. See id. 
289. 295 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Haw. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 416 F.3d 1025 (9th 
Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc granted sub nom., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Kamehameha, 441 F.3d 1029 
(9th Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc sub nom., Doe v. Kamehameha, 470 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006). 
290. See, e.g., Kamehameha, 470 F.3d at 829. 
291. Id. at 831 (quoting Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 
663 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
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rights law that bans racial discrimination when making or enforcing 
contracts.292 
At the outset, Judge Alan Kay of the District Court for the District 
of Hawai‘i faced a United States Supreme Court case (where a 
University denied African Americans admission to maintain a white 
student body) that interpreted the civil rights law and held that private 
schools cannot employ race to exclude applicants.293  The formalist 
analysis urged by plaintiff would have deemed the case “binding” and 
invalidated Kamehameha’s admissions policy without attention to the 
historical setting, current conditions, or larger consequences for 
Hawai‘i’s Indigenous People.294  The one exception to the civil rights 
law’s racial differentiation prohibition rested on a judicial finding that 
the underlying policy addressed a “legitimate remedial purpose.”295  
“Precedent” interpreting that language, however, focused on affirmative 
action in private businesses, which was inapplicable in Doe.296  Formalist 
analysis thus appeared to dictate rejection of Kamehameha’s arguments. 
Judge Kay focused on the same legal language of the exception but 
deeply contextualized the interpretation.  He found that history linked 
to current socio-economic conditions rendered the school’s admissions 
policy both “remedial” and “legitimate,” and he granted summary 
judgment in favor of Kamehameha.297 
Judge Kay acknowledged the “exceptionally unique circumstances 
involving a private school, which receives no federal funding, with a 
remedial race-conscious admissions plan to rectify socioeconomic and 
educational disadvantages resulting from the influx of western 
civilization.”298  He determined that Hawai‘i’s history of colonization, 
the United States’ role in the overthrow of the Indigenous Hawaiian 
monarchy, and the harms resulting in daily consequences for Hawai‘i’s 
Indigenous People—including educational deprivation, loss of lands, 
homelessness, poor health, and high incarceration rates—provided “a 
legitimate justification for Kamehameha Schools’ . . . admissions policy 
 
292. Id. at 834. 
293. Id. 
294. Kamehameha, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. 
295. Id. at 1146. 
296. Id. at 1164?65. 
297. Id. at 1165–72, 1174–75. 
298. Id. at 1147. 
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and education program, which serves a legitimate remedial purpose.”299  
Indeed, as Judge Kay determined, Pauahi Bishop created a school for 
Maoli children as a pro-active response to the ravages of 
“Westernization”—a self-determination driven remedial measure by 
K?naka Maoli for K?naka Maoli. 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the majority of a three-judge panel 
reversed.300  The Ninth Circuit panel turned a blind eye to Hawai‘i’s 
history.  In considering whether Kamehameha had “legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reasons” for its admissions policy, the Ninth Circuit 
panel ignored Judge Kay’s historical analysis and restricted its inquiry to 
affirmative action in employment.301  Through this a-contextual, 
formalist analysis, the panel concluded that the school’s policy was not 
“remedial” but rather “preferential” and not “legitimate” but 
impermissibly “racial.”302 
Critical legal analysis reveals that in controversial cases like Doe, 
even if decision-makers feel constrained by legal rules, the language of 
rules alone will not dictate the end result.  Instead, the language of most 
substantive rules—such as whether “legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reasons” exist—is malleable enough to offer decision-makers a range of 
options and an ultimate choice influenced by their own political and 
economic philosophies.  Judge Kay’s contextual legal analysis, which 
was attentive to Hawai‘i’s Indigenous history and its linkage to current 
socio-economic conditions, more openly surfaced the social and political 
dimensions of judicial decision-making in contentious cases that are 
often hidden by formalist analysis.  In doing so, he gave meaning to the 
relevant legal language in ways consistent with Hawai‘i’s history, current 
socio-economic conditions, and values of Indigenous self-determination. 
Doe thus underscores both the promise and limits of legal justice for 
Native Peoples.303  The decision also highlights the significance of 
 
299. Id. 
300. Doe v. Kamehameha, 416 F.3d 1025, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005). 
301. Id. at 1030?39. 
302. Id.  In 2006, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case en banc and reversed the three-
judge panel.  Doe v. Kamehameha, 470 F.3d 827, 829 (9th Cir. 2006). 
303. For an example of how employing contextual legal analysis could also benefit 
Native Peoples, see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1974).  In Morton, the United 
States Supreme Court considered a class action brought by non-Indian employees of the 
Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) who challenged the BIA’s policy of first hiring and 
promoting Indians, alleging that it discriminated against them on racial grounds.  Id. at 537.  
The lower court deployed a formalist tool of viewing the law broadly to hold “that the Indian 
preference was implicitly repealed by § 11 of the 1972 Act proscribing racial discrimination in 
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contextual legal analysis of Native claims—an analysis that explicitly 
considers history and current socio-economic conditions in the context 
of the four values of Indigenous self-determination.304 
 
most federal employment.”  Id. at 540. 
 On appeal, the Supreme Court employed contextual legal inquiry to more 
comprehensively examine the impact of the United States’ history on Native Americans.  In 
dramatic contrast to Johnson, this framework revealed a new understanding of the 
“settlement” of the Americas that considered history to discern the impacts of colonization 
on Native Peoples (including impacts on cultural integrity, lands and resources, social welfare, 
and self-governance) and the federal government’s resulting trust obligations.  Id. at 541?43.  
The Court contemplated who crafted the laws that were being challenged and why those laws 
and their preference policy was necessary, asserting as follows: “The preference, as applied, is 
granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign 
tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion.”  Id. at 
554.  The Court acknowledged that such action was necessary to repair the harms of 
colonization, the confiscation of Native lands, the suppression of Indigenous culture, the 
imposition of dismal social welfare conditions, and to remedy the denial of self-governance.  
Id. at 541?42.  “The purpose of these preferences, as variously expressed in the legislative 
history, has been to give Indians a greater participation in their own self-government; to 
further the Government’s trust obligation toward the Indian tribes; and to reduce the 
negative effect of having non-Indians administer matters that affect Indian tribal life.”  Id.  
The Court conceded that such laws were “[o]ne of the primary means by which self-
government would be fostered and the Bureau made more responsive was to increase the 
participation of tribal Indians in the BIA operations.”  Id. at 543.  After considering who 
claimed to be hurt by the hiring policy (Whites), the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 
ruling that “[a]ny other conclusion can be reached only by formalistic reasoning that ignores 
both the history and purposes of the preference and the unique legal relationship between the 
Federal Government and tribal Indians.”  Id. at 550. 
 By utilizing contextual legal inquiry to incorporate new understandings and more 
accurate history, the Supreme Court in Morton upheld government acts aimed at repairing 
the long-standing damage of American colonization.  History, when combined with cultural 
values and current social welfare concerns, sheds light on the necessity of the BIA’s 
preference policy.  By respecting that policy, the Court sought to restore cultural integrity, 
attempt to redress historic injustices, and improve social welfare conditions, all of which 
resulted from the denial of self-governance, suppression of Native culture, seizure of ancestral 
lands, and imposition of dismal social welfare conditions.  Importantly, the Hawai‘i District 
Court relied on Morton to rule in favor of the State of Hawai‘i in Rice v. Cayetano.  See Rice 
v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547, 1550–51 (1997).  The district court thoroughly examined 
Hawai‘i’s history before ruling that allowing Maoli to elect trustees to manage their land and 
other resources was rationally related to the government’s interest in repairing the damage of 
American colonialism in Hawai‘i.  Id. 
304. For example, first, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Doe would maintain disparate 
social welfare conditions instead of allowing a private educational trust to focus resources on 
closing educational gaps for K?naka Maoli.  Second, contextual legal analysis reveals that Doe 
would prolong historical conditions imposed by colonizers as opposed to allowing a Native 
institution to make independent educational and other self-governance decisions necessary to 
care for its own people.  Third, forcing an Indigenous institution to open its doors to non-
native students reduces cultural learning opportunities for K?naka Maoli, undermining 
cultural survival as opposed to restoring cultural integrity.  Fourth, by disallowing 
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V.  THE WATER COMMISSION’S N? WAI ‘EH? RULING: CONTEXTUAL 
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF NATIVE PEOPLES’ CLAIMS 
These contextual insights also help to refine what justice means for 
N? Wai ‘Eh?’s people and communities, and how legal rights should be 
interpreted and applied.305  For the Hui and its allies, restoring water to 
N? Wai ‘Eh? is about more than legal victory, or even the actual 
restoration of water to streams; this struggle is about something far 
deeper.  The groups seek na‘au pono: a deep sense of justice that one 
can feel in his or her gut; that, hopefully, will breathe new life into 
dormant constitutional and statutory provisions while returning the 
physical and spiritual resources necessary to restore Native ecosystems 
and cultural practices and improve social welfare conditions.306  Through 
this shifted framework, legal norms can realistically engender a more 
just result. 
As detailed more specifically in Part V.B, below, na‘au pono for 
K?naka Maoli and their allies cannot be achieved through litigation 
alone, or even through new legislation.  This deep sense of justice must 
be sustained through initiatives grounded in reparatory justice; that is, a 
series of collaborative projects and programs, backed by laws and 
community organizing that are aimed less at achieving “legal rights” on 
paper and more on repairing the persistent damage of colonization to 
K?naka Maoli.307  This developing framework starts with the language of 
rules but acknowledges that, in complex or controversial cases, rule 
language alone will not determine the final outcome.  Although 
decision-makers may feel constrained to follow legal rules to appear 
“legitimate,” they do not consistently do so in a “neutral” or “objective” 
manner.308  Instead, decisional outcomes are often a matter of value 
choices influenced by the decision-makers’ political and economic 
 
Kamehameha’s admissions policy, Doe perpetuates the subjugation of Native lands and 
resources.  Instead of allowing the revenues from an Indigenous land base to educate its own 
people, Doe requires those resources to be used for the benefit of non-Maoli as well.  This 
decision highlights the importance of culture and history in developing a contextual legal 
framework for Native Peoples in general and K?naka Maoli in particular. 
305. See supra Parts III–IV. 
306. HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 257. 
307. See Eric K. Yamamoto & Ashley Kaiao Obrey, Reframing Redress: A “Social 
Healing Through Justice” Approach to the United States-Native Hawaiian and Japan-Ainu 
Reconciliation Initiatives, 16 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5, 32?36 (2009). 
308. See supra Part IV.A. 
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ideologies.309  To strive for na‘au pono, contextual legal analysis must 
consider impacts on the four realms of cultural integrity, lands and 
resources, social welfare and development, and self-government, with 
the special political and cultural circumstances of Native Peoples and, in 
this context, K?naka Maoli in particular.310  By examining, for example, 
Indigenous Peoples’ physical and spiritual relationship to natural and 
cultural resources and the impacts of colonization, legal and other 
analysis can begin to conceptualize the deep desire for justice that 
Native Peoples maintain.311  As demonstrated here, contextual legal 
analysis of Native Peoples’ claims is vital to any quest for justice; 
otherwise, decision-makers will be free to deploy formalist methodology 
to maintain the current state of affairs. 
A.  Life and the Law in N? Wai ‘Eh? 
Some never accepted the social contract that had evolved in N? Wai 
‘Eh? during the late 1800s and early 1900s where plantations drained 
streams, but provided jobs and other income for the community.312  This 
arrangement became even less palatable when Wailuku Agribusiness 
ceased agricultural operations and implemented a liquidation plan, 
transforming itself into Wailuku Water Company, LLC (“WWC”) and 
selling contracts for water delivery.313  By 2003, community members 
began rallying in opposition.314  They questioned the propriety of 
continuing to drain N? Wai ‘Eh?’s streams at maximum levels when only 
HC&S still cultivated cane and only about one fifth of the original 
plantation acreage that these waters had previously irrigated.315 
As detailed in Part I, above, in June 2004, Maoli group, Hui o N? 
 
309. See supra Part IV.A. 
310. See supra Parts IV.B–C. 
311. See supra Part IV.B. 
312. See TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 15–16; Martin et al., supra note 62, at 
90?102. 
313. See, e.g., Letter from Kent T. Lucien, Chief Exec. Officer, C. Brewer and Co., to the 
Shareholders of Wailuku Agribusiness and C. Brewer and Co. (Oct. 3, 2005) (on file with 
author) (explaining the history of and evolution from Wailuku Agribusiness to Wailuku 
Water Company, LLC, as well as plans to market 27.5 mgd to new customers); Final D&O, 
supra note 25, at 36. 
314. See supra note 10. 
315. See No Be Lolo! Get the Facts, EARTHJUSTICE, http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/ 
files/library/factsheets/fiction-v-fact.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2011); Restore Stream Flow, 
EARTHJUSTICE, http://earthjustice.org/our_work/campaigns/restore-stream-flow (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2011). 
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Wai ‘Eh?, and environmental nonprofit, Maui Tomorrow Foundation, 
partnered with the environmental litigation firm Earthjustice to petition 
the water commission to restore continuous mauka to makai flow to N? 
Wai ‘Eh?’s communities, by amending the Interim Instream Flow 
Standards (IIFSs) for the streams at issue.316  The Hui and its allies, 
especially OHA, deeply contextualized the issues within the broader 
context of restorative justice for K?naka Maoli, detailing the water 
commission’s constitutional, statutory, and moral obligations to restore 
stream flows necessary to support Indigenous culture, communities, 
lands and other resources, and to begin to redress the effects of 150 
years of stream diversions.317 
WWC and HC&S (collectively, the Companies) objected to the 
restoration of the streams, and an extended contested case 
(administrative trial) ensued.318  Over the course of ten months of 
adjudicatory hearings, Water Commissioner and Hearings Officer Miike 
received testimony from 77 witnesses and accepted over 600 exhibits 
into evidence.319  After closely reviewing all of the submissions, on April 
9, 2009, the hearings officer issued Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order recommending that the 
water commission restore 34.5 mgd to N? Wai ‘Eh?’s four streams and 
communities.320 
Despite extensive findings regarding the cultural significance of 
mauka to makai flow, the negative impacts of diversions on Maoli 
culture, and the need for restoration,321 in June 2010, a majority of the 
commission applied the same laws to the same evidence but arrived at a 
dramatically different result that returned only 12.5 mgd to two of N? 
 
316. See supra notes 10?14 and accompanying text. 
317. See generally TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2 (detailing the impacts of stream 
diversions on Maui for the water commission). 
318. See, e.g., Final D&O, supra note 25, at 6–8; see also HAW. ADMIN. R. § 13-167-2 
(2011) (defining contested case as “a proceeding in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges 
of specific parties are required by law to be determined after an opportunity for an agency 
hearing”); id. §§ 13-167-51 to -65 (establishing rules governing contested cases before the 
water commission). 
319. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 7. 
320. Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 187–89; see supra note 24. 
321. See, e.g., Final D&O, supra note 25, at 12 (finding that testimony confirms that the 
restoration of streamflow is critical for the perpetuation of Maoli culture, to support kalo 
cultivation, and enable a connection to the land); see also supra note 14 (defining mauka to 
makai flow). 
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Wai ‘Eh?’s four streams.322  Rather than respecting the hearings officer’s 
recommendation—as the most experienced commissioner and the only 
one who participated in all of the hearings and reviewed all of the 
evidence323—a majority of the water commission, led by former Chair 
Laura Thielen, deployed formalist analysis to benefit the sugar company 
at the expense of Maoli rights, resources, and cultural survival.324 
Hearings Officer Miike authored a scathing dissent.325  He detailed 
the commission’s mandate to protect the public trust, including 
traditional and customary Maoli rights and the environment, before 
noting that “[t]he majority now turns all of these responsibilities on their 
heads,” which in turn provided “the least protection feasible or no 
protection at all to the waters of N? Wai ‘Eh?.”326  He concluded that 
“[b]y its decision, the majority has failed in its duties under the 
Constitution and the State Water Code as trustee of the state’s public 
water resources.”327 
B.  Contextual Legal Analysis of the Water Commission’s Final Decision 
and Order in N? Wai ‘Eh? 
This section employs contextual legal analysis of K?naka Maoli 
claims to deconstruct two aspects of the majority’s final order.  In doing 
so, it reveals the actual dynamics of the commission’s decision-making 
with an emphasis on the value choices and interests implicated in 
complex decisions like this one.  This interrogation exposes that the 
majority’s final decision was not “objectively determined” but a series of 
value choices that consistently benefitted the Companies at the expense 
of Native communities, resources, and culture. 
 
322. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 185?87 (detailing IIFSs). 
323. See Hearings Officer’s Dissent, supra note 23, at 7 (“This is my sixteenth year 
involved in state water resources issues, first as a [c]ommissioner in the original Wai?hole 
Contested Case, then as a hearings officer for the two remands from the Hawai‘i Supreme 
Court, and now again as a [c]ommissioner and the hearings officer in this contested case, 
where I was the only [c]ommissioner to have heard and reviewed all the evidence.”). 
324. Compare Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 179?82, with Final 
D&O, supra note 25, at 179?80. 
325. Hearings Officer’s Dissent, supra note 23. 
326. Id. at 2. 
327. Id. at 7. 
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1. Contextual Legal Analysis of Native Peoples’ Claims Exposes the 
Injustice of Restoring Only Two of N? Wai ‘Eh?’s Four Great Waters 
In N? Wai ‘Eh?, the principal issue involved IIFSs, which as detailed 
in Part II.C., above, are the minimum amount of water that must remain 
in a stream to restore and preserve K?naka Maoli and other beneficial 
instream uses, including “[t]he protection of traditional and customary 
Hawaiian rights” and the “maintenance of fish and wildlife habitats.”328  
Consistent with the Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s ruling that IIFSs are “the 
primary mechanism by which the commission is to discharge its duty to 
protect and promote the entire range of public trust purposes dependent 
upon instream flows,”329 the Hui and its allies utilized this legal tool, with 
the hope of restoring continuous mauka to makai flow to each of N? 
Wai ‘Eh?’s four communities. 
Of the almost 70 mgd that the companies historically took from N? 
Wai ‘Eh? streams for over a century, the Hui and OHA jointly 
requested 53.4 mgd to support a range of rights and uses reliant upon 
mauka to makai flow, including traditional and customary Maoli 
practices and environmental protection.330  The companies, on the other 
hand, advocated a minimalist approach.331  In its final decision, the 
commission majority rejected key aspects of the hearings officer’s 
recommendations, slashed the proposed IIFSs by two-thirds, and 
 
328. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-3 (1993) (defining IIFS and instream use).  See supra Part 
II.C for an in-depth discussion of IIFSs. 
329. Wai?hole I, 9 P.3d 409, 460 (Haw. 2000). 
330. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 158 (noting that the Hui and OHA recommended 
restoring 25.5 mgd to Waihe‘e River, 2.5 mgd to North Waiehu and 2.5 mgd to South Waiehu 
Streams, 18.8 mgd to ‘?ao Stream, and 4.1 mgd to Waikap? Stream); see also Hui’s Proposed 
Decision and Order at 3?6, Contested Case Hearing, No. CCH-MA06-01 (Dec. 5, 2008) 
[hereinafter Hui’s Proposed D&O].  
331. WWC recommended restoring a total of 4.2 mgd divided among the four streams, 
which would have kept the vast majority of water available for offstream use.  See Final 
D&O, supra note 25, at 155?56 (observing that the WWC would have restored 1.4 mgd to 
Waihe‘e River below all diversions, .5 mgd to North Waiehu and 0.5 mgd to South Waiehu 
Stream below all diversions, 1.4 mgd to ‘?ao Stream below all diversions, and 0.4 mgd to 
Waikap? Stream below all diversions); see also WWC’s Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decision, and Order of Wailuku Water Co. at 79, 101, 116, and 131, 
Contested Case Hearing, No. CCH-MA06-01 (Dec. 5, 2008) [hereinafter WWC’s Proposed 
D&O].  WWC’s proposed IIFSs “would be less than even the lowest flow” ever recorded in 
the streams above all diversions.  See Final D&O, supra note 25, at 155?56.  HC&S initially 
suggested that the Commission split between 2.3 and 3.5 mgd amongst Waihe‘e River and 
Waiehu Stream only, with no water for ‘?ao and Waikap?.  Final D&O, supra note 25, 161.  
HC&S later increased its “offer” after the hearings officer issued the Proposed Decision and 
Order.  See infra note 332. 
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embraced HC&S’s initial proposal of restoring flow to Waihe‘e and 
Waiehu only, with no water for ‘?ao and Waikap? Streams.332  Practically 
speaking, this maintained the status quo for ‘?ao and Waikap?, leaving 
those streams completely dewatered below the Companies’ diversions 
and disregarding both the Native values and practices dependent upon 
restored stream flows and legal directives to protect those interests.333  
This final order also allowed the Companies to continue plundering 
Indigenous resources for their own profit in direct contravention of the 
Constitution and Water Code. 
The majority justified its actions by finding that ‘?ao and Waikap? 
did not merit restoration after comparing “the importance of present or 
potential instream values with the importance of present or potential 
offstream uses of water for noninstream purposes, including the 
economic impact of restricting such uses.”334  As the Final Decision and 
Order made sure to note: “The law does not prescribe a specific method 
for weighing that economic impact.”335 
The majority, therefore, reasoned that assessing whether Waikap? 
Stream flowed continuously to the ocean “can be deferred until some 
future time when the balancing of instream values and offstreams uses 
might be more favorable.”336  The majority also concluded that ‘?ao did 
 
332. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 161.  HC&S would have restored 2?3 mgd to Waihe‘e 
River below all diversions and 0.15 to 0.25 mgd to both North and South Waiehu Streams 
below all diversions, but urged the Commission not to return any water to ‘?ao or Waikap? 
because they are “not viable candidates for restoration” and, therefore, the Commission 
“should deny the requests for amendment of their IIFS.”  Id.; see also Hawaii Commercial & 
Sugar Co. Proposed Decision and Order at 113?14, Contested Case Hearing, No. CCH-
MA06-01 (Dec. 5, 2008) [hereinafter HC&S Proposed D&O]. At the final oral argument 
before the water commission after the Proposed D&O was issued, HC&S upped its initial 
offer, suggesting that the Commission restore 16.5 (from its initial offer of 2-3 mgd) to the 
four streams.  Transcript of Closing Argument at 23–24, Contested Case Hearing, No. CCH-
MA06-01 (Oct. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Transcript of Closing Argument].  HC&S would have 
restored 5 mgd to Waihe‘e River, 3.5 mgd to Waiehu Stream, 4 mgd to ‘?ao Stream, and 4 
mgd to Waikap? Stream.  Id. 
333. The majority elected to restore flows at the “controlled release” rates proposed by 
the United States Geological Survey (“USGS”) as part of a 2007?2008 scientific study to, 
among other things, measure the amount of water the streams contribute to the underground 
aquifer.  Final D&O, supra note 25, at 180.  USGS’s estimates neither comport with the 
language of the law nor were they intended to be used as IIFSs.  See supra note 30.  By 
comparison, USGS’s “controlled releases” are about one-third of the amount that the 
hearings officer recommended restoring.  Final D&O, supra note 25, at 180. 
334. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 179 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(2)(D)). 
335. Id. at 142 (emphasis added). 
336. Id. at 179.  Although the majority did not say when this future time would be, it 
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not deserve restoration because channelization in the stream’s lower 
reaches posed challenges to the recruitment of native stream animals.337  
The majority characterized its decision as “follow[ing] the mandates of 
the law as described in the Constitution, state statutes, and the Hawai‘i 
Supreme Court decisions” and adopting “standards which the majority 
felt represented the best balance of the mandated values and trust 
responsibilities.”338  After all, “[a]s in any difficult decision, reasonable 
minds may reach different conclusions.”339 
In contending that its “balancing” complied with the law, the 
majority sought refuge in formalist methodology, attempting to make its 
outcome seem minimally plausible even though it was unsustainable on 
the facts and law as highlighted by contextual legal analysis of Native 
Peoples’ claims.  Given this formalist approach, the range of contextual 
factors—including impacts on cultural integrity, lands and other 
resources, social welfare conditions, and self-governance—were either 
deemed irrelevant or less relevant and the majority was free to disregard 
strong evidence bolstering those values while still maintaining, 
circularly, that it followed “the law.” 
As demonstrated in this controversial case, the formalist method of 
analysis hides the political and economic interests that influenced the 
majority’s “balancing,” while also subverting the values that law was 
designed to protect.340  For example, during the final oral argument, 
HC&S’s newly appointed Manager—and Alexander and Baldwin’s 
(A&B’s) Chief Financial Officer (CFO)—assured the commissioners 
 
suggested that the water commission’s separate process for issuing water use permits would 
help to provide more information and protect environmental interests: 
 
While the IIFS for [‘?ao] and Waikap? Streams are not amended, in the future 
permitting process, permittees will have to measure or gauge the amounts they are 
diverting to comply with their permits.  Present diversion structures that disrupt 
stream flows will have to be modified, in order to allow recruitment of stream life 
past the diversions. 
Id. at 188.  The majority’s reasoning again failed to adequately consider the impacts on Native 
culture, resources, and rights. 
337. Id. at 180.  The majority’s ruling contradicted expert and kama‘?ina (lay) testimony, 
as well as its own findings, which “documented substantial amphidromous migration when 
flow connected to the ocean for more than three or four days and thus anticipated that with 
continuous flow, [native] species would reestablish into the upper reaches of ‘?ao Stream.”  Id. 
at 149–50 (Conclusion of Law 167(4)). 
338. Id. at 191 (emphasis added). 
339. Id. (emphasis added). 
340. See infra Part V.B.2. 
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that while “[they] do not believe that there was any intent to shutdown 
HC&S through the proposed IIFS[,] . . . [it] will be the end result if [the 
commissioners] adopt the recommended decision.”341  After reciting the 
claimed economic impacts of a shutdown,342 the CFO referenced 
HC&S’s last ditch proposal to restore 16.5 mgd to N? Wai ‘Eh? streams, 
“an alternative IIFS that [they] believe better balances the offstream and 
instream values of these four streams to the better benefit of the people 
of Maui and of the state.”343  Those political drivers, especially the 
claimed economic impact of restricting HC&S’s practically free use of 
N? Wai ‘Eh? water, served the interests of Maui County’s largest 
employer—and possibly the economy in general—and disserved 
Indigenous needs and values.344  The majority’s one-sided “balancing” 
provided a critical foundation for its final decision.345 
Contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims, however, reveals 
the impropriety of formalist analysis, especially in “difficult” cases like 
this one.346  By broadening and deepening the analysis, the developing 
framework establishes that the majority’s final IIFSs were “wrong on 
the facts and law” because the underlying formalist analysis ignored the 
 
341. Transcript of Closing Argument, supra note 332, at 24.  For more information on 
the potential economic impact of an HC&S shutdown, see infra Part V.B.2.  In N? Wai ‘Eh? 
and other contested cases before the water commission, the practice has been to issue a 
proposed decision, allow the parties to file written “exceptions” to that decision, hold oral 
argument on the parties’ “exceptions” to the proposed decision, then issue a final decision 
and order.  See, e.g., Final D&O, supra note 25, at 7?8. 
342. “HC&S employs about 800 full-time workers” on Maui and one of its subsidiaries 
employs about another 17.  Final D&O, supra note 25, at 137.  As Maui County’s largest 
employer, HC&S claimed “immediate impacts [of its shutdown] would include lost jobs and 
in excess of $100 million of spending on Maui, generating approximately $250[ million] 
annually to the County of Maui and State of Hawai‘i economies.”  Final D&O, supra note 25, 
at 137. 
343. Transcript of Closing Argument, supra note 332, at 23–24 (emphasis added).  
Interestingly enough, the Commission majority restored even less water to the streams than 
HC&S requested at the final oral argument.  Compare id., with Final D&O, supra note 25, at 
185?87 (detailing amended IIFSs). 
344. See supra note 342 and accompanying text; HAWAIIAN COMMERCIAL & SUGAR 
CO., http://www.hcsugar.com/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (noting that HC&S is one of the 
largest employers on Maui). 
345. See Final D&O, supra note 25, at 155?80. 
346. Compare Final D&O, supra note 25, at 12 (“Restoring streamflow to N? Wai ‘Eh? 
‘would enormously benefit’ Native Hawaiians and other communities who seek to reconnect 
with their culture and live a self-sustaining lifestyle, and more people would be able to engage 
in traditional and customary practices with more water.”), with Final D&O, supra note 25, at 
188 (the Commission majority dismissed these and other cultural impacts and neglected to 
restore water to ‘?ao and Waikap? streams). 
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most significant factors for properly interpreting the relevant legal 
language—impacts on cultural integrity, lands and other resources, 
social welfare conditions, and self-governance.  By twisting the legal 
language, formalist analysis disguised the bare-knuckled political and 
economic interests at play as well as the resulting “unjust” 
consequences, which are measured by both Maoli values and interests, 
and the larger community’s desires as reflected in the evolution of water 
law in Hawai‘i (including the development of the Constitution and 
Water Code and the contextual factors they embody).347 
Contrary to the majority’s characterization, Commissioner Miike 
observed in his dissent that “[t]he amended IIFS were the amounts of 
water remaining after all offstream requirements were met; i.e., a 
residual—not a balanced—approach.”348  Commissioner Miike proposed 
returning 14 mgd to Waihe‘e, 3.5 to Waiehu, 13 mgd to ‘?ao, and 4 mgd 
to Waikap?,349 with the remainder available for offstream use.350  This 
would have reduced the amount of water previously available for 
HC&S, WWC, and other offstream diverters to about half their historic 
rates and would have required HC&S to use one of its wells to 
supplement the stream water it takes during summer months when flows 
are lower.351 
In issuing his proposed ruling, the hearings officer examined the 
evidence and employed contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ 
claims, consistent with the “justice principles” embodied in Hawai‘i 
water law.352  The hearings officer’s analysis specifically considered the 
context of Hawai‘i water law, such as Maoli rights and interests that 
 
347. See supra note 68; see also Final D&O, supra note 25, at 12 (“Restoration of mauka 
to makai flow to the streams is critical to the perpetuation and practice of Hawaiian culture in 
N? Wai ‘Eh?.’  ‘If we are not able to maintain our connection to the land and water and teach 
future generations our cultural traditions, we lose who we are as a people.” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
348. Hearings Officer’s Dissent, supra note 23, at 4 (emphasis in original). 
349. Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 180. 
350. Id.  Hearings Officer Miike recommended an almost even split of water between 
the Hui and its allies who sought stream restoration and the Companies who wanted to 
continue taking water for their private use.  Id. 
351. Id. at 180?81; see also infra Part V.B.2 (analyzing the majority’s decision regarding 
the practicability of alternate sources of water).  Hearings Officer Miike also recommended 
approving the following water use permits: 2.4 mgd to Maui County for municipal uses and 
0.1 mgd to HC&S for agricultural water uses.  Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 
20, at 191.  Hearings Officer Miike recommended denying WWC’s water use permit 
applications.  Id. at 191?92. 
352. See supra Part II. 
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were subverted by the majority’s formalist methodology.  He considered 
the history of this area and the plantation industry’s prior and 
continuing impacts on K?naka Maoli cultural integrity, social welfare 
conditions, lands and other resources, and other Indigenous values; 
specifically, he considered the contextual factors of Hawai‘i water law, 
such as Maoli rights and interests, that were subverted by the majority’s 
formalist methodology.  The hearings officer’s deeper contextualization 
informed his balancing of instream values versus offstream needs, and 
he proposed a decision that revealed the true impacts of the outcome on 
Hawai‘i’s Indigenous People and resources while also seeking to redress 
the harms of colonization through stream diversions in particular, 
consistent with the evolution and intent of Hawai‘i water law. 
The hearings officer examined the Companies’ 150-year history of 
stream diversions in N? Wai ‘Eh? and the impact on natural resources 
and Indigenous culture.  He gave credence to the “uncontroverted 
testimony regarding limitations on Native Hawaiians’ ability to exercise 
traditional and customary . . . practices in the greater N? Wai ‘Eh? area 
due to the lack of freshwater flowing in N? Wai ‘Eh?’s streams and into 
nearshore marine waters,”353 and took that into account in seeking to 
fulfill the state’s public trust obligations toward stream resources and 
K?naka Maoli in particular. 
The hearings officer also considered the cultural benefits of restored 
stream flows and the importance of beginning to rectify past harms to 
lands and other resources.  He found that “N? Wai ‘Eh? continues to 
hold the potential to once again support enhanced traditional and 
customary rights and practices if sufficient water is restored,”354 and that 
the “[r]estoration of mauka to makai flow to the streams is critical to the 
perpetuation and practice of Hawaiian culture in” this area.355  He 
understood that if Native practitioners “are not able to maintain [their] 
connection to the land and water and to teach future generations [their] 
cultural traditions, [they] lose who [they] are as a people.”356 
The hearings officer contemplated improved social welfare 
conditions that would result from restored flow, especially for K?naka 
 
353. Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 10. 
354. Id. at 11. 
355. Id. at 12. 
356. Id.  Regarding impacts to lands and other resources, Hearings Officer Miike also 
recognized that “[a]n overriding factor impairing the biological and ecological integrity of 
diverted Central Maui streams, compared to their non-diverted counterparts, is the disruption 
of natural flow via large-scale offstream diversions.”  Id. at 14. 
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Maoli.  He found that returning water to the streams to support cultural 
practices “will result in the betterment of the conditions of native 
Hawaiians and Hawaiians by restoring spiritual well-being and a state of 
‘pono’ (goodness, righteousness, balance) to the people and 
communities of N? Wai ‘Eh?.”357  He also acknowledged that the 
rejuvenation of cultural practices, especially “[k]alo cultivation[,] 
provides not only a source of food, but also spiritual sustenance, 
promotes community awareness and a connection to the land, and 
supports physical fitness and mental well-being.”358  The Final Decision 
and Order included these same findings while diluting others, and yet 
the majority’s “balancing” effectively negated the hearings officer’s 
findings in favor of the Companies. 
The hearings officer’s proposed order did not explicitly address self-
governance issues for K?naka Maoli.  It did, however, give meaning to 
the relevant legal language in ways that were consistent with Indigenous 
self-determination and would have significantly redressed the historical 
conditions of completely dewatered streams imposed by colonizers.359 
On its face, the language of the law governing IIFSs promotes stream 
protection and restoration, while also giving credence to the same values 
considered in contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims.360  The 
Constitution and Water Code direct the commission to protect and 
restore instream uses to the extent practicable.361  The law’s expansive 
language reflects a broad accommodation of interests and values, 
including specific safeguards for Indigenous interests.  For example, the 
Code makes clear that traditional and customary K?naka Maoli rights, 
along with appurtenant rights362 “shall not be abridged or denied.”363  
Despite this underlying accommodation and the explicit protections and 
preferences for “public trust purposes,” such as K?naka Maoli cultural 
 
357. Id. at 12. 
358. Id.; see also id. at 11?12. 
359. See, e.g., id. at 112 (emphasizing that Maoli traditional and customary rights may 
not be abandoned and are enforceable even if a practice has not been continuously exercised, 
which supports self-determination and cultural sovereignty). 
360. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(2)(D). 
361. Wai?hole I, 9 P.3d 409, 467 (Haw. 2000); see also HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 7; HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 174C-71(4) (requiring the Commission to “[e]stablish an instream flow program 
to protect, enhance, and reestablish, where practicable, beneficial instream uses of water”).  
The Code identifies nine beneficial instream uses.  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-3; supra 
note 17 and accompanying text. 
362. See supra note 36 (defining appurtenant rights). 
363. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-101(c)–(d) (1993). 
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practices and environmental protection,364 the actual language of the law 
(such as “to the extent practicable”) is general enough to enable 
formalist analysis to generate legal outcomes that might initially appear 
plausible but that actually disserve the intended accommodation of 
these interests and values.365 
As demonstrated by the analysis above, even when armed with the 
protective language of the law, the legal process has the potential to 
yield a wide range of outcomes as decision-makers are influenced by a 
broad spectrum of explicit and implicit forces—including personal 
values and economic interests—that shape how decision-makers 
interpret and apply the law broadly or narrowly depending upon the 
select facts of any case.366  Contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ 
claims reveals a far more appropriate interpretation and application of 
the relevant legal language, which is also consistent with the law’s initial 
framing.  The hearings officer’s proposed decision, even with 
shortcomings,367 would have achieved a more just result for K?naka 
 
364. Wai?hole I, 9 P.3d at 448?49; see also id. at 448 (“acknowledg[ing] resource 
protection, with its numerous derivative public uses, benefits, and values, as an important 
underlying purpose of the reserved water resources trust”); id. at 449 (“uphold[ing] the 
exercise of Native Hawaiian and traditional and customary rights as a public trust purpose”); 
id. at 454 (“[T]he constitutional requirements of ‘protection’ and ‘conservation,’ the historical 
and continuing understanding of the trust as a guarantee of public rights, and the common 
reality of the ‘zero-sum’ game between competing water uses demand that any balancing 
between public and private purposes begin with a presumption in favor of public use, access, 
and enjoyment.”). 
365. Id. at 467.  In this case, instream values include the environmental and cultural 
benefits advocated by the Hui and its allies and noninstream purposes include WWC and 
HC&S’s use of diverted stream water for their private commercial profit.  See HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 174C-3 (defining instream and noninstream uses); see also supra note 17 and 
accompanying text (defining instream uses). 
366. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 131, at 470 (“[L]egal rules were often vague and 
therefore ambiguous.  Since these rules often combined abstract and contestable concepts, . . . 
they were subject to broad interpretation.  Reasonable persons could disagree about what 
these concepts meant; thus judges could not apply them mechanically.”). 
367. Although significantly more balanced than the majority’s Final Decision and Order, 
both the Hui and OHA objected to various aspects of the hearings officer’s Proposed 
Decision and Order.  In the context of Maoli rights and interests, for example, both parties 
took issue with the hearings officer’s treatment of kuleana or appurtenant rights, which attach 
to land that was in cultivation, often in the traditional staple kalo, when private property was 
instituted in Hawai‘i.  See, e.g., Hui o N? Wai ‘Eh? and Maui Tomorrow Foundation, Inc.’s 
Exceptions to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order at 19–
26, Contested Case Hearing, No. CCH-MA06-01 (May 11, 2009) [hereinafter Hui’s Exceptions 
to Proposed D&O].  In particular, both the Hui and OHA raised concerns about the hearings 
officer’s refusal to make determinations on undisputed appurtenant rights, disinclination to 
require the Companies to continue supplying water to kuleana right holders, and 
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Maoli, agribusiness, and the Hawai‘i community at large. 
2. Contextual Legal Analysis of Native Peoples’ Claims Uncovers the 
Economic Interests at Play in Determining the “Practicability” of 
Alternate Water Sources 
A second example of the dangers presented by the majority’s 
formalist methodology involves the assessment of alternate sources of 
water.368  Because fresh water in Hawai‘i is part of a public trust, no one 
can own the resource; instead, the water commission balances rights and 
priorities of water use.369  If individuals or companies want to use water, 
they bear the burden of demonstrating both actual water needs and the 
absence of practicable alternatives, such as using another source of 
water or making their current use more efficient.370  Because the public 
trust establishes certain beneficial instream uses—such as Native 
practices and environmental protection—“as the norm or ‘default’ 
condition,” it creates a higher level of scrutiny for private commercial 
uses and places the burden of justifying those uses on the water 
commission and commercial users (as opposed to the public trust 
purposes).371  In this way, both the Constitution and Water Code 
embody restorative justice principles, including the contextual factors 
vital to any legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims. 
Enforcing this legal burden of proof was an onerous task in N? Wai 
‘Eh? because the parties bitterly disagreed about how much water the 
 
miscalculation of the amount of water necessary to enable and restore these constitutionally 
and statutorily guaranteed interests.  Id.  Compare Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra 
note 20, at 33?36, 118?20, with HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-63 (“Appurtenant rights are 
preserved.  Nothing in this part shall be construed to deny the exercise of an appurtenant 
right by the holder thereof at any time.”). 
368. The analysis regarding the practicability of alternatives also includes making uses 
more efficient, e.g., lining ditches and reservoirs, in addition to using other sources of water, 
e.g., ground water wells or reclaimed wastewater.  See, e.g., Final D&O, supra note 25, at 
107?110, 134 (regarding reclaimed wastewater); id. at 134 (regarding lining ditches and 
reservoirs). Although the water commission addressed these issues, they will not be discussed 
here due to space constraints.  See, e.g., id. at 134. 
369. Wai?hole I, 9 P.3d at 453?54. 
370. Id. at 473?74; Final D&O, supra note 25, at 112–13.  The Commission has defined 
practicable as “available and capable of being used after taking into consideration cost, 
existing technology, and logistics.”  Final D&O, supra, at 116 (citing Wai?hole II, 93 P.3d 643, 
661 (Haw. 2004)). 
371. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 112?13 (quoting Wai?hole I, 9 P.3d at 454).  
Moreover, “[t]he Commission ‘is not obligated to ensure that any particular user enjoys a 
subsidy or guaranteed access to less expensive water sources when alternatives are available 
and public values are at stake.’”  Id. at 116 (citing Wai?hole I, 9 P.3d at 484?85). 
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Companies actually needed and whether alternate sources of water, 
especially ground water wells, were practicable.372  The commission 
focused its attention on HC&S because prior to the administrative trial, 
that company alone was using roughly eighty percent of the water 
diverted from the streams, significantly more than all other users 
combined.373 
After considering the evidence in light of the relevant legal 
language, the commission majority determined that Well No. 7 was a 
practicable alternative and that HC&S could pump up to 9.5 mgd of 
ground water from that source during summer months instead of taking 
stream water.374  By deeming less than half of Well No. 7’s past use 
“practicable” for only several months each year, the majority allowed 
HC&S to continue using N? Wai ‘Eh? streams as its main irrigation 
source for the West Maui Fields375 and relieved HC&S of the obligation 
to pump Well No. 7 at previous rates.376  This enabled HC&S to avoid 
using internally generated electricity to pump its well (fueled by burning 
a byproduct of its sugar production) and instead, keep selling that 
electricity to the local utility for windfall profits.377 
 
372. Id. at 119–30 (discussing actual water needs and the majority’s ultimate decision). 
373. Id. at 210.  This analysis focuses on HC&S only.  For more information on WWC, 
Maui County, or any of the other uses, see id. at 32?38.  For general background, in 2006, 
HC&S used roughly 41.92 mgd, WWC used 2.37 mgd, and Maui Department of Water Supply 
used 2.84.  Id. at 210. 
374. Id. at 171.  HC&S argued that “as currently configured, Well No. 7 can supply only 
14 mgd to the Waihe‘e-Hopoi Fields.”  Id. at 85, 130–31.  Hearings Officer Miike 
recommended and the majority agreed, however, that “HC&S’s records do not indicate that 
Well No. 7 was ever configured differently than its current configuration.”  Id. at 85. 
375. “Approximately 5,300 acres of HC&S’s sugar plantation, or about 15 percent of the 
roughly 35,000 acres HC&S uses for sugar cane cultivation, are located in HC&S’s ‘West 
Maui Fields,’” which are irrigated with N? Wai ‘Eh? stream water.  Proposed D&O, supra 
note 20, at 66.  The West Maui Fields consist of: (1) the Waihe‘e-Hopoi Fields (3950 acres) 
that HC&S owns and irrigates with water from Waihe‘e River and ‘?ao and Waiehu Streams 
via the Wai‘ale reservoir; and (2) the ‘?ao-Waikap? fields (1350 acres), former WWC lands, 
most of which HC&S now leases and currently irrigates with water from ‘?ao, Waikap?, and 
Waiehu Streams and Waihe‘e River.  Final D&O, supra note 25, at 38?40; Hearings Officer’s 
Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 66?68.  HC&S irrigates the rest of its plantation?about 
30,000 acres?with stream water that it diverts from rural, predominantly Maoli communities 
in East Maui.  See Summer Sylva, Indigenizing Water Law in the 21st Century: Na 
Mokuaupuni o Koolau Hui, A Native Hawiian Case Study, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
563, 564 (2007) (overviewing the East Maui water issue). 
376. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 171 (regarding prior pumping rates).  Despite the 
historical average of 19 mgd, “[b]etween 1927 and 1985, HC&S pumped an average of about 
21 mgd from Well No. 7.”  Id. at 84 (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 130. 
377. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 171.  The majority’s determination would “not 
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The majority’s ruling was difficult to justify using even formalist 
methods because neither HC&S nor the majority could meet the legal 
burden of demonstrating the “absence of practicable alternatives” when 
HC&S had historically used only one-third of the water diverted from 
N? Wai ‘Eh? streams and maintained a battery of 16 non-potable 
agricultural wells to irrigate its fields.378  In fact, the majority itself 
determined that “[f]rom 1927 until additional N? Wai ‘Eh? water 
became available in the 1980s, HC&S’s primary source of irrigation 
water for its Waihe‘e-Hopoi Fields was Well No. 7,” not N? Wai ‘Eh? 
streams.379  Despite its own findings regarding HC&S’s longtime 
alternatives, the majority employed a narrow interpretation of the term 
“practicable” to reach its desired outcome.  The majority concluded that 
“[a]n alternative is practicable if it is available and capable of being used 
after taking into consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics.”380  
It then acknowledged that “Well No. 7 historically had pumped 
approximately 19 mgd,”381 but justified its determination of only 9.5 mgd 
as a “practicable” alternative by citing potential costs that HC&S might 
be forced to incur to install new pumps382 and lost profits from selling 
electricity to the power company,383 and ultimately focusing on the 
 
require capital costs, only the costs of pumping.”  Id.  Moreover, HC&S historically used 
electricity generated at its mill to pump its wells.  Andrew Gomes, HC&S, Last Sugar Cane 
Plantation, on Track toward More Financial Losses, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Nov. 15, 
2009, available at http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2009/Nov/15/ln/hawaii911150370.ht
ml.  Since the 1980s when N? Wai ‘Eh? water became “available,” HC&S has sold that 
electricity for private profit.  Final D&O, supra note 25, at 89. 
378. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 41–42 (documenting prior sharing of Waihe‘e and 
Spreckels Ditch flows with WWC’s predecessor in interest); see also id. at 39 (regarding 
HC&S’s sixteen non-potable wells).  “Since the additional N? Wai ‘Eh? flows became 
available, HC&S has minimized its use of Well No. 7,” but used it heavily in 1996 and 2000 
when it pumped an average of 25 and 19 mgd, respectively.  Id. at 84.  Non-potable water is 
not suitable for drinking, but may still be used for other purposes depending on its quality, 
including agricultural irrigation. 
379. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 84.  Moreover, “[b]etween 1927 and 1985, HC&S 
pumped an average of about 21 mgd from Well No. 7.”  Id. at 84 (internal citations omitted); 
see also id. at 130. 
380. Id. at 116 (citing Wai?hole I, 9 P.3d 409, 661 (Haw. 2000)). 
381. Id. at 171; see supra note 376 and accompanying text (noting historical rates of 
pumpage). 
382. Id. at 171 (acknowledging that Well No. 7 has two pumps and one booster pump, 
but that “[a]n additional 14 mgd booster pump would incur costs of $1 million, and $475,000 
in infrastructure costs”). 
383. Id. (noting that “HC&S also claims that there would be constraints on the power to 
run the pumps on a consistent and sustained basis because of its power contract with” Maui 
Electric Company). 
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possible impacts on the ground water source if the well was again 
pumped at historic rates that exceed the aquifer’s nominal sustainable 
yield.384  In doing so, the majority was able to conclude that “the 
practical alternative from Well No. 7 is lower than historic rates.”385 
The majority employed a formalist approach to determine that it was 
“practicable” for HC&S to periodically pump only 9.5 mgd from Well 
No. 7 even though that was unsustainable on the facts and the law, as 
demonstrated here.  Such a flattened construction of the relevant legal 
term and an application that focused on pumping exceeding the 
aquifer’s sustainable yield (which the commission knew about and 
allowed for years without any alleged adverse effect) was possible only 
if the majority ignored key aspects of the controversy (such as HC&S’s 
history of using this well in addition to the four values of contextual 
legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims).386  Despite these inherent 
contradictions, the majority zeroed in on this issue to protect the 
company’s interests rather than the Hui’s or the resources’ rights.  The 
majority, therefore, employed formalist methodology to attempt to 
impart an air of minimal plausibility to its inordinately narrow view of 
the pertinent legal language and “relevant” facts.  This rationale also 
masked the majority’s apparent economic motivation, which in turn 
silenced the larger historical context of Hawai‘i history and Indigenous 
Peoples’ claims in particular. 
As demonstrated here, the formalist method and its focus on 
sustainable yield attempted to obscure the political interests that were 
the actual drivers of the majority’s ruling.  For example, throughout the 
extensive hearings, HC&S decried the economic impacts of restricting 
 
384. Id.  The majority observed that 
 
The combined facts that the current sustainable yield of the aquifer is already being 
exceeded; that increased pumping from Well No. 7 may exacerbate that strain; and 
that the historically higher levels of pumping occurred during a period where furrow 
irrigation methods were affecting recharge rates for the aquifer, the practical 
alternative from Well No. 7 is lower than historic rates. 
Id.  Sustainable yield is the maximum rate at which water can be pumped from an 
aquifer while still maintaining the integrity of that ground water source.  See HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 174C-3. 
385. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 171. 
386. See supra Part II.A.1 (overviewing legal formalism).  Since formalist analysis 
assumes that the law is rationally determinate, judging is mechanical, and the legal process 
itself is sufficient to mete out “justice,” decision-makers use that methodology to minimize 
contextual factors.  Id. 
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its free access to N? Wai ‘Eh? water, arguing “[i]f reductions in HC&S’s 
use of stream waters were of such a magnitude as to force HC&S not to 
cultivate the 5300 acres that comprise the West Maui Fields, HC&S 
would not be a viable plantation.”387  In particular, HC&S claimed that 
“its survival hinges on the [1350-acre] ‘?ao-Waikap? fields having 
sufficient N? Wai ‘Eh? water to irrigate them.”388 
These threats were not without political weight; “HC&S employs 
about 800 full-time workers” on Maui and one of its subsidiaries 
employs about another 17.389  As Maui County’s largest employer, 
HC&S claimed “immediate impacts [of its shutdown] would include lost 
jobs and in excess of $100 million of spending on Maui, generating 
approximately $250[ million] annually to the County of Maui and State 
of Hawai‘i economies.”390 
HC&S’s pressure tactics escalated once the hearings officer 
recommended restoring about half of the water the Companies usually 
take from the streams.391  At the closing oral argument before the full 
commission, A&B’s CFO emerged on HC&S’s behalf.392  Though he had 
never previously appeared in the case and professed a lack of familiarity 
with the administrative record, the CFO announced that he expected “a 
 
387. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 136?37.  Along the same lines, HC&S also argued 
“that maintaining the number of acres it has in sugar cultivation is necessary to remain 
economically viable.”  Id. at 140.  It also claimed the “West Maui Fields provide the most 
productive yields of all of HC&S’s cultivated lands,” making them “critical” to HC&S’s 
continued existence.  Id. at 137. 
388. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).  HC&S claimed that reductions in its use of N? Wai 
‘Eh? stream water would result in  
 
lost jobs and in excess of $100[ million] of spending on Maui, closure of HC&S will 
have a deleterious effect on efforts to promote agriculture and curb urbanization in 
Hawai‘i.  The withdrawal of HC&S’ 35,000 acres of prime agricultural lands from 
sugar would vastly increase the agricultural lands in the State of Hawai‘i and on 
Maui that are idle. 
Id. at 90.  At the same time that it was arguing that it needed every last drop of N? Wai ‘Eh? 
Water for its very “survival,” HC&S’s parent company Alexander and Baldwin was discussing 
the possibility of a plant to treat up to 9 mgd from Waihe‘e and ‘?ao Streams for use by A&B 
and Maui County in various urban development initiatives.  Id. at 47. 
389. Id. at 137. 
390. Id. 
391. See supra note 341 and accompanying text (explaining the water commission’s 
contested case hearing process whereby the parties view the proposed decision and present 
oral and written argument on issues they would like changed before the Commission issues a 
final decision). 
392. Transcript of Closing Argument, supra note 332, at 28. 
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decision and determination on the future of HC&S” within a few 
months.393  Threats of an HC&S shutdown and the potential impacts of 
ordering HC&S to once again use its longtime non-potable well that was 
the actual source of water for its fields, influenced the majority’s 
determination of the “practicability” of alternate sources.  Those threats 
also outweighed the impacts of the majority’s factual findings on 
Indigenous efforts to reclaim land, resurrect culture, and restore natural 
resources essential to traditional practices in N? Wai ‘Eh?, subverting 
both these contextual factors and the law’s original design to protect and 
restore those interests.394 
Critical legal analysis reveals that the language of most substantive 
rules (such as whether an alternative is “practicable”) may be 
manipulated and applied selectively to specific facts (for example, the 
safety of pumping Well No. 7 at historic rates) so that the decision-
makers’ ultimate choice furthers his or her own political and economic 
philosophies.395  Here, the hearings officer and majority applied the 
same facts to the same legal principles but arrived at starkly different 
conclusions.  In N? Wai ‘Eh?, the “boogeyman of an HC&S 
shutdown”396 weighed heavily on the commission majority.  Despite its 
own findings that HC&S had historically used only a fraction of the 
water it was currently banking,397 had voluntarily reduced its own 
acreage,398 and had not attempted to acquire the leased fields it now 
claimed were vital to its very “survival,”399 in the end, claimed economic 
 
393. Id. at 21. 
394. See, e.g., Final D&O, supra note 25, at 67, 174?75. 
395. Id. at 116 (defining practicable alternative). 
396. Transcript of Closing Argument, supra note 332, at 21. 
397. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 44?45, 124?25. 
398. The hearings officer proposed a finding and the majority agreed that although 
HC&S claimed it needed to maintain its cultivated acreage to “remain economically viable,” 
records from HC&S’ parent company A&B revealed that “from 2000 through 2005, HC&S 
decreased its cultivated acreage by more than 2000 acres . . . .  Moreover, A&B ha[d] 
development plans that would remove almost 3500 additional acres from cultivation.”  
Id. at 140.  
399. Regarding HC&S’s claims that N? Wai ‘Eh? water for the leased, 1350-acre ‘?ao-
Waikap? Fields was vital to the survival of its 35,000-acre plantation, the hearings officer 
proposed and the Commission majority ruled that HC&S “made no apparent attempt to 
acquire those lands when they became available.  HC&S had no written agreement with 
WWC after July 2003, when WWC refused to extend the land lease and announced HC&S 
was ‘no longer entitled to any water allocation’” under the Companies’ water sharing 
agreement.  Id. at 140; see also id. at 93 (discussing HC&S’s claims that “its survival hinges on 
the ‘?ao-Waikap? Fields” but making no apparent attempt to acquire them when they were 
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impacts carried the most weight with the commission majority, 
informing its determination of practicability and other issues and 
overshadowing the law’s original design and specific mandate to protect 
and restore Indigenous rights and interests.400  Contextual legal analysis 
of Native Peoples’ claims uncovers these and other limitations of 
formalist analysis.  Broadening the analysis to alternatives that are truly 
“practicable” for HC&S from a historical and cultural perspective 
demonstrates that the majority’s ruling on this issue was unduly narrow 
and motivated by economic interests and small town politics—not the 
safety of pumping the well at prior rates, as formalist analysis claimed.401 
Contextual legal analysis exposes who truly benefits from the 
majority’s decision that largely maintained the status quo in N? Wai 
‘Eh? streams and communities (interests who have monopolized water 
resources for over a century).  It also reveals who is harmed by the 
status quo (disenfranchised communities, including K?naka Maoli and 
other people of color), who interprets the status quo (a commission of 
political appointees, not elected officials), and what is really at stake if 
the rules are “formalistically” applied (Hawai‘i’s water future).  When 
the framework is shifted and the right questions are incorporated into 
how the language of the law is construed and applied, then the law 
creates the potential to achieve its original intent of realizing justice for 
K?naka Maoli and all of Hawai‘i’s people. 
Commissioner Miike sharply dissented, noting that his “most 
 
available for sale.). 
400. Compare HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(2)(D) (outlining Commission’s duty to 
balance instream values and offstream uses), with HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-101(c)–(d) 
(maintaining that Native rights, including “traditional and customary rights . . . shall not be 
abridged or denied by this chapter”), HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-63, Final D&O, supra note 
25, at 10 (finding that “[c]ultural experts and community witnesses provided uncontroverted 
testimony regarding limitations on Native Hawaiians’ ability to exercise traditional and 
customary rights and practices in the greater N? Wai ‘Eh? area due to the lack of freshwater 
flowing in N? Wai ‘Eh?’s streams and into the nearshore marine waters”), and Final D&O, 
supra note 25, at 185–87 (restoring no water to ‘?ao and Waikap? Streams). 
401. See An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, supra note 93, at 2. 
 
 In the end, the route taken did not matter.  The result was the same.  Streams 
and the wildlife they support, and those seeking their restoration, whether for 
customary stream uses or for environmental reasons, lost out.  A&B[, HC&S], 
Wailuku Water Company, and Maui County, which has come to rely on HC&S as a 
kind of wholesale provider of water to the county municipal system, won out.  To be 
sure, some streams will see a bit more water in their lower reaches, but the total 
amount restored to streams is embarrassingly small. 
Id. 
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significant difference” from the majority “is the assignment of 9.5 mgd 
to HC&S’s Well No. 7 as a practicable alternative.”402  Both 
Commissioner Miike and the majority “agree[d] that Well No. 7 should 
be used only during dry-weather conditions, when available stream 
flows are insufficient to meet offstream requirements, but then the 
majority arbitrarily reduce[d] Well No. 7’s capacity in half.”403  He 
charged that “the majority, without any credible foundation chose 9.5 
mgd as the practicable alternative from Well No. 7 to protect HC&S’s 
interests, to the detriment of the stream resources.”404  Further, 
Commissioner Miike’s dissent concluded that “[b]y reducing Well No. 7 
as a practical alternative from approximately 19 mgd to 9.5 mgd, [‘?ao] 
Stream’s restoration gave way to HC&S’s irrigation requirements.”405 
As detailed in Part V.B.1, above, the hearings officer attempted to 
contextualize the issues, considering the practicability of HC&S’s 
alternate sources in light of over a century of stream diversions and their 
continued impact on cultural integrity, lands and other resources, social 
welfare conditions, and self-governance.406  He understood that over 150 
years of almost zero flow in N? Wai ‘Eh? streams subjugated ancestral 
lands, resources, and rights, while at the same time creating deplorable 
 
402. Hearings Officer’s Dissent, supra note 23, at 2.  After weighing all of the evidence, 
Hearings Officer Miike recommended that “fourteen mgd from Well. No. 7 is a reasonable 
alternative for the Waihe‘e-Hopoi Fields.”  Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, 
at 168. 
403. Hearings Officer’s Dissent, supra note 23, at 2 (emphasis added). 
404. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).  The hearings officer also pointed out that “[a]bsent an 
economic analysis by HC&S, the Commission cannot assume that HC&S’s doomsday 
scenario would result from an occasional 10.5 to 13.4 percent decrease in its irrigation 
requirements for 15 percent of its entire operations.”  Id. at 6.  Especially since HC&S 
strategically neglected to include an economic analysis so that it could “leap to its doomsday 
scenario—the drastic consequences to Maui county and the state if it were to close its entire 
sugar operations.”  Id.  Commissioner Miike determined that 
 
if reductions in its use of N? Wai ‘Eh? stream water were of such a magnitude as to 
force HC&S not to cultivate the 5300 acres that comprise the West Maui Fields, 
HC&S would not be a viable operation.  But rather than providing an analysis of 
the magnitude of reductions that would lead to that result, HC&S instead outlined 
the consequences if its entire 35,000 acre sugar operations were ended. 
Id. (citations omitted).  Furthermore, “[i]n the absence of any information supporting its 
doomsday scenario, the Commission could not assume that HC&S’s assertions overcame the 
presumption in favor of the public trust resource, the streams of N? Wai ‘Eh?.”  Id. at 6?7. 
405. Id. at 2. 
406. See supra Part V.B.1 (considering the four Indigenous values for contextual legal 
analysis in the context of stream restoration in N? Wai ‘Eh?); Hearings Officer’s Proposed 
D&O, supra note 20, at 83. 
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social welfare conditions for K?naka Maoli in particular.407 
In addition, the hearings officer grasped that, although requiring 
HC&S to continue to utilize its “primary source” of irrigation water that 
it had used without complaint for almost 100 years would impose some 
financial costs, failing to do so would continue to require Hawai‘i’s 
natural resources and Indigenous culture to subsidize HC&S’s private 
commercial business; it would also perpetuate the historical stream 
diversions and resulting conditions imposed by colonizers, their 
descendants, and, now, shareholders.408  The hearings officer considered 
these larger policy concerns in light of the commission’s duty to K?naka 
Maoli, including the fact that “restoration of N? Wai ‘Eh? waters is of 
importance for traditional and customary purposes,” and that, “in 
addition to its duty to resolve uncertainty in favor of resource 
protection, the commission has a duty to take feasible actions to 
reasonably protect native Hawaiian rights.”409  In doing so, the hearings 
officer gave meaning to the relevant legal language in ways that were 
consistent with Hawai‘i’s history, current socio-economic conditions, 
and the values of Indigenous self-determination?all of which shaped, 
and to some extent are already reflected in, the law itself.  Although less 
than perfect,410 the hearings officer’s proposed decision better balanced 
the four values of restorative justice for Native Peoples in a manner that 
moved the commission closer to providing na‘au pono for the Hui, its 
allies, and all of Hawai‘i’s people. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The water commission majority highlighted the challenges that it 
faced in N? Wai ‘Eh?: “Mark Twain’s witticism that ‘whiskey is for 
drinking and water is for fighting’ is apropos, given the immense task of 
establishing instream flow standards in regions where there is 
insufficient surface water to meet the cumulative needs of resources and 
uses.”411  But the commission’s ultimate chore in N? Wai ‘Eh? was no 
more difficult or complex than the host of other legal controversies 
 
407. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 1 (acknowledging the importance of Maoli traditional 
and customary rights, including water rights); see also sources cited supra note 243 (detailing 
Maoli social welfare conditions). 
408. Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 128. 
409. Hearings Officer’s Dissent, supra note 23, at 3. 
410. See supra note 367 (highlighting some of the shortcomings of the hearings officer’s 
Proposed Decision and Order). 
411. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 191. 
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around the world that involve Native Peoples’ struggle for self-
determination through varying forms of environmental justice.  And like 
those cases, perhaps the most significant challenge for the water 
commission was to meaningfully consider the rights and interests of 
Indigenous groups, who seek na‘au pono—that deep sense of justice 
people can feel in their gut, in the midst of a political firestorm. 
In N? Wai ‘Eh?, Hawai‘i’s comprehensive legal regime for water 
resource management embodied the necessary factors for the contextual 
legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims.  As detailed herein, state 
constitutional provisions, Hawai‘i’s Water Code, and the common law, 
provide specific protections for the environment and Native rights and 
practices, even though the ultimate expression of those values is broad.  
By employing formalist methodology and minimizing those contextual 
factors, the commission majority took that more general legal language 
and applied it to select facts to generate an outcome that appeared 
minimally plausible, but was ultimately unsustainable on the facts and 
the law. 
By contrast, contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims 
surfaced those necessary factors—particularly K?naka Maoli values and 
interests and the public trust—in a way that breathed new life into 
dormant constitutional and statutory provisions and that was also 
consistent with the law’s initial framing.  This analytical framework was 
critical in illuminating more informed conceptions of water in the law as 
well as unpacking the political and economic influences that shaped how 
rights were actually determined.  In this way, contextual legal analysis of 
Native Peoples’ claims provides a discrete method for ascertaining a 
more just result for Indigenous Peoples and an outcome that is 
consistent with how Hawai‘i law was intended to accommodate 
competing rights and interests. 
Given these complexities, at the outset, Indigenous and other 
advocates must ensure that legal rules acknowledge and embody the key 
values of cultural integrity, lands and other resources, social welfare, 
and self-governance.  In addition, when controversies arise, these same 
communities and groups must rally to ensure that advocates and 
decision-makers employ contextual legal analysis for Native Peoples’ 
claims rather than formalist methodologies.  Advocates must actively 
pursue dual strategies of shaping and enforcing the law.  Otherwise, as 
demonstrated here, even when the law itself embodies contextual 
factors, formalist methods can still be deployed to undermine both those 
values and the larger quest for na‘au pono. 
Contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims, especially in the 
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context of N? Wai ‘Eh?, reveals the promise and potential of the legal 
process, when appropriately linked to community organizing and other 
change agents, to create opportunities for liberation and justice.  
Because even when armed with the protective language of the law, 
contextual legal analysis is necessary to begin to contemplate the deep 
sense of justice that Native Peoples seek.  Without this important tool, 
decision-makers will continue to deploy formalist methodologies to 
subvert Indigenous values and claims in N? Wai ‘Eh? and beyond.  
Contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims, therefore, is vital for 
those pursuing justice through law.  In N? Wai ‘Eh?, the Hui and its 
allies will continue to seek wai through k?n?wai, employing legal and 
other available tools until they are successful in restoring water to 
Hawai‘i’s streams and justice to Maoli communities. 
 
 
 
